# MĀDHVA LOGIC.

BEING AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE PRAMĀṆA-CANDRIKĀ WITH AN INTRODUCTORY OUTLINE OF MĀDHVA PHILOSOPHY AND THE TEXT IN SANSKRIT

Chalāriśeṣācārya.

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# PREFACE

The accredited authority on Mādhva Logic is Jayatīrtha, and his celebrated work, the *Pramāṇapaddhati*, is the authoritative logical text of the Mādhvas. The *Pramāṇacandrikā* is a shorter work and follows the *Pramāṇapaddhati* closely, reproducing the language of the *Paddhati* in many places and acknowledging the *Paddhati* as its authority at the end of every section. The *Candrikā* however has the merit of being a clear presentation both of Mādhva and other rival views. The present translation, it is hoped, will give a clear idea of Mādhva logical theory and its points of agreement and disagreement with the theories of other schools. The Introduction which gives an outline of Mādhva Philosophy will also be of use in understanding and correctly appraising the Mādhva viewpoint.

Jayatīrtha is supposed to have flourised towards the middle of the fourteenth century. According to one estimate he must be placed between 1317 A.D. and 1380 A.D. Since the author of the *Candrikā* refers throughout to Jayatīrtha's *Paddhati* as his source-book, and always with profound respect, he may be taken to be one of Jayatīrtha's younger contemporaries.

He must therefore have flourished either at the latter half of the 14th or the beginning of the 15th century.

My sincerest thanks are due to my colleague, Dr. Satcowrie Mookerjee, for seeing the Sanskrit text through the Press. He has however departed from the original Mādhva Vilāsa edition (now out of print) in two respects. In the first place, he has divided the work into chapters—an evident improvement in form. Secondly, he has changed the text itself in some places. As I am unable to accept the correctness of *all* the changes he has made, some of the passages as they occur in the original Mādhva Vilāsa edition appearing to me to be quite in order, I leave the whole matter to the judgment of my readers.

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# INTRODUCTION

Mādhva philosophy is the conceptual formulation of the religious attitude of devotion or Bhakti and rests on the idea of an essential distinction between the devotee and the object of his worship. As the philosophic interpretation of the Vedanta teachings it is therefore not merely revolutionary but also heretical. Its dualistic metaphysics and its conception of the Lord as the efficient and not the material cause of the world are a direct negation of the monism of the Upanishadic teachings. It has thus been repudiated by Vedantists themselves as a gross caricature of the Vedanta doctrines, particularly by the Sankarite Advaitins who reject even qualified non-dualism as inconsistent with Vedantic Absolutism. Mādhvaism thus stands to orthodox Vedantism as Sufism does to Islamic Monotheism. If pantheistic Sufism is the worst heresy of Islamism, no less is Mādhva Theism as an interpretation of Vedanta monism.

The central conception in the Mādhva metaphysics is the idea of an eternal and unsurmountable gap between the Lord and the world of inanimate objects and sentient souls. The Lord is the highest reality and has independent being. The world and the individual souls are

all dependent on the Lord, but are not existentially one with Him. The Lord thus is the efficient and not the material cause of the world (*cf.* Nyāya). The world depends on the Lord, but also has being outside Him. So also have the *jīvas* or individual souls who are subservient to the Lord and are his eternal servants. Thus the distinctions between the Lord and the world and between the Lord and sentient souls are not merely essential but also eternal.

The main points of the Mādhva Philosophy are summarised in a Sanskrit sloka the purport of which we give here in English:—

The Lord (*Hari*) is the highest reality (*paratattva*). The world is real. Difference is real. Individual souls are the servants of the Lord (*Hareranucarāh*). They are distinguished by superior and inferior excellences. Liberation is the experience of untainted innate bliss. *Bhakti* or devotion together with the Lord's grace is the means to liberation. Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony are the sources of knowledge. In regard to the Lord the Vedas are the sole evidence. The Vedas are eternal and impersonal.

The above clearly brings out the wide divergence of the Mādhva and the Sankarite views. For the Sankarite the world is a false appearance in the Absolute and is devoid of strict reality. For the Mādhvas the world has reality, though not the self-dependent reality of the Lord. For



the Sankarites, distinction is an indescribable false appearance in the undifferenced reality of the Absolute. Hence the distinctive reality of the world is an eternally cancelled appearance in Brahman. For the Mādhvas, distinction is not only real but also eternal. Hence the five distinctions between the Lord and the inanimate world, between the Lord and the individual souls, between one individual soul and another, between one inanimate object and another and between an individual soul and an inanimate object are both real and eternal.

This brings us to the Mādhva view of the nature and constitution of the world and its scheme of the *padārthas* or knowables. Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who recognise seven kinds of knowables, the Bhāttas who recognise five (the seven of the Nyāya-vaisesikas *minus visesa* and *samavāya*) and the Prābhākaras who recognise eight [five of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas barring *abhāva* and *viśeṣa*, *plus samkhyā* (number), *sādṛśya* (similarity) and *Śakti* (potency)], the Mādhvas recognise ten kinds of *padārthas*, *viz.*, (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) action, (4) generality, (5) individuality, (6) the qualified substantive (*visista*), (7) the composite whole (*amsī*), (8) Power or *Śakti*, (9) Similarity and (10) Absence or Negation.

Of these, substances are of twenty different kinds and comprise (1) The Supreme Soul or the

Lord, (2) *Lakṣmī*, the Lord's consort, (3) Individual Souls, (4) Unchanging Ākāśa which is the same thing as space, (5) Primordial Nature (*Prakṛti*), (6) The Three *Guṇas*, (7) *Mahat* or the Great Principle, (8) *Ahaṃkāra* or The Principle of Egoity, (9) Understanding (*Buddhi*), (10) Mind, (11) The Senses, (12) The Infra-sensibles (*mātrā*), (13) The Elements, (14) The Universe, (15) Nescience (*Avidyā*), (16) The Alphabetical Sounds, (17) Darkness, (18) Residual Traces and Dispositions, (19) Time, (20) Reflection (*Pratibimba*).

Qualities again are of 41 different kinds including the qualities of the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas as well as such other excellences and deficiencies as serenity, steadfastness, gravity of mind, fear, shame, strength, self-restraint, endurance, valour, magnanimity, etc.

Actions again are either moral or non-moral. Moral actions are objects of approval or disapproval. Non-moral action is physical motion.

Generality is either eternal or non-eternal.

Individualities are innumerable and are the bases of all differentiation and distinction.

By a qualified substance is meant a substantive specified by an adjective.

Composite wholes are again either limited in size or of unlimited extent.

*Śakti* or power is of four kinds, *viz.*, inherent power, adventitious power, the power that is



unthinkable, and a word's power of meaning or referring to an object.

Similarities are innumerable and are functions of single objects as determined by their relations to other objects. Thus though a similarity holds between one object and another, it is a function only of one and not of both.

Absence is of four kinds, *viz.*, Antecedent Absence, Emergent Absence, Absolute Absence and Reciprocal Absence. Of these the first are other than the locations they characterise. Not so reciprocal negation. It is the same as its locus, the negation being non-different from the entities which negate each other. Further it is either eternal or non-eternal. As negation of eternal entities it is eternal, as negation of non-eternal entities it is non-eternal. This follows from such negation being non-different from the entities which so negate each other. Absolute negation is the negation of what never, nowhere exists. It is thus the negation of the unreal or the imaginary. Though the entity which it negates is unreal, the negation itself as the absolute absence of the unreal is real. Thus absolute negation is the real absence of the absolutely unreal.

The Mādhva view of the Lord and the individual soul presents many points of contact with, as well as of divergence from, the Nyāya view. As with the Naiyāyikas, the Lord, according to the Mādhvas, is the efficient and not the material cause

of the world. The Lord further is independent, all-pervading and is the subject of such qualities as omniscience, etc. Lakṣmī is the power of the Lord. The *jīva* or individual soul, on the other hand, is atomic (contrast Nyāya), is existentially separate from, though dependent on, the Lord, is ignorant, in bondage, etc. Further the *jīva* stands to the Lord as reflection (*pratibimba*) to the original. Through the knowledge of the Lord the karmic potencies of the *jīva* wear away, and this prepares the way to liberation. *Bhakti* together with the Lord's grace is the cause of Liberation which consists in the experience of pure, inherent bliss. Prakṛti or primordial nature is the cause of bondage and is the root of beginningless nescience. Nescience itself is a positive category and is the source of the two kinds of ignorance, *viz.*, ignorance as regards one's own nature and ignorance as regards the nature of the Lord.

The Mādhva view of the twenty kinds of substance includes, it will be noted, not merely the nine different kinds of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas but also those of the Sāṅkhya Philosophers. Elementary Ākāśa of the Mādhvas, *e.g.*, is the same as the Ākāśa of the Nyāya-Vaiśesikas, while unchanging Ākāśa is only the space or *ḍvik* of the latter reintroduced under a different name. Thus we have all the nine of the latter, *viz.*, the five elements, besides space, time, mind and self. But in addition to these we have also some of the



Sāṅkhya metaphysics. For example, *Prakṛti*, the *Guṇas*, *Buddhi*, *Ahamkāra*, mind, the senses (*indriya*), the infrasensibles (*mātrā* corresponding to *tanmātra*), etc., are all Sāṅkhya *padārthas*. To these of the Nyaya-Vaiśesika substances and the Sāṅkhya *padārthas*, the Mādhvas add some of their own such as *Avidyā* (Nescience), *Pratibimba* (Reflection), the Alphabetical Sounds and Darkness.

As regards *guṇas* as qualities, it will be noted that they are not the same as the three *gunas* which are substances. The *gunas* as qualities are attributes while the three *gunas* are substantive reals. The *gunas* as qualities, it will be further noted, include not only the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika qualities but also many moral attributes of the soul such as serenity, mental gravity, magnanimity, etc. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will regard these latter as compounds of certain primary qualities of the self such as pleasure, pain, attraction, aversion, etc.

The Mādhva classification of actions into moral and the morally indifferent or neutral also shows a clear departure from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas willing is a quality of the soul and not an action—a quality presupposing attraction or aversion as its condition and as such being the object of moral judgment. In Mādhvaism however willing is regarded as a kind of acting and therefore as a species of the genus which includes physical motion as well.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of generality is also

similarly modified by the Mādhvas. The Naiyāyikas consider *nityatva* or eternality to be part of the definition of 'generality,' so that a 'generality' which is not *nitya* is no generality. The Mādhvas reject this view and subscribe to the conception of *nitya* and *anitya* generalities. Thus Brahminhood, manhood, etc., are non-eternal generalities, since their individual substrates are non-eternal. A man may become a Brahmin through the practice of penance and self-mortification just as contrariwise one may lose Brahminhood through misdeeds. So also manhood may be lost in a subsequent birth, it being possible for a man to be reborn as an animal in a subsequent rebirth. Thus we must suppose non-eternal generalities in such cases. But a generality like that of individual self-hood (*jīvatva*) is eternal, for no *jīva* ever ceases to be.

And what is true of generality also holds of particularity. Here also we must recognise, according to Mādhvas, both eternal and non-eternal particularities. Thus the particularity of an eternal spirit like the Lord is itself eternal, while the particularity of a non-eternal thing like a jar is non-eternal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas will say that the particularity of a non-eternal thing being due to the particularities of their eternal constituents, no separate particularity for the whole as a compound need be assumed. But this view does not appeal to the Mādhvas.

In place of the *samavāya* relation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, again, the Mādhvas will have the two *padārthas* of the *viśiṣṭa* or qualified substantive and the *amśī* or composite whole. These two between themselves comprise, according to the Mādhvas, every case of the so-called constitutive relation of *samavāya*.



*Śakti*, power, and *Sādṛśya*, similarity, are not admitted as distinct *padārthas* by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. They are however recognised as such by the Prābhākara Mimāmsakas and the Mādhvas agree with the Prābhākaras in this respect. *Śakti*, however, according to Mādhvas, includes, besides the power in words to refer to their meanings or objects, the unthinkable power which exists in the Lord alone in its completeness and only partially and in different degrees in other beings, the adventitious power which is generated in an idol or image through the inspiring influence of the worshipper's devotion and the inherent or innate powers of things. Similarity again is eternal or non-eternal like generality and particularity. Thus the similarity of *jīvas* or individual souls and other eternal substances such as the Lord is eternal, but the similarity of non-eternal things like jars, cloths, etc., is itself non-eternal.

As regards *Abhāva* or Absence, the Mādhvas hold that it has reality though the *pratiyogi* or counter-entity of the absence in some cases is *asat* or unreal (*e.g.*, in absolute absence). For the Naiyāyikas however *Abhāva* has *padārthatva*

or objectivity but not *sattva* or reality. *Abhāva* presupposes reality (*bhāva*) being adjectival to it, but is not itself reality. Thus reality (*bhāvatva*) appertains to the six positives or *bhāva-padārthas*, the first three (substance, quality and action) being real through the universal of being inhering in them (*sattāyogena sat*) while the second three (generality, particularity and inherence) being real through relation to that in which reality inheres (*ekārtha-samavāya*). For the Mādhvas however, 'absence' or negation is a form of sattva or reality just as is 'presence.' According to them, *padārthas* include both the real and the unreal, the latter being a *padārtha* or knowable without reality (*e.g.*, sky-flower, hare's horn, etc.). Reality again is either independent or dependent reality, the former being the Lord Himself and the latter including all positives (*bhāvāh*) and all negatives (*abhāvāh*) other than the Lord. Thus negation, according to the Mādhvas, is a form of dependent reality though the entity negated in the case of absolute negation is the unreal or the imaginary. The Mādhva, the Sankara-Vedanta and the Nāya-Vaiśeṣika views of absence thus present many interesting points of agreement and difference. For the Sankarites 'absence' has objectivity like its opposite 'presence' and as such presupposes the reality of the consciousness in which it appears. It however does not affect the latter just as the snake-appearance does not affect the nature of the rope



which is its substrate. Thus absence as objective appearance presupposes a substrate of reality but is not adjectival to the latter. For the Naiyāyikas however absence as objective not merely presupposes reality but also determines or characterises it. Hence absence though itself not a form of positivity yet both presupposes and infects the latter. For the Mādhvas however 'absence' is itself a kind of dependent reality to be distinguished from the kinds which positively fill experience.

We shall now close our survey of the Mādhva Philosophy with a brief statement of the distinctive features of the Mādhva Logic.

*Pramāṇa*, according to the Mādhvas, is either *kevalapramāṇa* or *Anupramāṇa*. *Kevalapramāṇa* is the knowledge which has *prāmāṇya* through itself as valid knowledge of objects. *Anupramāṇa* is *pramāṇa* as the conditioning process or activity which gives rise to self-validating knowledge. Thus *kevalapramāṇa* is *pramā* or valid knowledge regarded as being its own *pramāṇa* or evidence (*cf.* Rāmānuja, Prabhākara), while *Anupramāṇa* is evidence through conditioning or causing the resulting self-evidencing knowledge.

*Anupramāṇas* are of three kinds, *viz.*, Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony.

Of these, Perception is of seven kinds, *viz.*, the five kinds of external perception by the external senses, internal perception by the mind and perception through the Witnessing Intelligence

which is the seventh kind of Perception. *Smṛti*, **Recollection**, is a form of internal perception: it is an immediate presentation of the past through the instrumentality of the mind. The impressions or residual traces of the past experience are the connecting link between the past experience and the present mental function. The recollection is the insertion of the past into the present (*cf.* Bergson).

The Mādhva view of witnessing knowledge (*Śakṣijñāna*) as a form of perception is peculiar. The knower itself acting as an instrument of knowledge is the Śakṣī or Witnessing Intelligence, and the knowledge which results through the instrumentality of the latter is perception. The objects of such perception include the intrinsic nature of the self, the self's properties or attributes such as pleasure, etc., *avidyā* or nescience, the functions of the mind such as the cognitions of the external sense (which are also cognised by the mind), pleasure, pain, etc. Thus what other schools will regard as objects of internal perception are here regarded as being perceptions of the witnessing subject. But as perceptions such witnessing cognitions will be generated events and will thus lack the timelessness involved in the witnessing consciousness of temporal mental events as temporal. This is why Śankarites deny that the witnessing consciousness is a kind of ***pratyakṣa*** or perception. According to Śankarites



it is primary (*anubhutirūpa*) but is not a generated cognition being *nitya* or timeless.

As regards *inference*, the Mādhvas hold that the *vyāpti* which mediates inferential reasoning may be one of four kinds, *viz.*, *samavyāpti* (a symmetrical invariable relation—corresponding to Hamilton's *U* propositions), *viṣamavyāpti* (an asymmetrical invariable relation—corresponding to *A* propositions), of the form of mutual exclusion or *parasparaparihāra* (corresponding to *E* propositions), or *parasparasamāveśa*, mutual overlapping, along with *parasparaparihāra*, mutual exclusion [answering at once to the three propositions, (*i*) In some case at least where A is, B also is, (*ii*) In some case at least where A is, B is not, and (*iii*) In some case at least, where B is, A is not. The relation, *e.g.*, between 'being a male' and 'being a cook' illustrates this form.] Further, according to the Mādhvas, co-presence of the *probans* (*hetu*) and the *probandum* (*sādhya*) either temporally or spatially is not necessary for valid inference. Hence the existence of the *probans* in the subject of the inference need not be always insisted on. When, *e.g.*, one infers rain on the top of the hill from the perception of the fullness of the rivers at the base, the mark or *hetu* is the "fullness of rivers," and that which is inferred by means of this mark, *i.e.*, the *sādhya* or *probandum*, is "rain." But the place or locus where 'rain' is inferred, *i.e.*, the *pakṣa* or subject

of the inference is the hill-top, while the mark or *hetu*, *viz.*, 'fullness of rivers,' is observed not on the hill-top but at the base of the hill. Hence the Mādhvas conclude, what is necessary for producing valid inference is not the observed copresence of *probans* and *probandum*, nor the observed existence of the *probans* in the inferential subject, but observation of the mark in any suitable place and time (*samucitadeśādivṛtti*). The mark in the above inference exists in the present time while what is inferred therefrom, *viz.*, 'rain' belongs to the past. Similarly the mark is observed at the base while the rain which is inferred belongs to the hill-top.

It may be pointed out however that this is no innovation of the Mādhvas and cannot be regarded as one of the Mādhva contributions to logical theory. The point was anticipated by the Mimāmsakas long before the Mādhvas. Pārthasārathi in the "Nyāyaratnamālā" discussing the nature of *vyāpti* rejects the view that as a condition of inference it implies the copresence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* as an indispensable condition. Smoke, *e.g.*, which is rising up in the sky above proves fire not in the sky above but on the ground below. What is necessary therefore for inference is not spatial or temporal copresence of *hetu* and *sādhya* but simply fixed relation or *niyama* between them. Thus the way in which a thing is cognised in fixed relation to something else, in that way



does it produce the cognition of its correlative when cognised again (*cf.* "Nyāyaratnamāla" p. 57, Chowkhamba edition, 1900). The so-called Mādhva contribution in this respect is therefore nothing but a re-statement of the Mimāmsaka view.

The Mādhva rejection of *vyatirekivyāpti* as a condition of inference is also no innovation of the Mādhvas. The same view is also taken both by Mimāmsakas and Sankarites long before the Mādhvas, and the Mādhva view in this respect is only a reproduction of earlier views. The Mādhvas however may legitimately claim their classification of inference to be an improvement on earlier logic. Thus, according to them, inference is either from cause to effect or from effect to cause or from one thing to another not related to it as cause or effect. For the Buddhist such non-causal relation is nothing but the relation of co-essentiality between genus and species (*tādātmya*). But Naiyāyikas hold that there are other such relations besides co-essentiality. The Mādhva view of non-causal inferences combines in itself both the Buddhist and the Nyāya view-points and has thus the merit of being a simplified solution of the different issues.

As regards *Āgama*, or authoritative verbal testimony, the Mādhvas hold that it is both personal and impersonal. Thus the Vedas are authoritative evidence though devoid of a personal source. But so also are the personal communications

recorded in the Mahābhārata and other sacred works. In connection with Āgama, the Mādhvas discuss the question whether words mean common characters or denote individuals, and the Mādhvas decide for the dual character of the objective reference with the reservation however that in the case of nouns or substantives the primary reference is to an individual or individuals, while in the case of adjectives, verbs, etc., it is some attribute or character that is primarily meant. The psychology of learning word-meanings is also discussed by the Mādhvas in this connection, and the view which they advocate in this respect is that the process of learning word-meanings consists in a course of parental guidance by means of uttered words accompanied by gesture-indications of the objects meant. The Mādhvas reject the Nyāya view of naming as a process of *upamāna* based on the instruction of elders.

In regard to validity and its opposite invalidity, the Mādhvas hold independent views though apparently agreeing with the Mimāmsaka theory of intrinsic validity and extrinsic invalidity. Thus intrinsic validity, the Mādhvas argue, is intrinsicality in respect of *utpatti* (origination) or intrinsicality in respect of subjective acceptance or recognition (*jñapti*). Intrinsicality in respect of origin means that the validity arises from the same conditions as the cognition itself which it characterises. And intrinsicality in respect of



subjective recognition means that the agency that cognises the cognition is also the agency that cognises the validity of the cognition. Now as regards intrinsicality in respect of origin, the Mādhvas agree with the Mimāmsakas and reject the Nyāya view of an additional efficiency in the causal conditions as a condition of the validity of the valid cognition. As regadrs subjective recognition of the validity, the Mādhvas hold however that intrinsicality here arises from the fact that the witnessing Intelligence that cognises the cognition is also the agency that cognises the validity. This is a clear departure from the Mimāmsā view, according to the Mimāmsakas (Bhāttas) neither the cognition nor its validity being cognised by any witnessing Intelligence, both being cognised inferentially by the self from the mark of knowness in the object. As regards invalidity again, the extrinsicality in respect of *origin* consists, according to Mādhvas, in its arising from the presence of certain defects in addition to the conditions of cognition, while extrinsicality in respect of invalidation or subjective rejection consists in the cognition itself being cognised by one agency, *viz.*, the Witnessing Intelligence, and its invalidity being cognised otherwise, *i.e.*, inferentially from the mark of its practical failure. This also is an evident departure from the ordinary Mimāmsā view according to which invalidation comes either through

[illegible] of defects in the causal conditions [illegible] the consciousness of discrepancy with [illegible] experiences.

[illegible] may be added here that the Mādhva theory of [illegible] comes nearer the Buddhist than the Nyāya or Śankara-Vedanta views. Thus the Mādhvas reduce the false to the level of the imaginary and the unreal so that what the illusory experience apprehends is an absolute nought and not any elsewhere, elsewhen reality (as Naiyāyikas say), nor any indescribable positivity without reality (as Sankarites say). Further, correction as absolute negation is the cancellation or rejection of this absolute unreality. Thus absolute negation is the negation of a sheer nothing and not that of an elsewhere, elsewhen real something as Naiyāyikas say. For the Naiyāyikas negation is always the exclusion of a real something from some real locus so that a negation of the unreal is sheer non-sense. The Judgment: "The square-circle is not" is, according to Naiyāyikas, equivalent to the Judgment: "The square is not a circle," though expressed differently. For the Mādhvas however the object of absolute negation is the unreal or the imaginary so that the Judgment does not assert the exclusion of circle from square (as Naiyāyikas say) but expresses the absolute unreality of a square which is a circle as well.

# MĀDHVA LOGIC

## ENGLISH TRANSLATION

## OF THE

## PRAMĀṆACANDRIKĀ

### PART I

Reverence to the God with the Horse's neck, the God who has Lakṣmī as his consort and who incarnated Himself in Rāma—the God of Hanumāna, in Kṛṣṇa—the God of Bhīma, and in Vedavyāsa—the God of Mādhva. Oṃ Hari.

Having touched the lotus-feet of the Lord of Lakṣmī and also those of my Guru or Preceptor, I proceed to write this '*Pramāṇacandrikā*' for the easy comprehension (even) of young, immature learners.

Everybody on this earth desires that happiness alone shall be his lot and that not even the smallest unhappiness shall ever mar his life. This is the *mokṣa* or liberation that is sought by all. Since this freedom or liberation comes only from the knowledge of the absoluteness and independence

of the Lord and the dependence or subservience of everything else, it behoves every seeker of this freedom (*mokṣa*) to understand all things in this way as being essentially subservient to or dependent on the power of the Lord who is independent and absolute. Thus the commentator observes, he that realises all these that are dependent as being subject to the control of the Lord becomes liberated from the bonds of the empirical life. The knowledge of the dependent and the independent however comes from valid cognition and this is the reason why this particular treatise has been undertaken with the object of ascertaining the nature of valid cognition. Even though the master Jayatīrtha has elaborately expounded the distinguishing marks of valid cognition and the rest in such works as the *Paddhati*, etc. (*Pramāṇapaddhati*), yet, inasmuch as these works are not easily intelligible to persons of feeble intelligence on account of the deep and thoughtful language in which they are expressed, this treatise has been undertaken with a view to make the doctrines intelligible to these readers of average intelligence. And thus this undertaking is not superfluous even though it discusses most of the topics already discussed in these other works and gives besides a brief account of some of the objects of valid cognition as well.

Since the (scientific) knowledge of Pramāṇa and other allied things presupposes the trio of



statement (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*) and examination (*parīkṣā*), the definition of statement and the rest is therefore first of all set forth.

*Uddeśa* is the statement or verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only. In this definition the word '*uddeśa*' stands for what is defined and the rest constitutes its definition, *viz.*, the words 'verbal indication of the subject-matter by means of its name only.' This procedure (in regard to the thing defined and the definition thereof) will also be observed in all other cases (of definition) that will come up later on. If we say that a sound as such is a verbal indication, the babbling sound of the Ganges will rank as a verbal indication and thus our definition will be too wide. To exclude such cases we include the word *indication* in our definition. A verbal indication implies indication by alphabetical sounds (and not by sounds as such which may include non-alphabetical sounds such as the babble of a river). But if we stop here and say that an alphabetical sound as such is a verbal indication, the alphabetical sounds 'the son of a barren woman' should pass as a verbal indication. Hence to exclude such nonsensical combinations of alphabetical sounds the word 'subject-matter' (in 'indication of the subject-matter') has been included in the definition. (The words 'son of a barren woman' are not indicative of anything and therefore indicate no

subject-matter.) But if we stop here and accept 'verbal indication of the subject-matter' as a logically complete definition (of *uddeśa*), the 'caw' 'caw' of the crow will pass as a statement or *Uddeśa*. (The 'caw' 'caw' of the crow is a combination of alphabetical sounds and it also indicates something that really exists, *viz.*, the crow's voice.) Hence the words 'by the name' in the definition which mean 'by the words of the sacred language.' Even so, the definition is too wide applying as it does to a sentence like 'The earth has the character of smell' which amounts to a definition (and not to a verbal indication of the subject-matter only). To exclude such cases, the word 'only' has been added (in 'by the name *only*'). The meaning is: the name which indicates the subject-matter in a statement is not used with a view to bring out the distinguishing marks of the subject-matter. (The name is used only to indicate the subject-matter and not to define it.) In the case of the sentence 'The earth has the quality of smell' which amounts to a definition, though the subject-matter is indicated by means of the words (names) of the sacred language, yet, since the words have not been selected without reference to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter, the sentence cannot rank as a mere statement. Hence our definition of statement (as given above) is not too wide. Hence we conclude: a



statement consists in the indication of a subject-matter by means of such words (names) of the Sanskrit language as do not refer to the marks which distinguish or define the subject-matter in question.

Some hold that the word 'only' has been added (in the above definition of *Uddeśa*) with a view to exclude only such definitions as 'The earth has the quality of smell.' For (according to them) an *Uddeśa* is a statement of the subject-matter without reference to its specifying or uncommon properties. Thus in the sentence (which is, in effect, a definition) 'The earth has the quality of smell,' since the subject-matter is indicated by reference to an uncommon property, *viz.*, the possession of odour, the condition of indication of the subject-matter without reference to any uncommon property of it is wanting, and thus our definition (as not applying to it) is not too wide. It cannot be said that in the case of the earth and other things, statements in this sense are impossible in so far as such statements will have to indicate their respective subject-matters through the uncommon properties of earthiness and the rest that distinguish them. For what is meant (by a verbal indication without reference to the uncommon properties of the subject-matter) is merely that the statement should not contain any reference to distinctive or uncommon properties other than those

that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question.

This however is not a correct interpretation of our definition, for the definition as thus interpreted will apply to sentences which are in the nature of definitions such as 'The earth has the property of earthiness' and thus will be too wide. ('The earth has the property of earthiness' is a verbal definition and not a statement of a subject-matter.) The sentence 'the earth has the property of earthiness' indicates a subject-matter (*viz.*, the earth) without reference to any uncommon properties other than those that constitute the bare property of being the subject-matter in question (*i.e.*, the property of earthiness).

(Having explained the nature of *Uddeśa*, we now proceed to define *Lakṣaṇa* or definition.)

A defining mark (*lakṣaṇa*) is an attribute that exists only in the thing defined (and not in anything else). This means that a defining mark is an attribute that exists in every instance of the thing defined and does not exist in anything else. Thus in the case of the cow, the 'possession of a dewlap' serves as a defining mark as it exists only in (all) animals that are cows and does not exist in animals that are not cows.

If we say that an attribute as such is a defining mark, the 'possession of undivided hoofs' will pass as a definition (of the cow) and thus



our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Possession of undivided hoofs is an attribute, but it is not an attribute of the cow which has cloven hoofs.) Hence we insist on the *existence* of the attribute in the thing defined.

If we stop here and rest content with saying that a defining mark is an attribute that exists in the thing defined, then the 'possession of mixed colour' will pass as a definition of the cow and thus our definition of a defining mark will be too wide. (Mixed colour exists in some cows but not in all cows and therefore cannot be a definition of the cow.) To exclude such attributes (as do not exist in every instance of the thing defined) we say the attribute (that is, a defining mark) must exist in every instance of the thing defined.

But this also does not suffice, for 'possession of horns' may pass as a defining mark (of the cow) as thus interpreted and thus our definition becomes too wide. (Possession of horns cannot be a defining mark of the cow, for though this attribute may exist in every instance of a cow, yet it exists also in other animals such as the goat, the dear, etc.) To exclude such attributes (as exist both in the thing defined as well as other things) we say the attribute (that is, a defining mark) must exist *only* in (all) the instances of the thing defined (and in nothing else).

What, then, is the purpose or end (*prayojana*) subserved by the knowledge of a defining mark? The purpose or end subserved by the knowledge of a defining mark is the differentiation of the thing defined from all other things of a homogeneous or heterogeneous nature as also the correct use of terms (without a too wide or too narrow meaning). A thing is said to be homogeneous (*sajātīya*) with the thing defined when it is specified by the next higher class that subsumes the defined thing under itself. (This means that the homogeneous is a species co-ordinate with the thing defined and subsumed under the same immediately higher genus.) A thing is said to be heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) with the thing defined when it is not specified by the immediately higher genus that subsumes under itself the character of the thing defined. Thus in the definition of the 'cow,' 'the essence of being a cow' or 'cow-ness' constitutes the character of the thing defined. The immediately higher genus comprehending this character (of 'cowness') is 'animality.' Therefore the horse and other animals which are characterised by this generic character of animality are homogeneous (*sajātīya*) with the 'cow.' (Contrarywise,) the jar and other things which are non-characterised by this generic character (of 'animality') are heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) with the 'cow.' By 'an immediately higher genus' or 'next higher genus' is meant a genus which while not including any higher class inclusive of the thing defined is yet inclusive of the thing defined. Thus in the example of 'animality,' since the class of animals is inclusive of the class of cows without including the class of material objects which also includes the class of cows, the animal-class must be understood as the immediately higher genus in relation to the cow-class. These considerations (concerning the nature of the next higher genus) leave no room for the objection that all things being included under one all-inclusive class, *viz.*, the class of knowables and the like, are all homogeneous with one another and that therefore there is no real heterogeneity anywhere. (Since all things come under a common all-inclusive class, *viz.*, the class of knowables, they must all be said to be of the same class or genus, *i.e.*, homogeneous. How then can you sensibly talk of the heterogeneous and of one thing being heterogeneous with another? The answer to this objection is furnished by the definitions we have given above of the homogeneous and the heterogeneous as based on the concept of the next higher genus. When a thing is included under the next higher genus or class of the thing defined, it is said to be homogeneous with the thing defined. When a thing is not so included, it is said to be heterogeneous.) In this way in all other defini-

tions the homogeneous and the rest are to be understood.

(Having explained the nature of a valid logical definition, we shall now proceed to explain what constitutes the opposite, *i.e.*, an invalid definition or non-definition.)

An invalid definition or non-definition is the negation of a logically valid definition. Hence it is the negation of "that which, existing in every instance of the thing defined, is non-existent in things other than the instances of the thing defined." As a negation, it is of the nature of a negation of a qualified thing. A qualified negation or a negation negating a qualified thing may be of three kinds, *viz.*, (*a*) a qualified negation negating the thing qualified, (*b*) a qualified negation negating the qualification of the thing, (*c*) a qualified negation negating both the thing qualified and the qualification of it. (An invalid definition is a qualified negation, because it is the negation of a valid definition which consists of a substantive and an adjectival part, the substantive portion being 'that which is non-existent in other things' and the adjective qualifying it being 'while existing in every instance of the thing defined.' Thus a non-definition, as being the negation of this substantive qualified by the adjectival portion, is a qualified negation.) Thus the non-definition



"The cow is an animal possessing horns" is a qualified negation negating the substantive part of a valid logical definition. (It negates the condition that 'the defining mark must not exist in anything other than an instance of the thing defined.' 'Possession of horns' is existent also in animals which are not cows.) Again the non-definition 'The cow is an animal possessing mixed colour' is a qualified negation negating the qualification (that characterises a valid definition). (The qualification 'existing in every instance of the thing defined' is negated in this case as every cow does not possess mixed colour.) Lastly, the non-definition 'The cow is an animal possessing undivided hoofs' illustrates a qualified negation negating the substantive as well as the adjectival part of a valid definition. ('Possession of undivided hoofs' is present in animals that are not cows and absent in cows. Thus it negates the substantive 'absence from other things' and also the adjective 'existing in every case of the thing defined.')

(Having explained the nature of a logical definition and its opposite, we shall now proceed to explain the nature of *parīkṣā* or examination.)

Examination or sifting of evidence (*parīkṣā*) is mentally reflecting on the cogency or otherwise (of the evidence that has been adduced). Too wide use (*ativyāpti*) consists in the use of a defining mark that exists in things

other than the thing defined. Too narrow use (*avyāpti*) consists in the use of a defining mark that does not exist in a part of the extent (*i.e.*, in some instances) of the thing defined. Absurdity (*asambhava*) consists in the use of a property as a defining mark that does not exist in any instance of the thing defined. That which is defined by the defining mark is called the *lakṣya* or thing defined.

(Let us now proceed to define the subject-matter of this work, *viz.*, *Pramāṇa.*) *Pramāṇa* as such (*i.e.*, *pramāṇa* in general as distinguished from any particular kind of *pramāṇa*) may therefore be first of all defined here. *Pramāṇa* (we hold) is that which agrees with the nature of the object (known). This means that the essence of *pramāṇa* consists in making the cognitum an object (of cognition) in the form in which it actually exists. There are many things to be said here, but as this treatise is meant for young learners and as (more) intelligent people may know all these from the work called the *Paddhati*, therefore they are not mentioned here.* The same observations hold

* The *Pramāṇapaddhati* observes that *pramāṇa* is here so defined as to apply both to the cognitive process and the knowledge that results therefrom. The cognitive process conduces to the apprehension of the cognitum as it actually exists and is called *Anupramāṇa*. The resulting knowledge also apprehends the cognitum as it actually exists and is called *kevalapramāṇa*.

(*Pramāṇapaddhati*, Mādhva Vilāsa Edition, p. 9.)



also in respect of other matters that will come up later on (in this treatise).

In the above definition of *Pramāṇa*, since the property of apprehending the object is common to valid as well as doubtful and erroneous cognitions, the qualification 'in the form in which it actually exists' has been included. If we had defined *Pramāṇa* merely as that which abides in the form in which it actually exists, then our definition would apply also to the cogniser and the cognitum (since these also abide in the form in which they actually exist), and thus will be too wide. Therefore we say: it must apprehend the cognitum as well (and not merely that it should abide in the form in which it actually exists). Here 'apprehending the cognitum' means 'apprehending the cognitum immediately as well as mediately' (through the help of a cognitive process). Hence our definition as applying also to the cognitive processes of perception and the rest (as also to the knowledge that results therefrom) cannot be said to be too narrow. Nor can this be said to be an illegitimate extension of the meaning of the term *Pramāṇa*, for such extension is quite unexceptionable (inasmuch as the term *Pramāṇa* is, as a matter of fact, used in both the above two senses of the cognitive processes and the resulting knowledge).

The subject who cognises a valid cognition

is called the *cogniser* or knower. The object that is cognised by a valid cognition is called the *cognitum* or object known. Knowledge of the object as it actually exists is called valid knowledge or valid cognition. If valid knowledge were not defined as a form of knowledge, our definition would be too wide as applying also to the processes which are only instrumental in the production of valid knowledge.* Similarly, if valid knowledge were not defined as apprehension of the object *as it actually exists*, our definition would also be too wide as applying to doubtful cognitions and the rest.

What, then, is the essence of a doubtful cognition (*saṃśaya*)? It may be said that it cannot be said to consist merely in an indefinite apprehension for this amounts to a mutual dependence (a circular definition). Thus (one may argue) in so far as a certain cognition is a definite apprehension the definition of a doubtful cognition as mere indefinite apprehension amounts to a circular definition in asmuch as a certain cognition is the other of a doubtful cognition and a doubtful cog-

* A distinction is drawn between *Pramā*, valid knowledge, and *Pramāṇa*, the instrument of valid knowledge. *Pramāṇa* signifies both the source of the knowledge and the knowledge itself (as correct apprehension of the object). But *Pramā* means the knowledge only and not its instrumental means. Thus *Pramā* must be distinguished from the processes of intellection that bring about the result of valid knowledge, but *Pramāṇa* may be used alike for the cognitive processes and the knowledge that results therefrom.



nition (defined as indefinite apprehension) is likewise the other of a certain cognition. This argument, we hold, is not a sound one. An indefinite apprehension is in reality the correct definition of a doubtful cognition. There is no circle involved in this definition (as is contended by the opponent). For by the term 'indefinite apprehension' is here meant a cognition that appears clothed (bathed) in the numerous mutually incompatible forms that manifest themselves in (float on the surface of) one single thing. If we had defined doubtful cognition as that which is a cognition our definition would be too wide as applying also to the case of the (certain) cognition 'There is a jar here.' Therefore we say 'it must be clothed in many forms.' Even so however our definition would be too wide as applying also to composite or collective cognitions such as the simultaneous cognition of a man and a post, or of a jar, a piece of cloth, a pillar and a pitcher, etc. To exclude such composite (certain) cognitions we say 'there must be one single thing' (in which the different forms are apprehended). But even then our definition remains too wide as applying to cognitions like 'This tree is of the Simśupā species,' 'The jar is a substance,' etc. (In these also there is cognition of different forms in a single thing.) Therefore (to exclude these), we say 'the different forms must be *mutually incompatible.*'

But even so, our definition remains too wide as applying to erroneous cognitions like 'This is silver.' (In the case of the cognition of silver in the locus of a mother of pearl, there are two incompatible forms, *viz.*, the form of mother-of-pearl and the form of silver, and these forms refer to one single thing, *viz.*, the mother-of-pearl, and yet the illusion of silver in the mother-of-pearl is not a doubtful cognition.) To exclude such erroneous cognitions we say (not merely that there should be numerous incompatible forms but also) that, 'the numerous incompatible forms should also manifest themselves as incompatible.' (In the case of the illusion, the form of silver manifests itself while that of mother-of-pearl remains non-manifest to the cogniser.) Thus (since in the doubtful cognition) the different incompatible forms are held also to *present* themselves as incompatible forms (referring to one single thing), our definition is not open to the aforesaid objection (of being too wide).

Some hold that this doubtful cognition arises, with the absence of its solvent as an auxiliary condition, from five different causes, *viz.*, (1) (cognition of) a common character, (2) (cognition of) an uncommon character, (3) (cognition of) contradictory characters (in one and the same thing), (4) positive cognition (of certain objects), and (5) non-cognition (of certain objects). A doubt arising from the perception of a common character is illustrated in the case of the perception of a certain tall stature which is common to a man and a post. The perception of this common character calls forth a simultaneous recollection of the two forms of 'man' and 'post' in the perceiver's mind as the result of which there arises in the latter a desire to ascertain the true nature (of the thing perceived, *i. e.*, a desire to ascertain whether the object perceived is 'a man' or 'a post.') In the absence, however, of perception of the crucial test, *viz.*, the curved hollow which is peculiar to the trunk of a tree or the possession of a head, hands, etc., which is peculiar to a man, there arises a doubt in the form of a mental oscillation (between the two alternatives in the form) 'Is that a man?' 'Or, Is that a post?.' A doubt arising from the cognition of an uncommon character is illustrated in the following case. The cognition that sound is a quality that belongs exclusively to Ether (*Ākāśa*) awakens a doubt, in the absence of a perception of the solvent, as to whether it is an eternal or a non-eternal quality. A doubt arising from the clash of contradictory views is illustrated in the following case. The man who discovers that the Vaiśeṣikas teach that the sensibilities are constituted by the elements but that the Sānkhya teaches that they are not and at the same time

cannot find the means of deciding between the rival views is thrown into doubt as to whether the sensibilities are constituted by the elements or not. A doubt arising from a positive cognition is illustrated in the case of a man who first discovers the underground water in the act of sinking a well. The discovery of the water throws him into a speculative doubt (as to the real source of the water), and he thus enquires, for want of a solvent, as follows: 'Has the action of digging only made manifest the water which has been existent all along but remained non-manifest? Or, has it made the non-existent water start into existence? The following, lastly, illustrates the case of a doubt arising from non-apprehension. The man who learns from hearsay that there lives a ghost in the banyan tree yonder and yet finds none when he comes near the tree is thrown into a mental uncertainty as he does not cognise the solvent. He thus enquires: 'Is the demon not perceived because of its power of making itself invisible? Or, is it unperceived because it does not exist?'

Others hold that positive cognition and non-apprehension (as causes of doubt) being only modalities of the 'common character' (as a cause of doubt), doubtful cognition must be said to have three causes only (and not five as stated above). How is 'positive cognition' to be regarded as a modality of the 'common



character' that is supposed to be a cause of doubt? In this way. There is positive cognition of a jar that exists in a dark place when a lamp is lighted and the surrounding darkness is dispelled thereby. There is also positive cognition of a jar that did not exist previously till the potter has operated on the lump of clay and brought a jar into being. (The positive cognition is thus a character that is common to an existent and a non-existent thing and thus raises doubt as to the existence or non-existence of the object in the mind of the cogniser). How is non-apprehension a modality of the 'common character?' In this way. There is non-apprehension of the existent such as the non-perception of God as well as of the non-existent such as the non-perception of the hair's horn. (Thus non-perception as appertaining alike to the existent and the non-existent raises doubt as to the existence or the opposite of the object non-perceived.)

But the true view is that the so-called 'uncommon character' as well as 'the clash of contradictory views' being really modalities of the 'common character,' there is only one cause of doubtful cognitions, *viz.*, the cognition of a common character.' The way in which these (*viz.*, 'the uncommon character,' 'the clash of doctrines,' etc.) are to be regarded as comprised in the 'common character' should be understood

in the manner they are shown to be so comprised in the work called the 'Paddhati.'

(Having explained the nature of doubt we now proceed to explain the nature of erroneous cognition.)

An error (*viparyaya*) is a cognition consisting in the conscious certitude that a thing exists just where as a matter of fact it does not exist. If we define an error simply as a cognition, our definition will apply also to doubtful cognitions (which are also cognitions), and thus will be too wide. Hence we define error as a cognition which amounts to a certain knowledge or conviction. This excludes the cases of doubtful and uncertain cognitions. But since valid cognition is also as much self-confident as invalid cognition or error, we define error as a cognition that apprehends a thing where in reality the thing does not exist. This distinguishes an error or invalid cognition from valid cognition and thus our definition is not too wide. But even thus our definition fails to exclude the cases of doubtful cognitions. A doubtful cognition (though lacking in certitude or decisiveness) also apprehends a thing where it does not exist. Hence we say, an error is a *certain* cognition. Even thus however our definition remains faulty as applying to the case of valid cognitions as well, *e.g.*, the cognition, 'the tree is in contact with the monkey.'



The contact does not exist in all parts of the tree. (Therefore contact is asserted in respect of an object which is devoid of contact in some of its parts). Hence we insist on the word *just* in our definition, *i.e.*, we say an error cognises a thing *just* where the thing does not exist. Such errors arise from faulty perceptions, fallacious reasonings and defects of verbal communications. The illusion of silver in the locus of a mother-of-pearl is an illustration of error arising from faulty perception. An error of reasoning is illustrated in the case of the man who under the influence of blinding dust imagines he perceives smoke and on the basis of the illusory smoke infers the existence of fire in a place where fire does not exist. Similarly, when on the strength of the lying report of an untrustworthy man one believes that there are five different fruits lying on the banks of a neighbouring river, we have a case of an error arising from a faulty verbal communication.

An objection however may be raised here. We have defined *Pramāṇa* as consisting in making the object of cognition to be cognised in the form in which it exists (actually). Butthe definition may be objected to as being too wide applying as it does to the case of 'memory' also (which is not usually recognised as a *Pramāṇa*). Our reply is: this is not so, for scripture testifies to the fact that 'memory,' 'perception,' 'tradition'

and 'inference' are to be regarded as the *pramāṇas* or valid sources of knowledge in regard to such things as (*dharma*) merit and the like, by all those who desire liberation. Thus we have the testimony of scripture showing that memory is a form of valid knowing.

Some philosophers define *pramāṇa* as the *karaṇa* or instrumental cause of *pramā* or valid cognition. An instrument *as such* (according to them) is not a *pramāṇa*, otherwise any instrument such as an axe would rank as *pramāṇa*. Hence the definition of *pramāṇa* as an instrument of *valid cognition* (and not as a mere instrument). Similarly the epithet 'valid' is also necessary as without it the definition would apply to non-valid and erroneous cognition and thus be too wide. Lastly, the word instrument is also necessary as without it the definition would tantamount to an absurdity and also be too wide as applying to the consequence or result that follows from the instrumentality of valid knowing.

We however do not accept the above view as we consider the definition too narrow as not applying to the result of valid knowing. (Our view is that the word *pramāṇa* signifies the knowing act as well as the result of knowledge that arises therefrom.)

Others define *pramāṇa* as that which is pervaded by *pramā* or valid knowledge.



This also is not a tenable position. Every knowable object is validly cognised by the Lord. Hence every knowable such as the jar and the like is pervaded by the Lord's valid knowledge. Thus every knowable answers to the above definition of *pramāṇa* or valid knowing as that which is pervaded by valid knowledge. Thus the definition is too wide as applying to knowables (and not merely to knowing acts).

With a view to escape from the above difficulty, others modify the above definition as follows :—*Pramāṇa* is that which being either a substrate or an instrument is at the same time pervaded by valid knowledge.

Even thus however the definition is not faultless. The mention of the word 'substrate' in the definition is without rhyme or reason. Even granting that the Lord is regarded as a standard of validity, it cannot be said that this in itself is a sufficient reason for introducing the word 'substrate' in the definition. For the word *pramāṇa* is derived by means of the suffix *lyut*, and, according to the rules of grammar, the suffix *lyut* applies only to the instrumental, the locative and the nominative absolute. There is no rule for its application to a nominative as such, *i.e.* (as in the present case), to the agent, nominative or subject of valid knowing. (The Lord is regarded as the standard of valid knowing only as the absolute knower, *i.e.*, as the *agent or*

*subject* of absolute knowledge and not as its substrate or instrument.)

It may be argued that even though the Lord as knower is the subject of knowledge, yet He also is the substrate or locus of such knowledge, and thus may very well be the meaning of the word *pramāṇa*. But even this argument does not bear examination. The Lord as knower is an agent of the knowing act and not its substrate or locus in the strict sense. For what is a locus or *adhikaraṇa?* A locus is that which is the ādhāra or container of the agent acting or the object acted on and is at the same time the *āśraya* or substrate of the action itself. (The Lord cannot be the substrate of the knowing act of which He is the subject.)

Others (the Prābhākaras) define Pramāṇa as *anubhūti, i.e.*, as the apprehension of a fact. By *anubhūti* they mean cognition other than recollection or memory. According to them, *anubhūti* cannot be defined simply as 'other than recollection,' for in this case the definition will apply to *objects* of cognition like the jar and the rest (which are other than recollection). Nor can it be defined simply as 'cognition,' for in this case the definition will apply to 'recollection' (which is not an independent source of knowledge according to Prābhākaras).

But the Prābhākara definition of Pramāṇa is open to the following objections. In the first



place, it is too wide as applying to doubtful cognitions (which are also forms of apprehension or *anubhuti* other than recollection). Secondly it is also too narrow as not applying to memory (*smṛti*) and the social codes (derived from the Vedas. (*Smṛti* means recollection as well as the social codes based on the Vedas and their teachings. The latter are analogous to recollection which is based on an original primary presentation. The Mādhvas accept *smṛti* as pramāṇa in both these senses.)

(This closes our discussion of the definition of *Pramāṇa*. We now proceed to discuss its different varieties.)

*Pramāṇa* is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) *Kevala-pramāṇa, i.e.*, self-contained, absolute knowing, and (2) *Anupramāṇa, i.e.*, valid knowing as the instrumental cause of self-contained, absolute knowing. This enumeration is based on the order of importance. (*Kevalapramāṇa* being of superior importance is first mentioned.)

*Kevalapramāṇa* means knowledge that agrees with the nature of the object known. The words 'agrees with the nature of the object' dispose of uncertain and doubtful cognitions, while the word 'knowledge' disposes of perceiving (and other intervening processes). (*Kevalapramāṇa* is the resulting knowledge as distinguished from the processes leading thereto.)

There are four kinds of *Kevalapramāṇa* (*i.e.*, four kinds of self-sufficient, self-contained knowledge) :—(1) the knowledge of the Lord or *Iśvara*, (2) the knowledge of the Lord's Consort, *viz.*, *Lakṣmī*, (3) the knowledge of the Sage or *Yogin*, (4) the knowledge of the Non-Sage or *Ayogin*.

The Lord's knowledge is the knowledge that rests on, *i.e.*, presupposes, itself only. The fact of its 'depending on itself only' distinguishes the Lord's knowledge from that of the Lord's Consort. (The Consort's knowledge, while depending on itself, also depends on the Lord's knowledge.) The fact of its being 'knowledge' distinguishes it from the Lord Himself whose knowledge it is. (This is aimed at the Shankarite theory according to which Brahman is nothing but pure self-revealing Intelligence. The Mādhvas distinguish between the Lord Himself and the knowledge which the Lord has of Himself and all other things.) Or, we may say, the Lord's knowledge is knowledge that embraces *all* that appertains either to the Lord Himself or to that which is other than the Lord. The Lord's knowledge cannot be defined simply as knowledge, for in this case the definition will be too wide as applying to the *Yogin's* knowledge as well (which is also knowledge of a sort). To exclude the latter, the definition stresses the words 'that embraces *all*, etc.' (The *Yogin's* knowledge is not all-embracing



as is the Lord's). Further, the word 'knowledge' prevents a too wide application of the definition to the perception of the Lord. The Lord's knowledge is invariably in agreement with the nature of the object known, constitutes the essence or *svarūpa* of the Lord, is without beginning and without end.

The Consort's knowledge is knowledge that depends on, *i.e.*, presupposes, the Lord's knowledge only. If the Consort's knowledge had been defined simply as 'knowledge,' the definition would have been too wide and applicable to the Lord's knowledge as well. To exclude the latter, the words 'depending on the Lord's knowledge' have been added. Since dependence implies a distinction (between the dependent and that on which it depends), the possibility of confusion (between the Consort's knowledge and the Lord's knowledge) is precluded. But mere dependence on the Lord's knowledge does not fully define the Consort's knowledge. The knowledge of Brahmā and others is also characterised by this dependence on the Lord's knowledge. To preclude such extension of the definition (to the knowledge of Brahmā and others), the word 'only' has been added. (The Consort's knowledge depends on the Lord's knowledge only, but the knowledge of Brahmā and others depends both on the Lord's knowledge and the Consort's knowledge.) Further, the word 'knowledge' in the definition serves to

distinguish the Consort's knowledge from the Consort herself. Or, we may say, the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. Here the word 'knowledge' by itself fails to distinguish the Consort's knowledge from knowledge like that of ourselves. Hence, to prevent such too wide application, the words 'of all objects' have been added. Even then the definition has a too wide application to the *Rju Yogin's* knowledge. (The *Rju Yogin* also has a reflective knowledge of all objects). Hence the word 'non-reflective.' The *Rju-Yogin* has only a reflective knowledge of objects. Again to say that 'the Consort's knowledge is the non-reflective knowledge of all objects' does not distinguish it from the Lord's knowledge (and thus the definition as so worded remains too wide). Hence the further qualification 'excepting the Lord Himself.' But the words 'non-reflective knowledge of *all* objects and no such knowledge of the Lord Himself' would be absurd and self-confuting. Hence the words 'other than' (*i. e.*, non-reflective knowledge of all things *other than* the Lord Himself). Further, the word 'knowledge' in the definition distinguishes it from the Consort's perception (*i. e.*, the process of perceiving which leads to, or results in, knowledge). The Consort's knowledge is also invariably in agreement with reality, is the essence



of the Consort herself and is beginningless and eternal.

The *Yogin's* knowledge is the knowledge that has attained to special perfection or excellence through the power born of the practice of *yoga* or mental concentration. It is of three kinds, *viz.*, (1) the *Rju Yogin's knowledge*, (2) the *Tāttvika Yogin's knowledge*, (3) the *Atāttvika Yogin's knowledge*.

By *Rju Yogin* is meant a *jiva* or individual soul who is capable of the spiritual excellence of Brahman. The *Rju Yogin's* knowledge is the reflective knowledge of all objects other than the Lord Himself. As the mere words 'the *Rju Yogin's* knowledge is knowledge' will not prevent a too wide application of the definition to our knowledge as well, the words 'of all objects' have been added. As even then there is a too wide application to the Lord's knowledge, the word 'reflective' has been incorporated. As thus simply the definition entails an absurdity, the knowledge being a reflective knowledge of *all* objects and yet not a knowledge of the Lord Himself, the words 'other than the Lord Himself' have been added. This knowledge is of two kinds: (*a*) knowledge which is the essence or nature of the *Yogin* himself, and (*b*) knowledge which is only a mental state of the *Yogin*. Of these, knowledge constituting the *Yogin's* essence is beginningless and eternal, while knowledge as the

*Yogin's* mental state is beginningless only as being comprised in a (beginningless) flow or stream (of states). Both these however are invariably in agreement with the nature of the objects (known).

The *Tāttvika Yogins* are the supernal beings (with godly qualities) other than the *Ṛju Yogins* and full of the conceit of true knowledge of reality. Merely saying that 'the *Tāttvikas* are the gods with self-conscious knowledge of reality' would have involved a too wide application to the *Ṛju Yogins* (who also have self-conscious knowledge of reality). Hence the words 'other than the *Ṛju Yogins*.' Merely saying again that 'the *Tāttvikas* are other than the *Ṛju Yogins* would have involved a too wide application to the gods or spirits who are non-*Tāttvikas*. Hence the words 'with self-conscious knowledge of reality.' Since there are also ungodly beings (other than *Ṛju Yogins*) who also have self-conscious knowledge of reality, therefore the words 'with godly qualities' have been added. The *Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge is that which being beginningless does not, even by way of reflection, embrace all things other than the Lord. Merely saying that 'the *Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge is knowledge' would have entailed a too wide application to the Lord's knowledge. Hence the words 'does not embrace all things.' Even then there would have been a too wide application to the Consort's knowledge. The Consort's knowledge is non-all-embracing in so far as it does not extend to the Lord Himself. Hence the words 'other than the Lord.' Even then, there would have been a too wide application to the *Ṛju Yogin's* knowledge, for the *Ṛju Yogin's* knowledge does not embrace all things other than the Lord in the absence of reflection. Hence the words 'even by way of reflection.' Even then, however, the definition would have a too wide application to the non-*Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge. Hence the words 'being beginningless.' It also is of two kinds, *viz.*, (*a*) knowledge which constitutes the *svarūpa* or essence of the *Tāttvika Yogin*, and (*b*) knowledge which is external (*i.e.*, relates to external objects). Of these, 'essential' knowledge is in agreement with reality, but 'external' knowledge is occasionally false, *i.e.*, not in agreement with the nature of things.



The non-*Tāttvikas* or *Atāttvikas* are the Gods and Sages practising *Yoga* who are other than the *Ṛju* and the *Tāttvika Yogins*. The non-*Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge is that which, having a beginning in time, is characterised by slight or partial ignorance in respect of objects other than the Lord. Merely saying that the non-*Tāttvika* Yogin's knowledge is knowledge would have entailed a too wide application to the Lord's knowledge. Therefore the words 'characterised

by ignorance' have been incorporated. Even then there would have been a too wide application to the non-*Yogin's* knowledge. Hence the word 'slight or partial.' Even then the definition would have entailed an absurdity, for the non-*Tāttvika's* knowledge in respect of the Lord is tainted by *immense* (and not slight) ignorance. Hence the words 'other than the Lord.' Even then there would have been a too wide application to the *Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge. Hence the words 'having a beginning in time.' This also is of two kinds, *viz.*, essential knowledge, and external knowledge. The rules as to their truth or untruth are the same as in the previous case. The beginninglessness and the beginning-in-time of the *Tāttvika* and the non-*Tāttvika Yogin's* knowledge respectively should be understood in the manner explained in the 'Paddhati.'

The *non-Yogins* or *Ayogins* are the individual souls other than the *Yogins* or sages. The word '*Jivas* or individual souls' differentiates the *Ayogins* from the Lord and the Lord's Consort, and the words 'other than the Yogins' distinguish the *Ayogins* from the *Yogins*.

The *Ayogin's* knowledge is knowledge characterised by immense ignorance in regard to objects other than the Lord. Merely saying that the *Ayogin's* knowledge is knowledge characterised by immense ignorance' would have entailed a too wide application to the *Yogin's* knowledge



also. The *Yogin's* knowledge is also accompanied by immense ignorance, *viz.*, in regard to the Lord. Hence the words 'other than the Lord.' The *Ayogin's* knowledge is also of two kinds as in the previous cases. Besides, it is also generated in time and perishable in time. This generation or cessation means generation or cessation with respect to the manifestation of the *svarūpa* or essence. The *svarūpa* or essence here means the *svarūpa* or essence of the knowing as a cognitive process or state.

The *Ayogins* or *non-Yogins* are also of three kinds: (1) those that are fit for liberation, (2) those that are perpetual participators in (the storm and stress of) life, (3) those that are fit only to live the stupefied life of inertia or *Tamas*. Of these, 'essential' knowledge in the case of 'those fit to be liberated' is in agreement with the nature of reality, while the same in 'the perpetual participators in life' is of a mixed character (partly true and partly false). Of others, however, such knowledge is false as being in non-agreement with reality. As regards 'external' knowledge, it is both (true and false, *i.e.*, in some cases true and in other cases false) in all the three kinds of the non-*Yogins*.

The Vaiśeṣikas accept sense-perception, inference from a mark, memory and the intuitions of the Sages as the four kinds of valid evidence. This (the Vaiśeṣika view) however is untenable

as this enumeration does not include the Lord's knowledge which is timeless and eternal as also knowledge derived from authoritative communication (*Āgama*). Further, recollection being the effect of the action of the mind which is a sense-organ, and the intuitions of sages being only a species of Yogik knowledge, and Yogik knowledge being itself a variety of sense-knowledge aided by the power of Yoga (according to their own admission), there is no reason for a separate enumeration of memory or recollection and of the intuitions of sages as independent sources of knowledge.

[Having explained the nature of direct self-contained knowledge (*kevalapramāṇa*), we shall now discuss the nature of *pramāṇa* as *Anupramāṇa* or mediating processes.]

*Anupramāṇa* is the means or instrumental cause of valid knowledge. Merely saying '*Anupramāṇa* is knowledge' would entail a too wide application to knowledge itself (which is the result or effect of *Anupramāṇa*) and to uncertain and doubtful cognition (which also is a species of knowledge, though not valid knowledge). Again, merely saying '*Anupramāṇa* is an instrument or effectuating means' will entail a too wide application to the axe and other like instruments. Again merely saying '*Anupramāṇa* is valid knowledge' will entail a too wide application to *Kevalapramāṇa* (which is direct, self-contained valid



knowledge). Simply saying again that '*Anupramāṇa* is the instrument of that which is valid' will entail a too wide application to the instrument of perception (which also is valid). Likewise saying merely that '*Anupramāṇa* is the means to knowledge or cognition' will entail a too wide application to that which is a means to doubtful cognition, etc. Lastly saying that 'Anupramāṇa is the cause of valid cognition' will entail a too wide application to the knower. Thus our definition of *Anupramāṇa* is proved to be necessary in all the points.

(What, then is a *sādhana*, instrumental cause or means?) A *Sādhana* or instrument is that which being absent, the effect does not arise, even though other conditions like the knower, etc., are present, and which being present unobstructed, the effect necessarily arises. *E.g.*, the axe in the process of striking (the tree to be felled). Hence there is no too wide application to any and every concomitant condition, *e.g.*, no too wide application to cases of erroneously cognised marks or signs. Where error is involved, the presence of defects of sensibilities, etc., is the bar (to the cognition of the really effective means).

(The *sādhana* is thus the cause *par excellence*, *i.e.*, the most effective of the causal conditions. And this brings us to the question of the nature of the cause.)

The cause may be defined as the unconditional,

invariable antecedent of the effect. And the effect may be defined as that which is negated by the negation consisting in antecedent non-existence. (This means that the effect is that which does not exist before it is caused to be.) The cause again is of two kinds, *viz.*, the material cause and the instrumental cause. The cause which suffers transformation (into the effect) is the material cause, for example, *Prakṛti* or primal matter as the cause of the universe, the lump of clay as the cause of the jar. The cause which produces the effect without being itself transformed thereinto is the instrumental cause, for example, the unseen moral forces (*Adṛṣṭa*) as the cause of the universe, the potter's stick as the cause of the jar. Hence it follows that among the assemblage of causal conditions that which is the cause *par excellence* (*i.e.*, most effective) is the *sādhana*, means or instrument.

*Anupramāṇa* is of three kinds, *viz.*, perception, inference and authoritative communication. (Of these) perception is the means to the apprehension of that which is comparatively proximate, is non-mediated and present here and now. Hence perception is limited in range, being restricted to a small number of objects (*i.e.*, objects which are near and present and not separated by any barrier). Inference however is a means to the knowledge of the remote, the mediated and



the past and the future. Lastly, *Āgama* or authoritative communication is an independent source of the knowledge of all sorts of objects of which the number is endless. The above enumerative statement is based on the order of the kind and number of objects made known (respectively by the three kinds of knowing, *viz.*, perception, inference and authority). There being three kinds of *Anupramāṇa* or effective means to valid cognition, the cognition resulting therefrom is also of three kinds, *viz.*, perceptual, inferential and authoritative knowledge. Of these, perceptual knowledge is the cognition that is produced by the process of perceiving. This (cognition) is what is meant by immediate knowledge, direct knowledge or witnessing knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*). Similarly, the knowledge reached through inference is called inferential or mediate knowledge. Lastly, the knowledge derived from authoritative communication is called authoritative knowledge or revealed knowledge.

(What, then, is perception as a source of knowledge?) Perception is the process of a sense-organ that is free from defects. (In other words, perception is the stimulation, by the object, of an organ of sense not subject to any sensory defects.) Here the word 'sense-organ' prevents a too wide application to inference and the rest.

But it may be said, perception is a species o

an instrumental cause, and an instrumental cause is possible only through an intervening action or operation. For example, the instrument of the act of cutting is the axe, and the axe is an instrumental cause of the cutting or felling of the tree through the intervening operation of coming into contact with the tree. The intervening operation is that which being effected by the instrumental cause serves to effect that which results from the action of the instrumental cause, *e.g.*, the contact with the tree which is effected by the axe. (What, then, is the intervening action in the case of perception as an instrumental cause or agency.')

We grant the force of the question which is thus raised. And our answer is this. The sense-organ is the instrument, and the contact of the sense-organ with the object (perceived) is the intervening operation (through which the sense-organ produces its effect as an instrumental cause). The consequence or effect which results from the action of the sense-organ as an instrument is direct or immediate knowledge (*sākṣātkāra*). Here the process or operation (*i.e.*, the perceptive operation) is described as the operation of the eye (*i.e.*, of the sense-organ concerned) with a view to stress the fact that the organ (as the seat of the operation) is primary while the operation inhering therein is secondary. And further the organs are said to be free from



defects and to be in contact with their respective objects with a view to ensure the truth or validity of the knowledge resulting therefrom. Hence there is no discrepancy in our definition.

Perception is of seven kinds, *viz.*, the six different kinds of perception consisting of the operations of the senses and the perception of the *sākṣī* or witnessing consciousness. Of these, the perception of the witnessing consciousness is perception consisting in the operation of the Witnessing Intelligence as organ or instrument. The objects of such immediate knowledge or presentation are: the essence of the Self or Atman as well as the properties thereof, the nescience underlying absence or privation, the mind, the functions of the mind such as knowledge, pleasure and the rest, time, Ākāśa in its original unmodified condition, etc. It also reveals its own nature.

(Sensuous perception as arising from the operation of the six different organs presupposes the six organs of sense.) The six sense-organs are the olfactory sense, the gustatory sense, the visual sense, the tactual sense, the auditory sense and the mind. Of these, the objects of the olfactory sense are odour and the different kinds of fragrance which are the specific modes of odour; the objects of the gustatory sense are tastes and its specific forms; the objects of the visual sense and touch are substances having magnitude and

perceptible (generated) colour and form, certain qualities such as number and the rest, the different kinds of motion, and the generic characters. The feel of air is also an object of touch. Air itself is (not directly perceived by touch, but only) inferred from its feel (which is revealed to touch). (The inference is as follows.) The wind that blows is felt as being neither hot nor cold. Since the feel is a quality like colour and cannot go wandering, there must be some substance in which the feeling in question inheres or abides. What, then, is the substance which is the substrate of the feeling in question? It cannot be earth, for earth, though characterised by perceptible touch, is also characterised by perceptible form and colour, whereas the feeling which is experienced (in the case of the blowing wind) evidently has no substrate of a perceptible form and colour. Nor can the substrate in question be either water or fire, for the feel which it induces is not experienced as cold (as in the case of water) or hot (as in the case of fire). Nor again can it be the four ubiquitous substances since they are all devoid of the quality of such feeling. The assumption of tactual properties in the ubiquitous substances would entail a perception of touch everywhere and at all times. Nor also can the mind be the substrate in question, for the mind is atomic or infinitesimal and the touch of the infinitesimal or atomic is imperceptible,



*i.e.*, beyond sense-perception. Hence we conclude that which constitutes the substrate of the quality that is felt by touch in the case in question is the (specific) substance we call air.

But it may be said air is perceptible (and not inferred as above shown), because it is the substrate of a perceptible touch just as is the jar. This objection is not tenable, for air is the substrate of perceptible touch only because of an adventitious condition, *viz.*, its association with an object of perceptible form and colour. (An adventitious condition is anything that is invariably correlated with the *probandum* but is not an invariable correlate of the *probans*.) In the case in question, the condition is an invariable correlate of the *probandum* as determined by the property of the subject in which it is inferred. (The subject of the inference is air which is an external substance and the *probandum* is perceptibility). That the adventitious condition is perceptible colour and form is proved by the invariable correlation of external substances that are perceptible and the presence of perceptible colour and form together with the absence of any such correlation between the ground of the inference, *viz*, 'being the substrate of perceptible touch' and the adventitious condition, *viz.*, the 'presence of perceptible colour and form.' Thus we find that whatever is an external substance and is perceived is also characterised

by perceptible colour and form, but we cannot say that whatever is a substrate of a perceptible touch has also perceptible colour and form. (Hence being the substrate of a perceptible touch is a valid ground for perceptibility only on the condition that the substrate has perceptible colour and form and not otherwise. In other words, the ground is a ground only under conditions and not unconditionally and therfore the inference in question is not flawless.) Hence though you affirm the presence of the ground (*viz.*, being the substrate of a perceptible touch), in the subject of the inference (*viz.*, air), yet perceptible form and colour which always accompany the *probandum*, *i.e.*, perceptibility, is no invariable correlate of the ground (and so the ground fails to prove the presence of the *probandum* being shown to be no invariable correlate of an invariable correlate of the *probandum*.) Hence it follows that air is inferred from its special touch (and not perceived as contended).

The objects perceived by the auditory sense are sounds and their varieties in the form of the alphabetical or verbal sounds.

Inadvertence of the mind (partial or complete), colour-blindness, jaundice, etc., are the defects of the five sensibilities.

The objects (of the five different senses) are also objects of the mind (the sixth sense) and the mind makes them its objects by presiding



over and guiding and directing the operations of the five external senses.

But the mind also perceives past events and in such perception it does not require the aid of the external senses. The result of such perception (of the past independently of the external senses) is memory or recollection. Memory is thus said to be an effect of internal perception (by the mind as the sixth sense). The contact of sense and object in this case (*i.e.*, in the case of a direct perception of the past by means of the mind as the sixth sense) is furnished by what we call the *Samskāra*, trace or disposition left behind by the past experience. (The mind as the sixth sense has a direct vision of the past and what we call the disposition or trace of the past experience is nothing but the contact of the past with the present, or as Bergson would say perhaps, the insertion or prolongation of the past into the present). The process (of the mind in recollection) is thus analogous to that of the specially gifted senses of the *yogis* which possess extraordinary supernal powers due to the practice of *yogik* concentration (and thereby cross the gulf between the past and the present).

The defects of the mind (which vitiate the mental or internal perceptions) are desires, predispositions, etc.

There are also defects of the objects perceived (which interfere with their correct perception) and

these are long intervals (of time or space), close proximity (in time or space), subtile or potential condition of the objects, intervening barriers (media) separating the objects from the perceiver, non-manifestation of the objects (*e.g.*, of the stars in daylight), intermixture with objects of a like or similar nature, etc.

These defects being present, in some cases the cognition itself is not generated and in some cases doubt or uncertainty arises (as to the evidence of the cognition that is generated).

In the case of cognition due to the operation of the senses, the cause consists of the contacts of the four beginning with the self. Thus the self must come into contact with the mind, the mind with the sensibilities, the sensibilities with the objects. The sensibilities have no immediate intuition of objects at a distance and must actually dart forth to the place of the objects and come into contact with them in order to reveal them. The self-same contacts which enable the sensibilities to reveal their respective objects are also the immediate cause of the perception of their respective absence. No intervening relations mediate between the contacts and the absence in the case of perception of absence (as Naiyāyikas say).

One school of philosophers (the Naiyāyikas) holds that the contact which brings on cognition in the form of immediate perception is of six different kinds. Thus (according to



this school) it is either conjunction, or inherence in the conjoined, or inherence in that which is inherent in the conjoined, or inherence, or inherence in the inherent, or the relation of qualifying and qualified. Of these, conjunction is the contact or relation that is effected between the eye and substances like jars, etc. (*i.e.*, the relation which brings on the perception of substances like jars, etc.). The relation of inherence in the conjoined similarly exists in the case of colour (which is a quality), actions and generic characters. (These inhere in substances like jars, dishes, etc., and these latter are in conjunction with the eye. Therefore the visual perception of colour, action and generic character takes place through the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction with the eye.) In the same way in tactual perception, the relation which brings on perception by the tactual sense is actual conjunction with the tactual sense in the case of perception of substances such as jars, etc., and the relation of inherence in that which is in conjunction in the case of the quality of touch, the actions and generic characters of these substances. So also in the case of the internal perception of the self by the mind, the relation is conjunction of mind and the self-substance in the case of the perception of the latter while it is inherence in that which is in conjunction in the case of the perception of the pleasure

and pain that exist in the self. So also in the case of perception of smell and taste by the olfactory and gustatory senses, respectively, the relation is inherence in that which is in conjunction, the smell and the taste being inherent in substances which are in conjunction respectively with the olfactory and gustatory senses. Similarly, in the perception of the generic characters of qualities and actions, the relation which mediates is inherence in that which is inherent in substances in conjunction (the generic characters being inherent in the qualities and actions which are themselves inherent in the substances of which they are qualities and actions). In the perception of sound by the auditory sense, however, the relation is simple inherence, for the auditory sense is nothing but ether or *Ākāśa* as limited by the tympanum of the ear (sound being a quality of *Ākāśa* and so inherent in *Ākāśa*). (The auditory sense being *Ākāśa* itself as limited by the tympanum and sound being inherent in *Ākāśa* the relation which holds between sound and the auditory sense in the case of perception of sound is a relation of pure inherence.) But the perception of the generic characters, etc., of the sound (inherent in particular sounds) is mediated by the relation of inherence in the inherent (sounds being inherent in *Ākāśa* and therefore in the limited *Ākāśa* which is the auditory sense, and the generic characters, etc., of sounds being



inherent in sounds). The perception of the absence of the jar by the eye takes place through the relation of qualification and qualified. In the case of the perception in the form 'In this place here, there is no jar,' the absence of the jar is the qualified and the qualification which specifies the absence is the particular place or locality with reference to which the absence is perceived. (The localisation thus acts as the specifying attribute of the absence in question.) In the case again of the perception of the absence being in the form "This place is characterised by the absence of the jar," the place itself acts as the qualified substrate and the absence of the jar is regarded as its qualification. Similarly in the perception of Inherence itself the mediating relation is that of qualified and qualification (Inherence does not inhere. Nor is it in conjunction with the objects between which it holds. Hence the relation of inherence to the objects between which it holds is said to be a unique relation which is that of qualification and qualified. The inherence is a qualification of the objects between which the inherence holds.) Thus in the case of the inherence of the whole cloth in its parts, *viz.*, the threads, the inherence is related to the cloth and the threads by the relation of qualification to qualified (and not by a second relation of inherence nor by conjunction).

All this however is fallacious and untenable. Qualities, actions, etc., being nothing apart from

(*i.e.*, being non-different from) the things qualified or the things acting, etc., a relation of inherence between qualities, etc., and their substrates is impossible (for inherence presupposes a difference between the inherent and that in which the inherent inheres). Besides, there is no valid ground for the acceptance of inherence as real. Though the relation of conjunction between the self and the mind is required in the case of the perception of other objects, it is not so required in the perception of the self itself or its properties and states, for the self and its properties being the objects presented to the witnessing Intelligence are not objects of perception by the mind. Again, alphabetical sounds being themselves substances are not qualities at all. It cannot be said that they cannot be substances as besides having generic characters they are perceptible to only one of our external senses. For this rule fails, according to our view, in the case of darkness. (Darkness has generic character, is revealed only to one of our external senses, and yet is a substance and not a quality.) And it fails also in the case of the light of the lamp according to the view of those who hold it to be substantive. (The light of the lamp has generic character, is presented to one external sense and yet is held by the Naiyāyika to consist of nothing but fire-atoms which are substances.) Further though non-alphabetical sounds are qualities of ether or



*Ākāśa*, yet since as qualities they are non-different from their substrate of *Ākāśa*, a relation of inherence between non-alphabetical sounds and *Ākāśa* is impossible. As regards the relation of qualification and qualified, it being only another name for the relation that consists in nothing but the essence of a relation itself (*svarūpasambandha*), no separate relation of qualification and qualified really exists. (*Svarūpsambandha* is the name of the relation that consists in the essence or *svarūpa* of a relation. Thus inherence is related by *svarūpasambandha* to the objects between which it holds. This means that the relation which relates inherence to its relata is no separate relation but the *svarūpa* or essence of the inherence itself.)

But some however say that memory is the consciousness that is caused only by traces of past experience. The adverb 'only' precludes recognition (which arises not simply from traces but also require other factors). Recognition is the cognition that arises from the joint operation of traces of past experience and sense-contact with present objects. The word coincidence (*samprayoga*) means contact (of sense and object). Non-mention of traces (as a causal condition of recognition) will make recognition indistinguishable from a simple cognition like 'Here is a jar.' Non-mention of coincidence or contact (as a causal

condition) will again make recognition indistinguishable from memory.

The above view is not tenable. For all valid knowledge is due to a valid ground or source of knowledge and therefore since memory is one kind of valid knowledge, the cause of memory, *viz.*, the traces of past experience, will have to be admitted as an independent *pramāṇa* or ground of true knowledge. But in this case the number of *pramāṇas* or valid sources of knowledge will be four and this is unestablished (as we have seen that the number is three and neither more nor less). It cannot be said that the objection applies also to our view (of recollection or memory). We hold memory to be due to internal perception by the mind with concentration of attention (*bhāvanā*) as an auxiliary condition. (Hence in our view memory is a form of perception, a kind of intellectual intuition where the trace of the past experiences serves the function of contact of the present mind with the past experience. Thus according to our view, though memory is admitted to be a form of valid knowledge, it is regarded only as a variety of perception, and so the cause of memory is not a *separate* source of knowledge, though no doubt it is a ground of true knowledge.)

There are four kinds of perception (as a source of valid knowledge), *viz.*, the Lord's perception, the Consort's perception, the perception that



belongs to the *Yogin* or Seer, and the perception that belongs to an ordinary mortal (*ayogin*). The objects of these different kinds of perception are the same as the objects of the corresponding cognitions or experiences which each kind induces in its respective perceiver. For fuller details the reader is referred to Jayatirtha's *Pramāṇapaddhati* (which we think unnecessary to go into over again here). Thus everything (relating to perception) has been set forth and therefore we close our chapter on perception as expounded in this *Pramāṇacandrikā* on the lines chalked out by the revered Jayatirtha. We bend our heads in respect to the sage Vyāsadeva.

Let us now proceed to the next Pramāṇa, *viz.*, Inference. Inference is flawless reasoning, flawless establishment or proof of a conclusion (by means of a reason or ground). The synonyms of proof are reasoning, arguing from a mark to the thing marked, concluding on the basis of something which is pervaded by an invariable relation to something else.

Inference cannot be defined simply as reasoning or arguing from a mark, for the definition would then apply to fallacious reasonings such as those where the subject of the inference is fictitious or unreal and where the mark is known by a valid source of knowledge to exclude (instead of being invariably related to) the thing marked. In these cases the reasonings are

grounded on an invariable correlation and yet the reasonings are fallacious. (In the former, though the invariable relation holds, the subject of the inference is non-existent and thus the locus in which the relation is to prove the existence of the *probandum* does not exist. In the latter, the invariable relation is asserted in the reasoning but in actual fact no such relation holds, and thus the conclusion lacks material truth.) Hence inference is defined not as reasoning merely, but as flawless reasoning. Nor again can inference be defined simply as that which is flawless for in this case the definition will apply equally to Perception as a source of knowledge. Hence it is defined as reasoning (which is flawless).

The instrumental cause of inference is the sign or mark (by means of which we infer the *probandum*). The operation or process (of the instrumental cause) which leads to or establishes the conclusion is reasoning or argumentation (*i.e.*, reasoning by means of the sign through which the subject of the inference is brought in relation to the *probandum*). The inferred conclusion is the result which emerges out of the process. Reasoning (*Parāmarśa*) consists in the cognition of the mark in the form of its invariable relation to the *probandum* as a property of the subject of the inference. For example in the inference of fire in yonder mountain from the perception of smoke therein, the reasoning consists in cognition of



the smoke as an invariable concomitant of fire and as being, as so invariably related, a property of the mountain yonder. The cognition which results from the process, *viz.*, yonder mountain is on fire, is the resulting inference. Invariable relation means invariable concomitance (or sequence) as in the case 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' By concomitance or co-existence is here meant a relation merely between the ground of the inference and its *probandum*. By the invariableness of the concomitance is not meant then co-inherence in the same substrate. The invariableness of the concomitance means simply that the concomitance is fixed and unfailing. The purport of the whole is that *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance consists in an unfailing relation between the ground of the inference and its *probandum*. It follows therefore that the essential character (the defining mark) of *vyāpti* consists in the unfailing regularity of concomitance (between two or more phenomena). Thus when we observe that wherever smoke is perceived, there fire also is perceived, we are said to cognise the relation of *vyāpti* or invariable concomitance between 'smoke' and 'fire.' Here 'smoke' is the pervaded and fire the pervading property. The locus or abode of the invariable relation is called the pervaded while that which defines or marks off the relation is called the pervading. [Thus if A is invariably related

to B, A as the locus of the invariable relation is the pervaded, while B as defining or marking off this (particular) invariable relation from other invariable relations is the pervading or pervader.] By the pervaded being a property of the subject of the inference is meant its existence in a suitable place (so as to make its invariable relation with the pervader possible. It does not mean that the pervaded property should be spatially or temporally included within the pervader). And thus our theory is free from flaws even of a trivial character.

Some however give the following account of invariable concomitance. Invariable concomitance (as an element or factor of inference) means the coinherence of the ground and the *probandum* in one and the same locus so that the *probandum* can never be that which is negated by the absolute negation that coinheres in the locus of the ground of the inference and also does not coinhere in the locus of that which it negates. (In other words, if the *probandum* is not that which is negated bý the absolute negation that occupies the place where the ground exists and also does not occupy the place where the object negated by the said absolute negation exists, then the relation of coexistence in the same locus between the ground and the *probandum* is an invariable relation.)

Mere coexistence with the *probandum* in one and the same locus does not fully bring out the



nature of *vyāpti* or invariable relation. Take the inference, f. i., "Yonder mountain is on fire, because it has the character of knowableness." Here coexistence in the same locus holds (between the ground, 'knowableness,' and the *probandum*, 'fire,' *i.e.*, the locus of 'fire,' *e.g.*, the 'oven,' is also the locus of knowable ness, *i.e.*, the oven is a knowable object). And yet the inference is evidently fallacious. To exclude such cases, the *probandum* (coexistence wherewith will constitute *vyāpti*) is qualified as being one which is not that which is negated by the absolute negation which occupies the place where the ground or *Hetu* exists. (This qualification of the *probandum* excludes the case of the above fallacious inference and other like cases. For 'fire,' the *probandum* of the above inference, is that which is negated by the absolute negation occupying the place where the ground, *viz.*, 'knowableness,' exists; *e.g.*, fire never exists in the great lake and yet 'knowableness' exists in the great lake in so far as the lake is a knowable object. Therefore the *probandum*, 'fire,' *is not* that which is absolutely non-existing where the ground, 'knowableness,' exists.) Even this qualification of the *probandum*, however, fails to exclude the case of (the evidently fallacious) inference, "The tree is in contact (with the monkey) because it has the generic character of substances." (Here 'contact' is the *probandum*,

and it is not that which is absolutely non-existent where the *hetu*, or ground, *viz.*, 'the generic character of substances,' exists. 'The generic character of substances' exists in substances. 'Contact' as a quality also exists in substances. Hence 'contact' is not that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. And yet the inference is fallacious.) To exclude such cases the *probandum* is further qualified as being one which also does not coexist in the same substrate with that which is absolutely non-existent where the ground or *hetu* exists. This excludes the case of 'contact' and the like. ['Contact' abides in substances. It is thus not that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. But despite this, contact is also not that which does not coexist with that which is absolutely non-existent in substances. For 'contact' coexists with the absence of contact in the same substance. 'Contact' of the tree and monkey coexists in the tree with the negation or absence of such contact in another part of the tree. 'Contact' thus coexists with non-contact (with the absolute negation of contact) in one and the same substrate.] In other words, non-contact or negation of contact being coexistent in the same substrate or substance with contact which is the object of the negation, the rule, that the *probandum* should not exist in the same substrate with that which is absolutely non-existent where



the ground exists, fails, and the case cannot be regarded as one of invariable relation or *vyāpti*.

But all this, we hold, is fallacious and unsound. Take the case of the inference 'There is rain on the hills higher up because the rivers below are full.' Here from the fullness of the rivers at the base we infer the occurrence of rain at the top. In such inferences, where the *probandum* occupies a different place from that occupied by the *probans* or ground, the above definition of invariable concomitance as coexistence, in the same substrate, of the ground and the *probandum* altogether fails. It cannot be said that our view is open to the self-same objection as the above view, for unfailing relation of effect and cause holds equally, in our view, in the case of inferences where the *probans* and the *probandum* occupy different places.

(We have so far discussed the meaning of invariable relation. We now proceed to explain the different forms of invariable relation that constitute the grounds of inference.) Dharmas or properties of things may be related in four different ways. Thus two *Dharmas* or properties may be related by a positive symmetrical invariable relation so that each is invariably concomitant with the other. Two properties again may be so related that one of them is an invariable concomitant of the other, but not *vice versa*.

Two properties again may be invariably related by the relation of mutual negation and exclusion. Lastly, two properties may be so related that at least in one case where one is, the other is, as also at least in one case where either one is, the other is not. (This last relation is equal to the following three propositions taken together where A and B express the two properties, *viz.*, 'At least in one case where A is, B is' 'At least in one case where A is, B is not,' 'At least in one case where B is, A is not.' The first form of concomitance is similarly equal to the two propositions—'Wherever A is, B is,' and 'Wherever B is, A is,'—taken together. The second and the third will correspond respectively to the propositions 'In all cases where A is, B is' and 'In no case where A is, B is.') We have a concrete illustration of the first form of invariable concomitance in the unfailing relation that holds between scriptural (Vedic) prohibition and conduciveness to demerit and sin and between scriptural injunction and conduciveness to merit and righteousness. Thus whatever is scripturally prohibited is productive of sin and demerit and whatever tends to demerit and sin is scripturally prohibited. Here each of the two (related properties) is at once pervaded by, and pervader of, the other. Similarly it is also observed that whatever is scripturally enjoined is also conducive to merit and righteousness and whatever is



conducive to merit and righteousness is also laid down by scripture. The second form of invariable concomitance is again illustrated in the case of the relation between smoke and fire, as also between the product of will and non-eternity. Thus 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire' but no invariable relation holds in the form 'Wherever there is fire, there is smoke,' for in the case of the heated iron-ball (where fire is, but smoke is not) the invariability fails. Here 'smokiness' is the pervaded and occupies a smaller area while 'fireness' is the pervader and occupies a wider area. Similarly, 'whatever is a product of will-causality is also non-eternal,' but no invariable relation holds in the form of the converse of this, *viz.*, 'whatever is non-eternal, is also a product of will-causality,' for it is seen to fail in the case of antecedent non-existence (which is non-eternal and yet is no product of will-causality). The third form of invariable concomitance is illustrated in the relation which holds between the generic character of the cow and the generic character of the horse as also between that of the elephant and that of the lion. Thus wherever there is the generic character of the cow, there is nowise the generic character of the horse and wherever there is the generic character of the horse there is nowise the generic character of the cow. No relation of pervader and pervaded holds between either one and the other, all relation

being non-existent between the two. Similarly, 'whatever is an elephant, is nowise a lion' and 'whatever is a lion, is nowise an elephant' are well-known mutually exclusive relations to be noted in this connection. The fourth kind of invariable concomitance is illustrated in the case of the relation which exists between the the property of being a cook and the property of a man as also between the property of being one of the five elements and the property of moving. Thus though in one particular instance the property of being a cook and the property of being a man may co-exist, yet in another case the property of being a cook may co-exist with that of being a woman to the exclusion of that of being a man as also in a third instance the property of being a man may co-exist with the property of being a non-cook to the exclusion of the property of being a cook. In this case also no relation of pervader and pervaded holds between either one and the other, for inspite of a relation existing between the two, there are instances in which the relation fails. In the same way, though the property of being an element is co-existent in some instances with the property of moving (*viz.*, in earth, water, air and fire), yet in the case of *Ākāśa* or ether (which is an element but does not move) the property of being an element exists to the exclusion of the property of moving, and in the case of the mind the



property of moving exists to the exclusion of the property of being an element. (The mind is not an element and yet it moves.)

In all these when the property which is pervaded produces the cognition of the property that is the pervader, we have what is called an inference or *anumāna*. The pervading property (of which the inference produces the knowledge) is called the inferred character, *anumeya*, or object of inference.

The following objection may however be raised to the view of inference expounded above, *viz.*, that it is not possible for the smoke that exists in the mountain far away to produce a valid cognition of fire in the man who exists here in his house. The reply to this objection is as follows. In the case of inference the instrumental cause is a known agency and not an unknown condition as in the case of perception. (The relation of smoke to fire is known to the man who makes the inference, but in perception the action of the sensibilities with reference to the object perceived is not known before the perception.)

The reply however does not seem to be convincing, for there are people (*e.g.*, the savages of the Cocoanut Island) in whom the perception of smoke at a distance does not call forth the cognition of fire. The answer is that in this case though they have a cognition of the form of

the smoke, yet they have no knowledge of it as an invariable concomitant of fire. For even when an object like smoke might previously be cognised as an invariable concomitant of something else such as fire, it may fail to be cognised on account of failure of memory as an invariable concomitant of the latter in a fresh instance and thus fail to produce the cogniton of fire. (Therefore in the case of savages where the smoke was never cognised as invariably related to fire, a cognition of smoke in the first instance cannot possibly produce the knowledge of fire.)

Therefore we conclude : when an accurately and correctly cognised mark or sign is accompanied by a recollection of its invariable concomitance with the thing marked or signified and is thereby able to produce the cognition of the thing marked or signified in a fit place or locality, we have what is called an inference or *anumāna*. Hence even though the form of the marked or signified thing may be already known yet since the inference makes it known further in relation to a particular place or locality, the inferential process is not useless or superfluous. (The inference, in other words, entails a real march of thought conducing as it does to a new synthesis of the already known thing with a place or situation to which it was not previously known to be related.) Hence inference consists of two factors : (1) invariable concomitance (of



the mark with the thing marked) ; (2) the presence of the mark in a suitable place such as will make possible the inference of the thing marked either in the same place or some other (causally or otherwise connected) place. There is no rule that the mark should also be cognised as a property existing in the subject of the inference (for the mark may exist in one place, *e.g.*, the fullness of the rivers at the base, and the thing marked, *viz.*, rain, may be proved to exist in some other place, *e.g.*, at the top of the hill).

A question here arises : how does the cognition of the invariable concomitance arise? How in other words, do we arrive at the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between different objects or events? The answer is, by means of the corresponding perceptions, inferences and testimony. Thus in the case of the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire, we arrive at the knowledge of the concomitance of smoke with fire by the *perception* of the one together with the other in the domestic oven and other places. Here repeated observation and non-observation of the contrary are the auxiliary conditions. But how can perception which apprehends only that which is present and is in contact with the sensibilities, apprehend an invariable concomitance that extends not merely to all cases (actual and possible) but also to the past (and the

future and the remote)? It would be possible if you admitted a transcendental contact (*pratyāsatti*) of past and present and of here and far (as Naiyāyikas do), but according to you, no such transcendental contact exists (between the present sense organ and the past and distant objects). The answer to this is: though there is no transcendental contact between a particular instance and its *sāmānya* or class, yet since the past and the distant are capable of being drawn into relation to the present instance by means of similarity or resemblance, the cognition of an invariable concomitance as extending to all instances (actual and possible) is fully established. Invariable concomitance as made known mediately by means of inference will be illustrated later on. The following are instances of invariable concomitance known from authoritative testimony. 'Whoever is a Brahmin, is a person who must not be put to death,' 'The animal that is a cow is one that must not be touched with the feet,' 'Whatever is enjoined by the Vedas, ought to be accomplished as a duty.'

Inference is of three kinds: inference from effects, inference from causes, and inference from phenomena that are neither causes nor effects. When an effect is the ground of our inference of the cause, we have an inference from an effect, *e.g.*, when from the presence of smoke we infer the existence of fire. When the cause serves as



the ground of an inference of the effect, we have an inference from a cause, *e.g.*, when we say, 'yonder mass of clouds which owes its special character to its own cause proves an impending rain-fall.' When a particular mark proves the existence of a *probandum* without being either the cause or the effect of it, we have an inference from something which is neither a cause nor an effect, *e.g.*, when the presence of taste proves the existence of colour.

Inference may be divided again into two classes from another standpoint, *viz.*, into inference of what is specifically observed and inference of what is generically observed. Thus where the object inferred is perceptible we have an inference of the specifically observed, *e.g.*, when fire is inferred from smoke. Where the object inferred is not perceptible, we have an inference of the generically observed, *e.g.*, when the visual sensibility is inferred from the cognition of colour.

Some (the Naiyāyikas) hold that inference is of three kinds, *viz.*, *Kevalānvayī* inference, *Kevalavyatirekī* inference and *Anvayavyatirekī* inference.

(According to the Naiyāyikas) the *pakṣa* or the subject of an inference is that substrate which is to be proved to own the *probandum* as its property. To exclude the *sapakṣa* or the co-ordinate of the subject and other like substrates, the subject is defined as that which is to own the *probandum* as a

property. Since the property here means that the cognition whereof is to be produced by the sign or mark (in the inference), the definition is not too wide. (The *sapakṣa* is also a substrate of a property, but it is not the substrate of the property the cognition whereof is to be produced by the mark or sign. It is the substrate of a property which is homogeneous with the property that constitutes the *probandum*, but it is not the substrate of the property which is the *probandum* itself.) But it may be said that the *hetu* or ground has also this character of being characterised by the *probandum* as being related to it by conjunction (and thus the definition is too wide as applying to the *hetu* or ground as well). To meet this objection the *pakṣa* has been defined as a *substrate*. (The *hetu* is not the substrate of the property that constitutes the *probandum*, but is related to it only by concomitance or conjunction, but the *pakṣa* is the substrate in which the *probandum* is to be proved to abide as a property.) The *sapakṣa* or co-ordinate of the inferential subject is that substrate which owns a property which is homogeneous with that which constitutes the *probandum*. To preclude a too wide application to the case of the smoke in the oven, the definition includes the word 'substrate.' [The smoke in the oven is the familiar instance or *dṛṣṭānta* and not the *sapakṣa*. It is distinguished from the latter by the fact that it is not the substrate, while the



*sapakṣa* is the substrate of a property (in thi case the kitchen fire) homogeneous with the property constituting the *probandum* (*i.e.*, the fire in the mountain)]. To have defined the *sapakṣa* simply as the substrate of the *probandum* (and not of a property homogeneous with the *probandum*) would have been absurd. (For the *sapakṣa* and the *pakṣa* would in that case have been identical, and a *sapakṣa* other than the *pakṣa* would have been an impossibility.) Therefore in the definition the word 'homogeneous' has been included. The meaning is that the *sapakṣa* is the substrate of a property homogeneous with the *probandum* and as such is devoid of the character of uncertainty (*i.e.*, the uncertainty that characterizes the *pakṣa* as the substrate of the *probandum*). The *vipakṣa* or contra-ordinate of the inferential subject is a substrate devoid alike of the *probandum* and every property homogeneous with the *probandum*. The words 'devoid of the *probandum*' distinguishes the *vipakṣa* from the *pakṣa* while the words 'devoid of every property homogeneous with the *probandum*' distinguishes it from the *sapakṣa*. (The *sapakṣa* is a similar instance in which the existence of a property like the *probandum* is known for certain, and the *vipakṣa* is a dissimilar instance in which the non-existence of the *probandum* and of all properties similar to the *probandum* is known for certain.)

[These definitions of the inferential subject, the co-ordinate of the inferential subject and the contra-ordinate to the inferential subject, prepare the way for the definitions of *Kevalānvayī* and other forms of inference.]

Thus the *Kevalānvayī* inference is one which is based on a ground that pervades the subject and also exists in its co-ordinates but which has no contra-ordinate to its subject actually existing. [In other words, a *Kevalānvayī* inference is one that is based on numerous instances of agreement in presence but is without any instance of agreement in absence.]

*Kevalānvayī* inference cannot be defined simply as an inference in which there exists no co-ordinate to the subject, for in this case it will be indistinguishable from the inconclusive reasoning 'All things are nameable, because they are knowable.' (Here the subject of the inference being 'all things' or 'everything,' no contra-ordinate to the subject exists, but since there is here also no co-ordinate to it, the ground of the inference, *viz.*, the invariable relation between 'knowableness' and 'nameableness,' is without a corroborative familiar instance and thus lacks material certitude.) Hence the words 'in which the ground is existent in the co-ordinate.' But even thus the definition remains imperfect for an inference which has no contra-ordinate to its subject and in which the ground is existent also in



the co-ordinate, is not distinguishable from the fallacious reasoning in which the ground does not exist in the subject of the inference, *e.g.*, the inference 'sound is nameable because it is visible.' To exclude such fallacious reasonings *Kevalānvayī* inference is further specified by the qualification that it is an inference in which the ground must exist in the subject. Even this, however, is not sufficient, for this by itself does not distinguish it from such fallacious reasonings as 'The jar and sound are nameable, for they are characterised by shape' where the ground, *viz.*, 'shape,' exists only in one part of the subject, *viz.*, the 'jar,' and not in the other part, *viz.*, 'sound.' To exclude such fallacious reasonings and prevent these being confounded with *Kevalānvayī* inference, the ground is stated as being not merely existent in the subject but also as pervading it. The pervasion of the subject may again be of two forms, *viz.*, (1) Where the ground pervades both the subject and its co-ordinates, and (2) where the ground pervades the subject but exists only in a portion (*i.e.*, in some) of the co-ordinates. 'Sound is namable, because it is knowable, just as is the jar' illustrates the case where the ground pervades not merely the subject but also its co-ordinates. In the same reasoning the words 'because it is a quality just as is colour' (in place of the words 'because it is knowable just as is the jar') illustrates the case where the

ground exists only in some (*i.e.* a portion of the entire extent) of the co-ordinates. (The ground, *viz.*, 'quality' is predicable of some nameable things, but not of all nameable things.)

The invariable concomitance which constitutes the ground of inference is of two kinds, *viz.*, invariable concomitance as agreement in presence, and invariable concomitance as agreement in absence. Invariable concomitance as agreement in presence consists in the invariable concomitance of the ground of the inference with the *probandum*. Invariable concomitance as agreement in absence consists in the invariable concomitance of the absence of the *probandum* with the absence of the ground. In the case of agreement in presence, the ground is the pervaded and the *probandum* is the pervader. In the case of agreement in absence, the absence of the *probandum* is the pervaded and the absence of the ground the pervader. In every case an invariable concomitance is understood as following in the wake of the pervaded. In the case of the above inference 'sound is nameable, because it is knowable, just as is the jar,' the invariable concomitance of 'knowable' with 'nameable' is based on an agreement in presence only. The agreement in presence here is 'whatever is knowable, is nameable, just as is the jar.' But we have no agreement in absence here in the form 'what is not nameable is not



knowable,' it being impossible to get any case of an object which is not nameable as illustrative of such absence, since all things are nameable and there is nothing that is not nameable. This is why inference based on such concomitance consisting of agreement in presence only is called inference of the *Kevalānvayī* type. Where the ground pervades the subject, where no co-ordinate of the subject exists and where further the ground is excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject, we have an inference of the *Kevalavyatirekī* type (according to *Nyāya*). If *Kevalavyatirekī* inference had been defined as one in which the ground is excluded from (some instances of) the contra-ordinate to the subject, the definition would have been too wide and would have applied to the fallacious reasoning based on a non-invariable ground, 'yonder mountain is on fire, because it is a mountain.' To exclude such reasonings the definition lays down that the ground must be excluded *from every instance* of a contra-ordinate to the subject. In the present case, the ground, *viz.*, 'being a mountain,' though excluded from such contra-ordinates as 'the great lake,' 'the sheet of water,' etc., is yet not excluded from such other contra-ordinates as 'a fireless mountain,' 'a hill without fire.' Hence the ground is not excluded 'from every case of a contra-ordinate to the subject' and thus does not come up to the requirements of the definition (of a *Kevalavyatirekī*

inference as set forth above). Thus the definition does not apply to such cases and is not too wide (as applying to such fallacious reasonings as well). It must be noted however that the mere fact of the ground being excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance does not suffice as a complete definition of the *Kevala-vyatirekī* inference, for as such it remains undistinguished from *Anvayavyatirekī* inference based both on agreement in presence and agreement in absence. To exclude such inferences, the definition stresses the fact that 'no co-ordinate of the subject should exist,' *i.e.*, no similar instance where the existence of the *probandum* should be known for certain should exist. (In *Anvayavyatirekī* inference, the existence of the co-ordinate or similar instance is a *sine quâ non* while in *Kevalavyatirekī* the non-existence of the co-ordinate is a *sine quâ non.*) But even this added qualification does not suffice as a definition of the *Kevalavyatirekī* inference, for as such it has a too wide application to the fallacious inference based on a *Svarupāsiddha* ground (*i.e.*, on a ground that does not exist in the inferential subject), *viz.*, 'The body of the finite individual has a soul accompanying it, since this body is conscious.' (Here the ground, *viz.*, 'consciousness' is non-existent in the 'body' which is the inferential subject. The dead body, *e.g.*, is devoid of consciousness.) To



exclude such cases, the definition insists on the existence of the ground in the subject. Even this, however, does not suffice, for as so qualified the definition applies to the fallacious inference based on a ground that exists in one part of the subject (and not in the whole of it), *viz.*, "The finite individual and the Lord are omniscient, because they are all-creating." (Here the ground 'all-creating' is true only of the Lord and not of the finite individual, *i.e.*, it holds good of one part of the subject and not of the whole of it.) To exclude such cases the definition says, 'The ground must *pervade* the subject.' The following is an instance of a *Kevalavyatireki* inference answering to all the above requirements :—'The Lord is all-knowing, because He is all-creating.' It is based on the invariable agreement in absence, *viz.*, 'Whatever is not all-knowing, is also not all-creating, just as is Devadatta.' There are innumerable instances illustrating this agreement in absence but none illustrating the positive agreement in presence between 'what is all-creating' and 'what is all-knowing,' for Ramkṛṣṇa and other Incarnations of the Lord are comprised in the subject of the inference (and therefore cannot serve as corroborative illustrations) while other finite individuals are non-omniscient (and therefore cannot be cited as illustrations of the agreement in presence). For these reasons (*viz.*, that it is based on an invariable relation which can be

actually observed only as agreement in absence and not as agreement in presence) such inference is called *kevalavyatireki* inference.

An inference in which the ground pervades the subject, exists in the co-ordinates or known similar instances wherein the *probandum* exists, and is excluded from every instance of a contra-ordinate to the subject is an *anvayavyatireki* inference. An *anvayavyatireki* inference is not completely defined as one in which the ground is found to be non-existent in the contra-ordinates, for as such the definition fails to exclude the fallacious inference based on a non-invariable ground, *viz.*, 'The body of the finite individual is non-eternal, because it has the character of the element of earth.' In this inference the ground, *viz.*, 'character of the element of earth,' though non-existent in such eternal entities as the ether, etc., is yet existent in such other eternal entities as the atoms of earth, etc. (Thus though excluded from some objects which are not non-eternal, it is yet not excluded from some other objects which are also not non-eternal.) To exclude such cases, the definition says, 'the ground must be excluded from *every* instance of a contra-ordinate.' But this also by itself does not suffice as a complete definition, for as such it remains indistinguishable from *kevalavyatireki* inference based on agreement in absence only. Hence the definition adds the words, 'the ground must exist in the co-ordinates.'



(The *kevalavyatireki* is devoid of co-ordinates.) Even with this added qualification, the definition has a too wide application to the fallacious inference based on a *svarūpāsiddha* ground (*i.e.*, a ground that does not exist in the subject), *viz.*, 'Devadatta is all-knowing, because he is all-creating.' (Here the ground 'all-creating' is excluded from all cases of 'not all-knowing' and also exists in 'what is all-knowing,' *viz.*, the Lord. But it does not exist in Devadatta, the subject of the (inference). Hence the definition further adds, 'the ground must exist in the subject.' Even now however the definition applies to the fallacious inference based on a *bhāgāsiddha* ground (*i.e.*, a ground that exists only in one part of the subject and not the whole of it), *viz.*, 'The mountain and the lake are on fire, because they smoke.' (Here the ground 'smoke' exists in one part of the subject, *viz.*, 'mountain,' and not in the other part, *viz.*, the 'lake.') To exclude such cases the definition says 'the ground must pervade (*i.e.*, exist in the whole of) the subject.' As 'smokiness' is absent in the 'lake' (being true only of the 'mountain') it lacks the character of pervading the subject (in the above case).

Such *anvayavyatireki* inference based both on agreement in presence and agreement in absence may again be of two kinds. Thus it may be an inference with a ground that

exists in every case of a co-ordinate, or again it may be an inference with a ground that exists only in some (not all) instances of its co-ordinates. For example, the inference, 'The finite individual is eternal, because there is no cause that can put an end to it' is a case of an *anvayavyatireki* inference with a ground existing in all cases of the co-ordinates. In respect of all eternal things such as the ether, etc., the ground, *viz.*, 'absence of a cause of an end or destruction' holds good. Again, the inference 'The mountain is on fire, because it smokes' is an instance of an *anvayavyatireki* inference with a ground that exists only in some (and not all) its co-ordinates, for in some 'fiery' things (*e.g.*, the red-hot iron ball) 'smoke' (which is the ground of the inference) does not exist. This latter example is a typical *anvayavyatireki* inference and takes its name from the following two invariable relations (of presence and absence) on which it is based, *viz.*, 'Whatever smokes, is on fire, just as is the oven' and 'Whatever is not on fire, does not smoke, just as is the great lake.'

Inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence take their character from the corresponding invariable concomitances. Thus we have invariable concomitance based on agreement in presence in 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' And we have invariable



concomitance based on agreement in absence in 'Wherever fire is not, smoke is not.' And inferences that resemble these two forms of concomitances considered together are called *Anvayavyatireki Inferences* or inferences based on agreement in presence and agreement in absence.

All this however (*i.e.*, this division of inference into *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki*) we (the Mādhvas) reject as untenable. For we consider an agreement in *absence* as being unsuitable for proving the *presence* of the *sādhya* or *probandum*. In proving the *presence* of a *positive* entity by means of the presence of another positive (entity), an invariable relation between the absence of one and the absence of the other has no logical scope. (An invariable relation between the negation of one thing and the negation of another does not justify any positive step from the presence of one to the presence of the other.) For in this case the positive ground exists in the subject of the inference (and thus falls within the domain of affirmation) while the invariable relation as an agreement in absence (the absence of the *probandum* and the absence of the ground) belongs to the domain of negation and thus occupies a different place. Thus the invariable relation occupies one place (the domain of negation) and the ground as a property of the subject occupies a different place (the domain of affirmation). (Hence there is no

relation between the two to justify an inferential step.) How then, it may be asked, are *kevala-vyatireki* inferences in vogue? In this way. Here also the real ground is an invariable relation in presence, *e.g.*, the invariable relation between 'omniscience' and 'all-creativeness' in the above inference. But it is impossible to cite positive similar instances of this agreement in presence in response to the demand for an indication of the actual places where this invariable relation holds. Hence for accomplishing this end by means of inference, an invariable relation of absence acquires relevancy (for our purpose). For example, if in the above instance it is asked :—"What proof have we of an invariable relation between 'all-creativeness' and 'omniscience'?" we can say at once that 'all-creativeness' must be pervaded by 'omniscience,' for it is that which is negated by the negation which pervades the negation of 'omniscience.' When one thing is so related to another thing that the negation of the former pervades the negation of the latter, the former thing is invariably related to the latter. (Thus if A is so related to B that the negation of A is pervasive of the negation of B, *i.e.*, if 'All not-B is not-A,' then A is invariably related to B, *i.e.*, 'All A is B.') This relation is admitted, *e.g.*, by the person seeking 'fire,' as holding between 'smokiness' and 'fireness.' In the case of the so-called *anvayavyatireki*



inferences supposed to be based on agreements in presence as well as absence, the agreement in absence is in reality purposeless and out of place. The invariable relation in such cases is sufficiently established by perception, etc., (of the instances of agreement in presence). (Thus the agreement in absence is without real usefulness.) Notwithstanding this it may be conceded that the agreement in absence serves some sort of purpose as indicating in a way that the positive relation of agreement in presence is not negatived by any instances of the failure of the agreement (*i.e.*, by any instances to the contrary.)

According to another (*Nyāya*) classification, inference is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) inference for oneself, and (2) inference for convincing others. Of these, inference for oneself is the cause of self-conviction and the knowledge one gathers for one's own self.

An inference for oneself takes place in the following way. A person in the first place makes repeated personal observation of the togetherness of 'smoke' and 'fire' in the oven and other places. From such observation he gathers that there is an invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire.' Having gathered the invariable relation, when he draws near a 'mountain' and is thrown into doubt as to the existence of 'fire' in the mountain, he notes the trail of smoke rising from the mountain and recollects the

invariable relation between 'smoke' and 'fire' (which he gathered from repeated previous observation). When the recollection takes place (that 'where smoke is, fire also is'), and the said person draws near the mountain (with the trailing smoke), the knowledge at once flashes forth that 'the mountain yonder has *smoke* which is an invariable concomitant of *fire*.' Thus does he make an inference for himself. This last step (*i.e.*, the knowledge that the mountain possesses 'smoke' which is invariably related to 'fire') is called *parāmarśa* or inferential reasoning. From this (reasoning process) arises the knowledge that 'the mountain is on fire.' (The above illustrates inference for oneself.) As regards inference for others, it is a fully-expressed reasoning consisting of five steps which are employed to convince others as to the way of inferring 'fire' from the (observed) presence of 'smoke.' The five steps are :—(1) 'Yonder mountain is on fire,' (2) 'because it smokes,' (3) 'Whatever has smoke, is also on fire, just as is the oven,' (4) 'So is it with this (mountain yonder),' (5) 'therefore it (the mountain) is so (on fire).' By all this even a second or third person is assured of 'fire' from the knowledge of the presence of the established mark or sign thereof (*i.e.*, of the sign of 'smoke'). The above five steps are called respectively (1) *Pratijñā*, (2) *Hetu*, (3) *Udāharaṇam*, (4) *Upanayah* and (5) *Nigamanam*.



Of these *pratijñā* (the statement of the proposition to be proved) consists in the statement of the subject of the inference as possessing the *probandum* as a property. (In the above inference), *e.g.*, the statement 'Yonder mountain is on fire' is the *pratijña*. (2) The *hetu* (the ground of the inference) is the statement of the mark or sign with a suffix indicative of its instrumentality (towards the conclusion), *e.g.*, the statement 'because it smokes.' (3) The *dṛṣṭāntah* is the concrete case in which the invariable relation or *vyāpti* is apprehended. It is of two kinds, *viz.*, (*a*) *sādharmyadṛṣṭāntah*, and (*b*) *vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntah*. A concrete example in which an invariable relation of presence is apprehended is called a *sādharmyadṛṣṭāntah*, *e.g.*, in the inference (of fire) from smoke, the case of the oven. A concrete case in which an agreement in absence is apprehended is a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntah*, *e.g.*, in the same inference from 'smoke,' the case of the great lake. The *udāharaṇa* is the statement of the concrete case or example as exemplifying or illustrating the invariable relation of which it is a case in point. (The *udāharaṇa* is thus a *statement* of a case in point while the *dṛṣṭāntah* is just the concrete case and no statement of it as illustrative of the invariable relation.) It is of two kinds, *viz.*, (*a*) *sādharmyodāharaṇam*, and (*b*) *vaidharmyodāharaṇam*. A statement of a concrete example

illustrating an agreement in presence is a *sādharmyodāharaṇam*, *e.g.*, the statement 'Whatever is smoky, is fiery, just as is the oven.' A statement of a concrete example illustrating an agreement in absence is a *vaidharmyodāharaṇam*, *e.g.*, the statement 'What is not fiery, is not smoky, just as is the great lake.' (4) *Upanayaḥ* is the statement of the mark, the invariable relation whereof has been well-established in the concrete example, as existing in the subject of the inference. It is also of two kinds according to the nature of the concrete example (which establishes its invariable relation). 'The mountain yonder has a trailing smoke just as the oven' is a case of a *sādharmyopanayaḥ*. 'The mountain is not devoid of smoke like the lake' is a case of a *vaidharmyopanayaḥ*. (5) *Nigamanam* (the conclusion) is the statement of the subject (as characterised by the *probandum*) as proved or demonstrated, *e.g.*, the statement, 'Therefore, yonder mountain is on fire.'

All this, we hold, is unsound and untenable. As there is no scope for the two kinds of *vyāpti* or invariable relation (in inference), so also there is no scope for the two kinds of *udāharaṇa* (illustrating such relation). Besides, the alleged rule as to the necessity of five steps in inference is an unproved assumption. The way in which the supposed necessity of the five steps may be refuted has been set forth in the *Paddhati* and the reader



is referred thereto for an understanding of the method of the refutation. This closes our dissertation on the nature of inference.

We shall now discuss the fallacies of reasoning. The fallacies are of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) fallacies arising from discrepancy or contradiction (*virodha*), and (2) fallacies of inappropriateness (*asaṅgati*). Of these, the fallacies of contradiction are of three kinds, *viz.*, contradiction in the *pratijñā* or proposition to be proved, contradiction in the ***hetu*** or ground, and contradiction in the ***dṛṣṭāntaḥ*** or illustration. Contradiction in the *pratijñā* again may be of two kinds, *viz.*, contradiction of the *pratijñā* or proposition to be proved with what is established by the recognised sources of knowledge, and internal self-contradiction in the proposition in question. Of these again, contradiction with the evidence of the accepted sources of knowledge may be of two kinds, *viz.*, contradiction with the deliverance of a stronger evidence or proof, and contradiction with the deliverance of an evidence of equal strength or force. The following is an example of a proposition in contradiction with the deliverance of stronger evidence :—'The subject-matter of controversy (*i.e.*, the world) is false ; because it is an object of perception ; whatever is an object of perception, is false, just as is the silver that is (falsely) perceived in the shining mother-of-pearl.' This conclusion is contradicted by the evidence of perception to

which objects like the jar, etc., are presented as real, by the evidence of inference also as it proves the opposite, *viz.*, 'The subject under discussion (the world) is real, because it yields expected results, just as admittedly real things do,' and lastly by the evidence of scriptural testimony which declares the world to be real. It thus runs counter to the combined evidence of perception, inference and authoritative testimony. Hence it is in contradiction with evidence of stronger force or strength. As an example of contradiction with evidence of equal force or strength we have the following pair of inferences:—(1) 'The disputed subject (*i.e.*, the world) is false; because it is perceptible; just as is the silver perceived in the locus of the mother-of-pearl.' (2) 'The disputed subject (*i.e.*, the world) is real; because it is the object of valid knowledge; just as is the self.' In these two inferences, the corresponding invariable relations as also the presence of the respective grounds in the corresponding subjects being exactly of the same order, we have here a contradiction between evidences of equal strength and force. An internally discrepant or self-contradictory statement may, again be of two kinds. It may be an *apasiddhānta* or a *jāti*. An *apasiddhānta* is an asserted proposition that contradicts the accepted beliefs of one's own school of thought. Since one has subscribed to the tenets of the school to which one has



elected oneself, in making a statement contradicting such tenets one is really contradicting oneself. This is why an *apasiddhānta* is regarded as a form of self-contradiction. A statement of the existence of God by one belonging to the atheistic Sankhya School of thought is an example of this kind of self-contradiction. When one refutes oneself by the very assertion one makes we have that form of self-contradiction which is called *jāti*. For example, one who says 'My mother is childless' commits this form of self-contradiction. *Virodha* or contradiction in the *hetu* or ground is also of two kinds, *viz.*, *svarūpāsiddhih* and *avyāptih*. The following is an example of *svarūpāsiddhih*:—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.' Here visibility is non-existent in sound, sound being audible (and not visible). *Avyāptih* again is of three kinds. We have *avyāptih* when the mark or sign (the ground of the inference) is related to the *probandum* as well as the absence of the *probandum*. We have also *avyāptih* where the mark or sign is related to the absence of the *probandum* without being related to the *probandum*. Lastly, we have *avyāptih* where the mark or sign is unrelated both to the *probandum* and the absence of it. As an example of the first (of these three) we have the following:—'Sound is non-eternal, because it is knowable.' The following is an example of the second:—'Sound is eternal, because it is a

product of will.' As an example of the third we have: 'All that is, is non-eternal, because it exists.' In this last example, the subject of the inference being 'whatsoever that is' the *hetu* or ground is unrelated both to the *probandum* and the absence thereof. (Since the subject in this case is 'all,' *i.e.*, everything actual and possible, there is nothing outside the subject to serve the purpose of a *probandum* or the absence thereof. Therefore the *hetu* or ground as a property of the subject is without relation to the *probandum* as well as the negation of it. There being no *probandum*, there is also no absence of *probandum* and thus the *hetu* or ground is without relation to either.) Contradiction in the example is of two kinds, *viz.*, contradiction arising from the example being without relation to the *probandum*, and contradiction arising from the example being without relation to the ground. The former is illustrated in the following:—'The mind is non-eternal, because it has shape, just as the atom has.' The second is illustrated by the same inference if in place of the words 'the atom' we substitute the word 'action.' (We shall now deal with the fallacy of inappropriateness.) An example of the fallacy of inappropriateness is addressing to an admitted theist the traditional theistic argument:—'The earth and the rest have an intelligent author, because they are effects, just as is a piece of



cloth.' The inappropriateness consists here in the absence of any demand for such an inference (the addressee being a theist and therefore not standing in need of being convinced). The inappropriate is just that for which there is no real need. This is the definition of the inappropriate.

Others (the Naiyāyikas) enumerate the following five as the essential characters of the *hetu* or ground of a valid inference:—(1) existence in the subject of the inference as its property or *dharma*, (2) existence in the co-ordinates or similar instances, (3) exclusion from the contra-ordinates to the inferential subject, *i.e.*, from dissimilar instances, (4) non-sublation of its *viṣaya* or object, (5) absence of a counter-*hetu* or counter-ground leading to a contradictory conclusion. Of these, all the five characters are attributed to the ground of an *anvayavyatireki* inference. The ground of a *kevalānvayi* inference however should possess only four of these, there being no contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance in such inference and so the exclusion of the ground from the contra-ordinate or dissimilar instance being impossible in this case. The ground of the *kevalavyatireki* is likewise required to possess only four characters, there being no co-ordinate or similar instance in such inference and therefore existence of the ground in the co-ordinate or similar instance being out of the

question in this case. The fallacious *hetu* or ground (according to these *Naiyāyikas*) is a ground that possesses only some of the above characters and does not possess the rest. The fallacious ground is either the *asiddha*, or the *viruddha*, or the *anaikāntika*, or the *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*, or the *satpratipakṣa* ground or *hetu*. An *asiddha* or unestablished *hetu* or ground is one that is devoid either of the character of invariable relation (to the *probandum*) or of the character of being a property of the subject of the inference. There are three kinds of an *asiddha* or unestablished *hetu*, *viz.*, an *āśrayāsiddhah hetu*, a *svarūpāsiddhah hetu* and a *vyāpyatvāsiddhah hetu*. An *āśrayāsiddhah hetu*, *i.e.*, a ground with its *āśraya* or substrate unestablished, is of two kinds, *viz.*, a ground with an asserted substrate that does not actually exist, and a ground with an asserted substrate in which the existence of the *probandum* is admitted as an established fact. The former is illustrated in the following inference:—'The sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, just as is the lotus in the lake.' Here the substrate of the ground is the sky-lotus, and a sky-lotus nowhere exists. The second form is illustrated in the case where the theistic inference 'The earth, etc., have an intelligent author, because they are effects, just as is a piece of cloth' is employed for the benefit of a convinced theist. Here the *probandum* being



admitted (before the inference) to be a character of the subject, there is no subject in which the existence of the *probandum* is doubted. Thus there being no subject to which the *probandum* may be (hypothetically) attributed for purpose of demonstration and proof by means of the inference, the substrate of the *hetu* or ground is non-existent for logical purposes. (Here the subject of the inference is 'the earth, etc.,' and this, according to the theist, being admittedly the handiwork of God, the proving of the same by means of the presence of the ground therein is superfluous. Thus the *hetu* has no logical function with reference to the asserted subject, and this is the same as saying that the asserted subject is no logical subject, *i.e.*, does not exist for logical purposes. The *svarūpāsiddhah hetu* or ground is illustrated in the following: 'Sound is non-eternal, because it is visible.' Here the ground is 'visibility,' and this is non-existent in sound, sound being audible (and not visible). The *vyapyatvāsiddhah hetu* or ground is of two kinds, *viz.*, a *hetu* or ground devoid of all relation to the *probandum*, and a *hetu* or ground related to the *probandum* only through an extraneous condition. The former is illustrated in the following:—'All that is, is momentary, because it exists.' Here as the subject of the inference is 'all', (and thus comprises everything), there is no similar instance or co-ordinate to the subject outside

the subject, and therefore the *hetu* or ground has no relation to anything outside the subject, *i.e.*, has no relation to the *probandum* (there being no *probandum* in reality). The latter is illustrated in the following:—'Vedic sacrifice (of animals) is a cause of sin, because it entails destruction of life, just as is the killing of a Brahmin.' Here 'scriptural prohibition' is the extraneous condition through which 'destruction of life' becomes 'productive of sin.' (On condition that the 'destruction of life' is also one that is *prohibited by scriptures*, is it a *source of sin*. Thus not 'destruction of life' as such, but such 'destruction of life' as is *scripturally prohibited*, is a source of sin.) (What, then, is an extraneous condition or *upādhi* ?) An *upādhi* or extraneous condition is defined as one which pervades the *probandum* but does not pervade the ground. 'Scriptural prohibition' (in the above inference) is an extraneous condition in this sense. Thus wherever there is productivity of sin, there scriptural prohibition may or may not be. In the subject of the above inference, *e.g.*, (*i.e.*, in sacrifice sanctioned by Vedic prescription) there is destruction of life but no scriptural prohibition. But how, it may be asked, is the presence of an extraneous condition a defect in reasoning? (In this way, we reply.) The presence of an extraneous condition is a defect as revealing the failure of the concomitance (on which the inference is



based) or as showing the inference to lead to a contradictory conclusion, *i.e.*, as showing forth the subject as related not to the *probandum* but to the contradictory of it. For the extraneous condition, *e.g.*, scriptural prohibition, being non-pervasive of the ground (*viz.*, animal sacrifice), may also be excluded from the subject of the inference (*viz.*, Vedic sacrifice), and being so excluded may effect the exclusion of the *probandum* which it pervades, *viz.*, productivity of sin. And so it may show forth the ground, *viz.*, 'animal sacrifice,' as being related, not to the *probandum*, but to the contradictory of the *probandum*. (In other words, it proves the failure of the concomitance between the ground and the *probandum*, for as non-pervasive of the ground, it shows forth the ground as capable of falling outside its range and thereby as failing to be related to the *probandum* which it pervades.) For the pervading (*i.e.*, the extraneous condition pervading the *probandum*) being itself non-pervasive of, *i.e.*, capable of being unrelated to, the ground, the pervaded (*i.e.*, the *probandum* which is pervaded by such extraneous condition) must also be similarly capable of being unrelated to the ground. And so the subject of the inference being shown to be reduced to the position of the contraordinate to the subject, the ground asserted to be existing in the subject is shown to be reduced to the position of a fallacious non-

invariable ground. Further, the *upādhi* also shows forth the subject as related to the contradictory of the *probandum, i.e.*, it gives rise to an inference proving a contradictory conclusion, in the following way. The *upādhi* or extraneous condition, being itself excluded from the subject of the inference, also effects the exclusion therefrom of the *probandum* which it pervades. And thus the absence of the *upādhi* establishes the absence of the *probandum*. Hence we get the counter-inference establishing a contradictory conclusion :—'Vedic sacrifice is not productive of sin, because it is not prohibited, just as is the daily meal.' In this way 'sacrifice of life' is a *vyāpyatvāsiddah hetu* or ground, being subject to an extraneous condition (in the matter of its invariable relation to the *probandum*). *Upādhis* may be of four different kinds. In the first place, an *upādhi* may be an extraneous condition pervading the *probandum* without qualification or restriction. Secondly, an *upādhi* may pervade the *probandum* as qualified by a property of the subject of the inference. Thirdly, an *upādhi* may be a condition pervading the *probandum* as qualified by a property of the ground or *sādhana*. Lastly, an *upādhi* may be a condition pervading the *probandum* as qualified by a neutral property (*i.e.*, a property which is neither a property of the subject nor a property of the ground of the inference). The first of these is illustrated in the inference



'Yonder mountain is smoky, because it is fiery,' where the presence of greenwood is the *upādhi* or extraneous condition. (Provided the fire is greenwood fire, it is a sign of smoke. Thus 'greenwood' is the condition of the fire being a sign of smoke. Now this 'greenwood' is pervasive of the *probandum* 'smoke' without any qualification.) The second is illustrated in the following :—'Air is perceptible, because it is the substrate of perceptible touch.' Here the *upādhi* is 'generated colour' which is pervasive of perceptibility *in external substances*. Here 'being an external substance' is a property of the subject of the inference, *viz.*, air. Now 'generated colour' (which is the *upādhi*) does not pervade the *probandum* (*viz.*, perceptibility) simply without qualification. In quality, etc., *e.g.*, there is 'perceptibility' inspite of the absence of 'generated colour.' Hence we have to say 'perceptibility *in substances*.' ('Generated colour' does not pervade 'perceptibility' as such, but 'perceptibility in external substances.' This excludes 'perceptibility of quality, etc.' which is not pervaded by 'generated colour.') But even this does not suffice. The Atman or self, *e.g.*, is a perceptible substance, perceptibility of the Atman as substance is not pervaded by generated colour. And so we have to say, 'perceptibility *in external substances*.' (The Atman is not an external substance. It is an internal substance revealed

to internal perception.) The third form of *upādhi* is illustrated in the following :—'The child in the mother's womb ought to be a dark-coloured one, because it is the child of Maitrī.' Here the *upādhi* is 'vegetable diet,' and it pervades 'darkness of colour *with respect to a child of Maitrī*.' In this case the *upādhi*, 'vegetable diet,' does not pervade the *probandum* without 'qualification.' In the (unbaked) jar, *e.g.*, there is darkness of colour, but there is no 'vegetable diet.' Therefore we have to say 'the *upādhi* pervades darkness of colour as *relating to a child of Maitrī*.' The fourth form is illustrated in the following :—'The colour of the atom is perceptible, because it is an object of knowledge, just as is the jar.' Here the *upādhi* is 'generated colour,' and it pervades 'perceptibility relating to external substances.' Now 'being an external substance' is a neutral property in this case. It is not a property of the subject ('the colour of the atom'). It is also not a property of the ground ('knowability'). Further in this case we cannot say that 'where perceptibility' is, there also generated colour is,' since the concomitance fails in the case of 'quality' and the like. Hence 'generated colour' is not pervasive of the *probandum* (*i.e.*, perceptibility) simply without qualification. Hence we say 'perceptibility *relating to external substances*'. Thus the meaning is 'where perceptibility relating to



external substances is, there generated colour also is,' and in this respect the *upādhi*, 'generated colour,' pervades the *probandum*, 'perceptibility'. But this *upādhi*, 'generated colour,' does not pervade the ground, 'knowability'. We cannot say 'whatever is knowable, is also characterised by generated colour,' the concomitance being seen to fail in the case of the subject of the inference (the colour of the atom). (The colour of the atom is knowable, but it is non-generated colour.) If we define *upādhi* merely as a condition that does not pervade the ground (and leave out the other part of the definition, *i.e.*, that such condition must also be pervasive of the *probandum*), then in the inference 'sound is non-eternal, because it is a product of will' the property of 'being a jar' will be an *upādhi*, for in a sound which is a product of will, there is absence of the property of a jar. (But the above inference is free from an *upādhi*, and therefore our mutilated definition of *upādhi* is the cause of the illegitimate assumption of an *upādhi* in this case.) Again if we define *upādhi* simply as a condition that pervades the *probandum* (omitting the other part of the definition that 'it must be non-pervasive of the ground'), then in the inference of 'fire' from 'smoke,' 'the nature of being a substance' will be an *upādhi*. (Fire is a substance and therefore pervaded by 'the nature of being a substance'.) Therefore (to avoid the absurdity of supposing an

*upādhi* where there is none) we say 'the *upādhi* must also be non-pervasive of the ground.' (The nature of being a substance pervades 'smoke' also and thus is not non-pervasive of the ground.) The *viruddhah hetu*, *i.e.*, the contradictory ground, is one that is pervaded by the negation of the *probandum*. *E.g.*, the ground in the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is a product of will,' is a contradictory or *viruddha* ground. The ground in this inference is 'being a product of will,' and 'being a product of will' is pervaded by 'non-eternality' which is the negation of 'eternality.' The *anaikāntikah hetu* or ground is one that is non-invariable (*i.e.*, one which is not invariably related to the *probandum*). The *anaikāntika* ground is of three kinds, *viz.*, the *sādhāraṇa* or common, the *asādhāraṇa* or uncommon and the *anupasaṁhāri* or inconclusive. Of these the *sādhāraṇah anaikāntikah* is a ground that exists also in that which is a negation of the *probandum*. (It is common to the *probandum* and its negation and therefore is called *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika* or common non-invariable.) The ground in the inference 'the mountain is on fire, because it is knowable' is an example of this kind of a non-invariable ground. The ground in this case is 'being a knowable' and this holds good also of the lake which is devoid of fire. The uncommon *anaikāntika* is a ground that is excluded from all co-ordinates and contra-ordinates



to the subject and exists only in the subject. For example, the ground in the inference 'the element of earth is eternal, because it has odour' is a case of an uncommon non-invariable ground. Here 'possession of odour' which is the ground or *hetu* exists only in the subject of the inference, *viz.*, in the element of earth, and is excluded alike from all other eternal and non-eternal objects. The inconclusive *anaikāntika* is a ground which is bereft alike of instances showing its agreement in presence with the *probandum* and instances showing its agreement in absence therewith. For example, the ground in the inference 'All that is, is non-external, because it is knowable' is a case of an inconclusive non-invariable ground. Here the subject of the inference being 'all that is' there is nothing outside the subject to serve as an illustration of the invariable relation between the ground and the *probandum*. The *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa hetu* or ground is one that seeks to prove a *probandum* the negation of which is established by valid evidence to be the property of the subject. It is also called the *badhita hetu*, the sublated or disproved ground. The ground or *hetu* in the following inference is a case in point:—'Fire is devoid of heat, because it is knowable.' Here the *probandum* is 'absence of heat' but the negation of this *probandum*, *viz.*, 'heat,' is proved by tactual perception to be the property of fire which is the subject of the inference. The

*satpratipakṣa hetu* or ground is one which has a counter-ground opposed to it proving the negation of the *probandum* (in the subject of the inference). For example, the ground of the inference 'sound is eternal, because it is audible, just as is the class-character or generic nature of sounds' is countered and stopped from functioning by the ground of the inference 'sound is non-eternal, because it is an effect, just as is the jar.' A countered or hindered ground is also called a *prakaraṇasamaḥ hetu*.

Just as we have the fallacious ground or pseudo-ground (in various forms) so also we have the fallacies of the example or *udāharaṇa*, *i.e.*, fallacious examples or pseudo-examples (*udāharaṇābhāsāḥ*). There are many different kinds of the fallacious example. For example, with reference to examples illustrating relations of agreement in presence, we have first the case of a fallacious example which is bereft of relation to the *probandum*. Thus in the inference 'the mind is non-eternal, because it has shape; whatever has shape, is non-eternal; just as is the atom,' the 'atom' which is cited as illustrating the agreement in presence is a pseudo-example in this sense. For the atom is devoid of 'non-eternality' and so is devoid of relation to the *probandum*. Secondly, we may also have pseudo-examples that are bereft of relation to the ground. In the same inference if we say 'just as is action' (in place of 'just as is the atom') we shall have a pseudo-example bereft of relation to the ground, for action, though non-eternal, is yet devoid of 'shape.' And thirdly, we may also have fallacious examples which are bereft of relation both to the ground and the *probandum*, *e.g.*, in the same inference, if we say 'just as is ether' (in place of 'just as is the atom') we shall have a pseudo-example devoid of relation to the ground as well as the *probandum*. (Ether is devoid of shape and is devoid of non-eternality.) In the case of examples illustrating relations of agreement in absence, we may also have pseudo-examples devoid of relation to the absence of the *probandum*. For example, in the same inference if we say 'just as is action (by agreement in absence).' (Action is non-eternal and therefore is devoid of relation to the negation or absence of non-eternality.) Secondly, we may also have in such cases fallacious examples in the form of examples bereft of relation to the absence of the ground. For example in the same inference, if we say 'what is not non-eternal, is not an object with a shape, just as is the atom.' And lastly, we may have also fallacious examples bereft of relation both to the absence of the ground and the absence of the *probandum*. For example, in the same inference, if we say 'just as is the jar.' (The jar is non-eternal and therefore bereft of relation to the negation of non-eternality. The jar further has a shape

and is therefore bereft of relation to the negation of shape.)

All these (*i.e.*, the Nyāya fallacies so far set forth) we reject as untenable. Why? Because some of these so-called fallacies are not fallacies strictly speaking, while the rest are comprehended in 'conflicting evidence' and the other fallacies we have explained above.

The manner in which some of these so-called fallacies may be proved to be logically flawless as also the manner in which the rest may be shown to be comprehended in *our* enumerations of the fallacies are fully set forth in the *Paddhati* to which the reader is referred for an understanding thereof. We refrain from going over the same ground here for fear of prolixity. Thus everything (relating to inference) has been correctly and intelligibly set forth. This closes the chapter on *Anumāna* of the *Pramāṇacandrikā* which follows the track shown by the reverend feet of Srī Jayatīrtha. Let our heads bend in honour to the sage Vedavyasa and let us close with an invocation of the name of *Hari* and the incantation of *Om*.

We now proceed to discuss the nature of Authority or *Āgama* as a source of knowledge. Any verbal communication free from defects is *Āgama*. The qualification 'free from defects' (in the above definition) distinguishes *āgama* from the mere (deceptive) appearance thereof, while



the words 'verbal communication' differentiate it from perception and other sources of knowledge.

What, then, are the defects of a verbal communication? The defects of a verbal communication are:—(1) unintelligibility, (2) conveying of the opposite of the true or correct information, (3) conveying of what is already known, (4) conveying of useless information (for which nobody cares), (5) conveying of information not derived or sought for by the person to whom it is conveyed, (6) conveying of a command or injunction to accomplish the impossible, (7) conveying of advice of a more difficult means when easier means are well within reach, etc. Of these (1) unintelligibility is of two kinds, *viz.*, (*a*) unintelligibility due to want of significant words, and (*b*) unintelligibility due to want of intelligible relation (between the words of a verbal communication). Examples of the former are:—'Because *ka-ca-ṭa-ta-pa*'s are *ja-ba-ga-da-ha*' (*cf.* abracadabra). Examples of the latter are:—'The cow is a horse,' 'Man is an elephant,' 'The bowl is the cumin seed,' 'The ten apples are five cakes.' (2) Conveying the opposite of what is true is illustrated in the following:—'The world is unreal,' 'The Sūdras have the right of access to the Vedas,' 'The Brahmins have no such right,' etc. (3) Examples of conveying what is already known are:—'The sun rises in the east, and sets in the west,' 'Molasses are sweet,' 'The Nimba fruit is

bitter,' etc. The objection that 'conveying the known cannot be a defect as it adds to the force of the evidence that is already available (and thus strengthens our knowledge), misses the real point at issue. Later evidence strengthens our knowledge only where earlier evidence has failed to remove uncertainty and produce complete certitude in regard to that about which we were in doubt. (Hence where no uncertainty exists, the attempt at further enlightenment by means of verbal communication is waste of energy.) (4) Examples of stupid, pointless communications (for which nobody cares) are :—'How many teeth has the crow ?' 'What is the weight of the sheep's egg ?' 'How many threads of hair are there in the blanket?' 'What is the news of the province of *Cola?*' (*Cola* being the name of the place where the questioner himself lives), etc. (5) Examples of communications which are of no use to the persons to whom they are conveyed are :—'Advice of business and trade to one who has subdued the desires of the world,' etc. (6) Examples of communications enjoining the accomplishment of the impossible are :—'When alluding to a person who is dead and gone, one proceeds to describe an elixir that will bring the dead back to life and that may be found in the north of a certain hill called *Mṛtiharamahīdhara*,' etc. (7) Examples advising more difficult and less accessible remedies where easier ones are at hand are :—'To ask a



man to cut down something with an axe which he can easily remove by his finger-nails,' 'To advise a thirsty man on the Ganges banks to sink a well for quelling his thirst,' etc.

A verbal communication is made up of words and sentences. A word is a combination of letters with a case-ending. The words 'with a case-ending' (in the above definition) exclude non-sense combinations of letters like *ja-ba-ga-ḍa-da* (which are devoid of case-endings). A sentence is a combination of words characterised by mutual expectation, suitability of relation, and proximity (in time). Expectation is that relation of one word of a sentence to another (or others) of the same sentence without which the relation expressed by the sentence will not be apprehended, *e.g.*, in the sentence 'Bring the jar,' the verb ('bring') without the object ('jar') will not produce the apprehension of the relation of a verb to its object, and so the verb 'bring' has the relation of expectation to the object 'jar'. Or we may say, expectation is the fulfilling (on the part of the subsequest word) of the intent or expectation which is generated by the word preceding it (in a sentence). Therefore, 'The cow is a horse,' 'Man is an elephant,' etc., are not sentences, for in these the words do not expect, *i.e.*, enter into relation to, one another. Though 'expectation' is, strictly speaking, a property of consciousness, yet objects (denoted by words),

as producing in the hearers of their respective names an expectation of these objects in mutual relation, are also said to 'expect' one another. And as words (the names of objects) denote such objects (with mutual expectation), words also are said to have 'expectation.'

By suitability or fitness of relation (between the words of a sentence) is meant the absence in the cognised relation (between the said words) of any clash with valid evidence. Thus in the words 'moistening by water,' the relation of effect and cause which is asserted between the act of 'moistening' and the agency of 'water' remains uncontradicted by valid evidence. Here the compatibility of the relation between 'moistening' and the agency of 'water' constitutes the suitability or fitness of the relation between them. For this reason the words, 'He is moistening by means of fire,' do not constitute a real sentence, there being no suitability of relation in this case. Between 'fire' and the act of 'moistening' there is no question of a mutual agreement or compatibility of relation.

By proximity (in time) is meant the expressing of the words (in a sentence) without any long pause or interval of time between the different words. Thus the words, 'Bring the cow,' uttered without any long break or interval of time between them, have this character of proximity (in time). For this reason, the words,



'Bring the cow,' uttered separately, each after an hour or thereabout after the previous one, will not constitute a sentence, for they lack the character of sufficient (temporal) proximity (to produce a unity of meaning).

In verbal communication as a source of knowledge, the sentence is the instrumental cause, the recollection of the meanings of the constituent words, the intervening process, and the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, the result (of the process). Verbal communication also (like inference) conveys knowledge only of such correctly communicated objects as are accompanied by the knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words of the communication. In this respect it is unlike perception (as an instrument of knowledge) which makes things known by its bare existence (without being itself known or apprehended), for an authoritative communication like inference depends on a known instrumental cause (*i.e.*, the knowledge of the meanings of its constituent words). Otherwise the absurdity will follow that an authoritative knowledge will have to be admitted where a verbal declaration (of a truth), though existing in itself, has not been actually heard by a particular person, or, even though heard by him, has not been understood because of lack of knowledge of the meanings of the constituent words.

(We now proceed to discuss how words *mean* their respective objects.) Some hold that words like 'the cow,' etc., mean only class-characters, these being the first to be presented as attributes (as soon as the words are heard). The individuals are reached (mediately) through these class-characters which drag them behind themselves. Others hold that words mean the individuals as specified by their corresponding class-characters. According to this view, a class-name is subject to the conditions which regulate the use of words. Thus all words such as 'ether,' etc., mean specified individuals, these alone being the determining conditions of the use of words. Others hold that words like 'the jar,' etc., mean class-characters; proper names like 'Devadatta,' etc., mean individuals; words like 'possession of the dewlap' mean shape or make; while words like 'the cow,' etc., mean all the three. The real fact, however, is that the meaning of a word is just that object which is immediately presented to consciousness as soon as the word is heard. In the apprehension of the meaning of a word similarity acts as connecting or mediating link. Thus since the word 'jar' calls forth the idea both of 'individual jars' and 'the class-character of jars,' this word must be supposed to be capable of meaning both the 'class-character' and 'the individuals.' Again, since the word 'white' calls forth the idea of the quality of white colour as



well as the substrate of the quality (the white thing), it must be supposed to mean both 'the quality' and 'the substrate.' Similarly, the word 'gone' means both the action of 'having gone' and 'the agent of the action,' the word 'stick-in-hand' means both the 'stick' and 'the person, Devadatta, who holds it in his hand,' etc. Or, we may say, words like 'cow' etc., being nouns or substantives, must denote individuals, while words like 'bring,' etc., should mean attributes or adjectives. In combinations of words such as 'bring the cow,' the act of bringing being made possible through an individual agent of the act, the meaning should be conceived as consisting in the individual (in the individual agent of the act).

(The question now has to be discussed, how we acquire a knowledge of the meanings of words.) Our view is that we learn the meanings of words from the signs made with the fingers (by our elders while uttering the words). Thus the child sitting on the person of its father or mother begins to learn the meanings of words when the said father or mother tries to rouse it from a state of inattention and to draw its attention towards himself or herself and to the words which he or she may utter, by making signs with the fingers, or by producing a soft sound by striking one finger-tip against another. In this way the child is taught the

meanings of such sentences as 'Child, that is your mother,' 'that, your father,' 'that, your brother,' 'the man is eating the plantain fruit,' etc. Thus by the said signs the child gradually learns that the said words are related in a general way to the said objects pointed out by these gestures and that the relation is the relation of meaning or signifying these objects. Later on when such words as 'This is your sister,' 'That is your friend,' 'He is eating a cake,' etc., are uttered in his presence, and he begins to note the different contexts in which these different words are uttered, he learns, through the differences of the contexts, to distinguish the *specific* meanings that attach to particular words, *e.g.*, that the word 'mother' attaches to 'the female parent,' etc. Others however opine that the meanings of words are learnt from the behaviour of the seniors or elders. Thus the inquisitive child, when he hears a senior say to a junior, 'Bring the cow,' and notes that immediately afterwords the junior is prompted to the act of bringing the cow, concludes by agreement and difference that the action of the junior is prompted by the knowledge produced by the words of the senior. And so assuring himself, when he hears other sentences spoken in other contexts such as 'Bring the horse,' 'Secure the cow with a rope,' etc., he gathers from the divergent contexts that the word



'cow' means one particular kind of animal, the word 'horse,' animal of a different kind, etc. But this view is not tenable. The quickly-forgetful child cannot possibly retain the consciousness of the word he hears till the actual bringing of the object desired.

A word has two kinds of function or *vṛtti*, *viz.*, (1) primary (*mukhyā*) and (2) non-primary or secondary (*amukhyā*). The direct or primary function of a word is its *śakti* or power of referring to, or meaning, a particular object. *Śakti* is defined as that relation between a word and an object which is conducive to the recollection of the object (as soon as the word is heard). *Samaya*, *saṅgati*, *saṅketa*, *vācaka*, etc., are used as synonyms of *śakti*. This *śakti* is of three kinds, *viz.*, *yogaḥ*, *rūḍhiḥ* and *yogarūḍhiḥ*. Of these, the power to refer to an object by virtue of the powers of the constituent parts of the word is *yogaḥ*. The power of meaning which belongs to a word as a whole irrespective of the powers of its constituent parts is *rūḍhiḥ*. Lastly, the power of meaning which is derived from both (*i.e.*, both from the word as a whole and the meanings of the constituent parts) is *yogarūḍhiḥ*. Of these, some words mean their respective objects through the meanings of its constituent parts only, such as the words *pāṭhaka* (reader), *pācaka* (cook), *daṇḍī* (the man with a stick in hand), *kuṇḍalī* (the coiling thing), etc.

Some words, again, mean their respective objects by the powers inherent in the words as a whole irrespective of the powers of the constituents. Such are words like *ghaṭa* (jar), *paṭa* (piece of cloth), etc. Lastly, some words mean objects through their powers as a whole as reinforced by the powers of the constituents such as the word *paṅkaja* (the lotus), etc. In this manner all other words with primary meanings, such as the *mahāyogaḥ*, etc., should be understood (as signifying their objects).

The non-primary or secondary function of a word is called *Lakṣaṇā* or Implication. Implication is a kind of relation to the object of a word's *śakti* or power of meaning. There are two kinds of Implication, *viz.*, (1) Implication which is independent of relation to the direct meaning (*Jahallakṣaṇā*), and (2) Implication in which the direct meaning also enters as a factor (*ajahallakṣaṇā*). 'The milkman lives in the Ganges' illustrates the former. (Here 'the Ganges' means not the river, but the banks of the river Ganges.) 'Men with umbrellas are going' illustrates the latter. (Here *chatriṇaḥ*, *i.e.*, 'men with umbrellas,' means 'pedestrians.') According to another classification, Implication is of the following two kinds, *viz.*, (1) Implication in which the implied meaning is independent of any special end or purpose to be subserved, and (2) Implication depending on some purpose that is subserved. 'Travellers are going' is an example of the former. (Here '*mārgāḥ*,' literally 'roads,' means 'travellers' by implication.) Here the traversing of the roads by travellers being observed to happen without any special end or purpose to be served, such implication is also called *rūḍhalakṣaṇā*. 'The milkman lives in the Ganges' is an example of the latter. (Here 'the Ganges' means 'the banks of the Ganges.') In this case 'living near the Ganges' being prompted by considerations of sanctity and the like, the implication is called *kevalalakṣaṇā*. The inapplicability or failure of the primary meaning is the real cause of an implication. In a similar way should be conceived other non-primary functions of words such as the *gauṇī* (the deferred), etc.



*Āgama*, *i.e.*, an authoritative verbal communication is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) communication having a personal source, and (2) communication devoid of a personal source. The *Ṛg-veda* and other orthodox scriptures are the impersonal *Āgamas*, or *Āgamas* without a personal source. Valid personal communications are those recorded in the Mahābhārata and other sacred works. Thus, it is said, "Scriptures are of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) the eternal, and (2) the non-eternal. Such, for example, are the Vedas beginning with *Ṛg-veda*, the Mahābhārata, the Pañcarātra, the original Rāmāyaṇa, and the Purāṇas. All these

as also all those that follow in the wake of these are to be regarded as the (authoritative) sacred scriptures. Those that are other than these, *O Janārdana*, they are heretical and should not be regarded as authoritative scriptures, etc."

But it may be said: 'The Vedas have a personal source, because they consist of collections of sentences, just as are the verses of Kālidāsa and the rest.' Our reply is, this conclusion does not follow, the inference in question being vitiated by the presence of an extraneous condition. The extraneous condition is 'a personal origin established by tradition.' In other words, 'a collection of sentences' (which is the ground of the inference) is in itself no proof of a personal origin. It is a sign thereof only on the condition that such personal origin is *established by tradition*.

But it may be said: 'The Vedas are devoid of evidential value and validity, because despite the due accomplishment of the Vedic prescriptions the promised fruits are not realised, just as are the hopes generated by the utterances of deceitful people.' Our reply is, this is not the case, because the above inference contradicts the following valid reasoning:—'The Vedas are authoritative, because they consist of impersonal prescriptions, *i.e.*, of sentences without a personal origin, just as are the lunatic's ravings by agreement in absence.' (The lunatic's ravings are



non-authoritative, and they are not without a personal source. And thus they illustrate the agreement in absence 'what is not authoritative is also not without a personal source.') It cannot be said that this inference entails the fallacy of an *asiddha hetu* or unestablished ground. For *śruti* (authoritative scripture) declares that the sentences of the Vedas (*i.e.*, the Vedic prescriptions) are eternal verities. (Thus the eternity, *i.e.*, lack of a personal origin, in respect of the Vedic sentences, is not *asiddha* or unestablished.) *Smṛti* (*i.e.*, the secondary scriptures derived from the primary scriptures) also declares that the Vedic sentences are without beginning and without end, are eternal or timeless, have inherent authority and are self-existent. Nor is non-fruitfulness or non-efficacy of Vedic prescriptions a proof of invalidity (of the Vedas), for the prescriptions being seen to bear the promised fruits only in the properly qualified agents accomplishing them, the non-perception of the fruits in other cases must be attributed to the inherent disqualifications of the agents.

But it may be said: '*Āgama* is not valid evidence, bacause it does not prove anything, just as a deceitful utterance.' Thus the *viṣaya* or object to be proved by valid evidence is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) the immediate, and (2) the remote or mediate. Of these, the immediate is

the object evidenced by perception. There is no other object, besides these two, which can serve as an object to be established by the evidence of *Āgama* or authoritative communication. If you say that *Āgama* causes the knowledge of the mediate, then as, in your view, nothing is valid independent evidence which causes the knowledge of the already known, and *Āgama* has application only to objects proved by other forms of evidence, so all *Āgamas* will be shorn of evidential value as wanting in any distinctive objects to be proved thereby. All this, we reply, is wrong. Just as the evidential value of visual perception in regard to objects distinct from the objects of hearing cannot be denied inspite of the fact that visual perception proves only immediate objects just as hearing does, so also the evidence of *Āgama* in regard to objects distinct from the objects of inference, *e.g.*, in regard to such special objects as heavenly happiness, liberation, etc. (which are not objects of inference), is unimpeachable despite the fact that *Āgama* is indistinguishable from inference in the matter of the mediateness of the objects it proves. It cannot be said that 'heavenly happiness,' 'liberation,' etc., are objects of inferential proof, and so *Āgama* is devoid of any special objects to be established by its evidence. For if you say this, we shall say contrarywise that *Āgama* as being evidence of mediate objects (such as



'heavenly happiness,' etc.) is a valid source of knowledge, while inference, being devoid of proper special objects (*i.e.*, objects not characterised by the mediateness that characterises the objects proved by *Āgama*) is devoid of evidential authority.

The *Vaiśesikas* hold that *Āgama* is included in (*i.e.*, is a variety of) inference. But this view is wrong, for even in the absence of the recollection of invariable concomitance and the like, there is realisation of the meaning of a verbal communication, this being a matter of common experience.

Bhāskara and his followers hold that *Āgama* without a personal source is independent evidence, but *Āgama* having a personal origin is a variety of inference. This also is a wrong view. For the sum of conditions for the comprehension of the import of sentences, *viz.*, expectancy, suitability of mutual relation between the constituent words, etc., being identical in both (*i.e.*, both Personal and Impersonal *Āgama*), there is no valid ground for assuming any special character attaching to only one of these.

Thus have we described all the three forms of evidence or *Pramāṇa*. Anything other than these (three) is not a *pramāṇa* or valid source of knowledge.

But it may be said: there is another form of evidence distinct from the above three, *viz.*,

*Arthāpatti* or Presumption. When a thing or event is seen to be inexplicable except on the assumption of something else and when on the basis of our observation of this otherwise inexplicable thing we are led to presume that which is necessary to account for it, we proceed according to the method of *Arthāpatti* or Presumption as a source of knowledge. Thus when we learn by perception or reliable testimony that *Caitra* is alive and yet is not in the house, we at once presume that he must be somewhere outside, for absence inside of one who is alive is not explicable except on the assumption of his existence outside. Hence the proof here of outside existence consists in the *Arthāpatti* or Presumption which is created therefor by the otherwise inexplicable fact of inside non-existence of one who is alive. This process is distinct from the processes of perception and the rest, for outside existence is not an object of perception and the rest.

This, we hold, is not the case, for the so-called presumption is only an inference (in disguise). (The inference is as follows :—) '*Caitra* must exist outside, because, though alive, he is absent inside; whoever is alive, and does not exist in a certain place, must exist in some other place, just as I myself do.' This inference being quite competent to produce the knowledge of the outside existence, what is the



use of assuming a separate source of knowledge such as Presumption? In this inference the words 'though living' preclude the case of the dead (who are non-existent because not alive). Similarly, the substantive (qualified by the adjective 'though alive'), *i.e.*, 'absence inside,' precludes the case of Devadatta and the like who are existent within the house.

But it may be said: there is another separate source of knowledge, *viz.*, comparison. Comparison (*Upamāna*) is the cognition of an object as characterised by likeness to another, *e.g.*, of likeness to the cow as produced by the recollection of a comparative statement as an auxiliary condition. Thus a person ignorant of the meaning of the word 'gavaya' first learns from a forester that 'gavaya' means 'an animal resembling a cow.' Thereafter when later on he comes across in a forest an animal looking like a cow, he recollects the previous advice of the forester that '*gavaya* is an animal like a cow.' Thereon the knowledge dawns on him 'That animal (resembling the cow) must be what is meant by the word *gavaya*.' As this knowledge is not caused by perception and the rest, the process (which generates the knowledge) is regarded as an independent source of knowledge called *Upamāna* or comparison.

This, we hold, is not the case, for (the so-called) comparison is really comprised in inference. The inference in such cases is as

follows :—'The subject of the enquiry is the meaning of the word *gavaya*, because, not being a cow, it possesses resemblance to a cow, just as is the jar by agreement in absence.' (What is not the meaning of *gavaya*, is also not that which, not being a cow, bears resemblance to the cow, just as is the jar which is not the meaning of *gavaya* and is also not that which, not being a cow, bears resemblance to the cow.) To preclude illegitimate application to a second cow resembling a first cow, the words 'not being a cow' have been included, and to preclude illegitimate application to the jar and the rest, the substantive 'that which bears resemblance to the cow' has been included.

But it may be said: there is yet another separate source of knowledge, *viz.*, negation or *Abhāva*. This must be admitted in order to account for the cognition of negation. Thus non-apprehension (*i.e.*, negation or absence of apprehension) of the jar and the rest assures us of the absence or negation of the jar, etc. This non-apprehension is just the negation or absence of apprehension. The non-apprehension being apprehended or realised in consciousness, the negation, *i.e.*, the absence, of the jar, etc., is also cognised or apprehended.

This is not the case, we say; for this so-called negation as a source of knowledge is in reality comprehended in one or other of the



*Pramāṇas* we have explained above. Thus, according to our view, that which causes the knowledge of negation (in a particular case) is the *Pramāṇa* or evidence of the negation in that case. For example, the evidence in regard to the present non-existence of the *Kauravas* is the *testimony* of the Mahābhārata. In the case of Devadatta's lack of vision we have the following *inference* as proof or evidence of the lack or negation :—'The subject of controversy (Devadatta) is devoid of vision, because he is ignorant of the nature of colours.' Similarly, the absence of pleasure, etc., is evidenced by the immediate intuition of the witnessing intelligence. The realisation of the non-existence of a jar before oneself results from a quickly-produced perception. It is not an effect of non-apprehension only, for it has the nature of an immediate positive experience. No doubt, a proximate non-apprehension is also an indispensable condition. But the mere fact of a proximate non-apprehension as an indispensable condition does not constitute the latter an independent source of knowledge, for in that case by a similar line of reasoning one may say that in the cognition of positive reality the non-apprehension of its negation is the real evidence or proof. Where in the midst of darkness we cognise the absence of a jar and the like by means of exploring with the hands, the non-apprehension

*qua* non-apprehension is not the real cause of our knowledge of the negation or absence. The non-apprehension is a cause here only as it is treated as a sign or mark serving as the ground of an inference. The inference in such cases is as follows :—'The jar does not exist here, for, though fit to be perceived, it is not actually observed here, just as an elephant.' But it may be said : a negation or absence being admittedly incapable of positively stimulating the sensibilities, we cannot sensibly talk of negation being perceived by the senses. Our reply is : this is not the case as there is no bar to a negation being in contact with the sensibilites just as there is none with respect to a positive entity.

But it may be said : we have mathematical or quantitative reasonings (*sambhava*) and these should constitute a separate source of knowledge. Thus when the cognition of the greater leads to the cognition of the less we have *sambhava* or quantitative reasoning. For example, the knowledge that there is one hundred yields or establishes the knowledge that there is fifty-five.

To this our reply is : quantitative reasoning is only a variety of inference. The inference here is as follows : 'Devadatta must own fifty-five, because he owns one-hundred, just as I myself do.'

There is another kind of knowing, *viz.*, knowing by the method of exhaustion. Thus when



by eliminating other possible alternatives one after another we arrive at the last or remaining alternative, our knowledge of the truth of this last alternative is gained by the method of exhaustion. It is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) that which proceeds by the method of affirmation, and (2) that which proceeds by the method of negation or exclusion. The former is illustrated in the following :—When we know that the two persons before us are *Caitra* and *Maitra*, then the knowledge, 'this one of the two persons is *Caitra*,' entails the knowledge, 'the other one is *Maitra*.' The second is illustrated in the following :—When we know that the two persons before us are *Caitra* and *Maitra*, then the knowledge, 'this one (of the two) is not *Caitra*' entails the knowledge, 'this, then, must be *Maitra*.'

This also, we hold, is a case of inferential knowledge. The inference is as follows : The disputed subject is *Maitra*, because, being either *Caitra* or *Maitra*, he is not *Caitra* (in fact), just as is *Caitra* (by agreement in absence). (In other words he who is not *Maitra*, is also not he who, being either *Caitra* or *Maitra*, is not *Caitra*, just as is *Caitra*, who is not *Maitra* and is also not he who, being either *Caitra* or *Maitra*, is not *Caitra*.) Here to preclude the illegitimate extension of the *hetu* to the cases of the jar, etc., the words 'being either *Caitra* or *Maitra*' have been included.

*Upakrama*, etc., are also forms of inference, for they produce an inferential knowledge of the purport of sentences. An unbroken continuum of tradition without any known originator thereof is *Aitihya* or Tradition. For example, the hearsay, 'In this fig-tree lives a demon' (is a case of *aitihya*). This is nothing but verbal testimony (and should not count as an independent source of knowledge). So also all the rest such as omens and signs (*Śakuna*), written language (*lipi*), gesture language (*cestā*) —all these as sources of knowledge are included in the forms of evidence (*i.e.*, the three we have explained) we have set forth above. We shall now explain the nature of validity itself. The intrinsic nature of validity is of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) intrinsicality in respect of origin (*utpatti*), and (2) intrinsicality in respect of verification in consciousness (*jñapti*). Of these, intrinsicality in respect of origin means that the validity arises from the same conditions as cause the cognition itself of which the validity is a logical character. In other words, validity being an intrinsic or essential character of a cognition in the matter of its origin means that the causes which produce a cognition are also the causes which produce the validity of the cognition. By intrinsicality in respect of verification in knowledge is meant that the validity is apprehended by the same agency as is the cognition itself of which it is a logical character. In other



words, validity being an intrinsic or inherent character of a cognition in respect of its being known as such means that that which apprehends the cognition also apprehends the validity of the cognition.

The extrinsicality of invalidity is likewise of two kinds, *viz.*, (1) extrinsicality in respect of the origin of the invalidity, and (2) extrinsicality in respect of its confirmation in consciousness as such. Of these, extrinsicality or adventitiousness in respect of origin means that the invalidity arises from conditions other than those which cause the cognition itself. Again, extrinsicality in respect of the invalidity being known as such means that the invalidity is cognised by an agency other than the agency which cognises or apprehends the cognition itself. Thus everything has been set forth in its proper place.

The Sānkhya philosophers however hold that both validity and invalidity are intrinsic alike in respect of their origin and their being known as such. The Naiyāyikas, on the contrary, hold that both are extrinsic. And they say in this connection that a cognition itself is caused by the sense-organs, etc., while the validity of the cognition is caused by the presence of certain specially efficacious qualities in the usual causes of a cognition. Similarly, the invalidity of the cognition is due to the presence

of certain special defects or deficiencies in the causes of a cognition. And so also (in the matter of being known) a cognition itself is cognised immediately by internal perception by the mind. But the validity of a cognition is cognised mediately by inference from the mark or sign of successful or unsuccessful practical re-action. Thus the general condition (according to Nyāya) of valid cognition is an efficacious quality (in the cause), and the general condition of invalid cognition is a certain defect or deficiency (in the cause). The Buddhists, again, say: invalidity is intrinsic while validity is extrinsic. But the real fact is, both the cognition and its validity are caused by the sense-organs and the rest. But the invalidity is generated by the sense-organs, etc., together with certain defects as auxiliary conditions. Similarly, both the cognition and its validity are cognised immediately by the witnessing intelligence. But the invalid cognition is cognised only as cognition by the witnessing intelligence. The invalidity of it is known mediately by inference from the mark of practical unfruitfulness or failure.

But it may be said: the position taken by the author here is not tenable. The author's view is: the agency which cognises the cognition also cognises the validity thereof. Further the power of the instruments of cognition to produce the cognition becomes the power to produce its



invalidity when aided by the special causes of invalidity. The power thus becomes as it were a different power through the influence of the defects in the matter of producing invalidity. Moreover, the cognition of these instruments takes place through a different agency, for the sense-organs, etc., are themselves cognised each by its own *pramāṇa* or suitable knowing process (*e.g.*, the sense-organs are cognised by inference from the results which their actions produce). At the same time their conduciveness to the production of valid knowledge is also cognised by inference (*i.e.*, by another inference from the mark of practical fruitfulness). But why should this be so? (*i.e.*, Why should you suppose that the agency which cognises a cognition also cognises its validity, but the fitness of the sensibilities to produce a valid cognition is not cognised by the same agency, *i.e.*, the inference that cognises the sensibilities themselves?) What is the bar to the supposition that the validity is cognised by an agency other than that which cognises the cognition (just as the fitness of the sensibilities is cognised by an inference different from that which cognises the sensibilities themselves)?

Our reply to this is: this cannot be admitted, because any such admission will entail an infinite regress. Thus we say: the validity of a valid cognition must itself be cognised as such by some valid cognition, otherwise there will be no

valid cognition anywhere. And such validity cannot possibly be cognised by any agency other than that which cognises the cognition itself. In the event of any other agency apprehending the validity, the validity of this apprehension will itself have to be apprehended by another (*i.e.*, a third) apprehension, thus leading to an infinite regress. And if to avoid the infinite regress we say that the second cognition apprehending the validity of the primary cognition is self-validating or self-evident, then so may also be the primary cognition. Therefore by the method of elimination of other possible alternatives, the intrinsicality of validity is established as the only position that remains unshaken. It cannot be said that the objection of an infinite regress holds equally in respect of our view that the validity is immediately cognised by the witnessing Intelligence, for the witnessing Intelligence (in our view) is self-revealing and as such reveals both itself and its validity. But why not assume the same with regard to cognition also? Because, we reply, cognition being a state or function of the internal organ is non-intelligent and as such is incapable of self-illumination or self-revelation. The validity of the instruments should be understood on the lines of the *Paddhati*. Thus is everything beautifully explained.



This brings the chapter on *Āgama* in the *Pramāṇacandrikā* by Srimacchalāriśeṣācārya to a close.

May the sage Srī Vedavyāsa be pleased.

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# प्रमाणचन्द्रिका

## प्रथमः परिच्छेदः

श्रीमद्धनुमद्भीममध्वान्तर्गत-रामकृष्णवेदव्यासात्मकलक्ष्मीहयग्रीवाय नमः ॥ हरिः ॐ ॥

लक्ष्मीपतेः पदाम्भोजयुगं नत्वा गुरोरपि ।
प्रमाणचन्द्रिकां कुर्मो बालानां बोधसिद्धये ॥

इह खलु सुखमेव मे स्याद् दुःखं मनागपि मा भूदिति निखिलापेक्षितमोक्षस्य भगवत्तदन्यस्वातन्त्र्यास्वातन्त्र्यज्ञानसाध्यत्वान्मुमुक्षुणा परतन्त्रमिदं स्वतन्त्रभगवदायत्ततयाऽवश्यं वेदितव्यम् । तदुक्तं भाष्यकारैः ।

य एतत्परतन्त्रं तु सर्वमेव हरेः सदा ।
वशमित्येव जानाति संसारान्मुच्यते हि स इति ॥

परापरतत्त्वज्ञानं च प्रमाणाधीनमिति तन्निरूपणार्थमिदं प्रकरणमारभ्यते । यद्यपि जयार्यैरेव पद्धत्यादौ प्रमाणलक्षणादिकं सविस्तरं प्रतिपादितम्, तथापि भावगम्भीरैरपि वाक्यैर्वर्णितमिति नाल्पप्रज्ञैः सुखेन शक्यते बोद्धुमिति तेषां तद्बोधनार्थं प्रायेण तदुक्तमेव किञ्चित्प्रमेयं संक्षेपेण प्रतिपादयितुमिदं प्रकरणमिति न वैयर्थ्यविरोधः ।

प्रमाणादिज्ञानं च उद्देशादित्रिकाधीनमिति उद्देशादीनां लक्षणमुच्यते ॥ नाममात्रेण वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनमुद्देशः । उद्देश इति

लक्ष्यनिर्देशः। नाममात्रेण वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनमिति लक्षणोक्तिः। एवमुत्तरत्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्। कीर्तनं शब्दः। तावन्मात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे गङ्गायां घोषेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय सङ्कीर्तनमिति। तदर्थस्तु वर्णात्मकशब्दत्वम्। तावन्मात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे वन्ध्यासुत इत्यादिशब्दे गतम्। अतो वस्त्विति। तावन्मात्रस्य लक्षणत्वे काकरवे गतम्। अतो नाम्नेति। गीर्वाणभाषयेत्यर्थः। तथापि गन्धवती पृथिवीत्यादिलक्षणवाक्येऽतिव्याप्तिः। तत्परिहारार्थं मात्रेणेति। तस्य लक्षणतया अप्रयुक्तत्वे सतीत्यर्थः। गन्धवती पृथिवीत्यादिलक्षणवाक्यस्य तु गीर्वाणभाषया वस्तुसंकीर्तनत्वेऽपि लक्षणतयाऽप्रयुक्तत्वाभावान्नातिव्याप्तिः। तथा च लक्षणतया अप्रयुक्तत्वे सति संस्कृतनाम्ना वस्तुप्रतिपादकशब्दः उद्देश इति पर्यवस्यति॥ केचिद्गन्धवती पृथिवीत्यादिलक्षणवाक्ये अतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रेणेति तस्यासाधारणधर्मानुपरागेणेत्यर्थः। तथा च गन्धवती पृथिवीतिलक्षणवाक्ये गन्धवत्त्वरूपासाधारण-धर्मोपरागेणैव वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनत्वेन तदनुपरागेण वस्तुसङ्कीर्तनत्वा-भावान्नातिव्याप्तिः। न च पृथिवीत्याद्युद्देशे असम्भवः। तस्य पृथिवीत्वादिरूपासाधारणधर्मोपरागेणैव वस्तुप्रतिपादकत्वादिति वाच्यम्। लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकातिरिक्तासाधारणधर्मानुपरागेण वस्तुप्रतिपादकशब्दत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वादित्याहुः। तन्न। पृथिवीत्ववती पृथिवीतिलक्षणवाक्येऽतिव्याप्तेः। तस्य लक्ष्यता-वच्छेदकातिरिक्तासाधारणधर्मानुपरागेण वस्तुप्रतिपादकत्वात्॥

लक्ष्यमात्रव्यापको धर्मो लक्षणम्। सकललक्ष्यवृत्तित्वे सति लक्ष्येतरावृत्तित्वमित्यर्थः। यथा गोः सास्नादिमत्त्वं, तच्च गोमात्रवृत्ति, नास्ति चागोषु। धर्मो लक्षणमित्युक्ते एक-शफत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतो लक्ष्येति। लक्ष्यवृत्तिधर्म इत्यर्थः।



तावत्युक्ते शबलत्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय लक्ष्यव्यापकेति। तावत्युक्ते शृङ्गित्वेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तत्परिहाराय लक्ष्यमात्रेति॥ सजातीयविजातीयव्यावृत्तिर्व्यवहारश्च लक्षणज्ञानप्रयोजनम्। लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकसाक्षाद्व्यापकजात्यवच्छिन्नमिह सजातीयम्। तदनवच्छिन्नं च विजातीयमिह विवक्षितम्। गोलक्षणे गोत्वं लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकं तस्य साक्षाद्व्यापकं पशुत्वम्। तदवच्छिन्ना अश्वादयस्सजातीयाः। तदनवच्छिन्ना घटादयो विजातीयाः। साक्षाद्व्यापकत्वं नाम तद्व्यापकाव्यापकत्वे सति तद्व्यापकत्वम्। पशुत्वस्य लक्ष्यतावच्छेदकगोत्वव्यापक-पृथिवीत्वाव्यापकत्वे सति गोत्वव्यापकत्वात् साक्षाद्व्यापकत्वं बोध्यम्। तेन प्रमेयत्वादिना सर्वस्यापि सजातीयत्वेन विजातीयस्याभावात् कथमेतदिति दोषानवकाशः। एवं सर्वेष्वपि लक्षणेषु सजातीयादि ज्ञेयम्॥ सकललक्ष्यवृत्तित्वे सति लक्ष्येतरावृत्तित्वाभावरूपो धर्मस्त्वलक्षणम्। इदं च विशिष्टा-भावरूपम्। विशिष्टाभावश्च त्रिविधः। विशेष्याभावेन विशेषणाभावेन उभयाभावेन चेति। तत्र शृङ्गित्वरूपे अलक्षणे विशेष्याभावेन विशिष्टाभावो द्रष्टव्यः। शबलत्वरूपालक्षणे विशेषणाभावेन विशिष्टाभावो ज्ञातव्यः। एकशफत्वरूपालक्षणे उभयाभावाद्विशिष्टाभावो ज्ञेयः॥

युक्तायुक्तचिन्ता परीक्षा। अलक्ष्ये लक्षणगमनमतिव्याप्तिः। लक्ष्यैकदेशे लक्षणस्यावर्तनमव्याप्तिः। लक्ष्ये क्वाप्यवर्तनम-सम्भवः॥ यस्य लक्षणमुच्यते तल्लक्ष्यम्॥

तत्रादौ प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणमुच्यते। यथार्थं प्रमाणम्। यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वं प्रमाणत्वमित्यर्थः। यद्यप्यत्र बहु वक्तव्यमस्ति तथाप्यत्र बालानामधिकारात् बुद्धिमतां

पदत्वेव ज्ञातुं शक्यत्वाच्च नेहोच्यते ॥ एवमुत्तरत्रापि ज्ञातव्यम् । ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वमात्रस्य संशयविपर्ययसाधारण्यात् यथावस्थितेति-विशेषणोपादानम् । यथावस्थितं प्रमाणमित्युक्ते प्रमातृ-प्रमेययोरतिव्याप्तिः । अतो ज्ञेयविषयीकारीत्युक्तम् । अत्र साक्षाद् वा परम्परया वा ज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वम् विवक्षितमिति न प्रत्यक्षादावव्याप्तिः । न चैवमननुगमः तस्यादोषत्वात् ॥ प्रमावान् प्रमाता । प्रमाविषयः प्रमेयम् । यथार्थज्ञानम् प्रमा । ज्ञानमित्यनुक्तौ करणेऽतिव्याप्तिः । यथार्थेत्यनुक्तौ संशयादौ ॥

नतु किमिदं संशयत्वम् । अनवधारणत्वं तदिति चेत्, न । अवधारणत्वं निश्चयत्वम् तच्च संशयभिन्नज्ञानत्वम् । संशयत्वं च निश्चयभिन्नज्ञानत्वमित्यन्योन्याश्रयत्वादिति चेत्, न । अनवधारणज्ञानस्यैव संशयलक्षणत्वात् । न चान्योन्याश्रयः । एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि भासमानविरुद्धानेकाकारावगाहिज्ञानस्यैव अनवधारणज्ञानपदेन विवक्षितत्वात् । ज्ञानं संशय इत्युक्ते अयं घट इति ज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः । अतोऽनेकाकारावगाहीत्युक्तम् । तावत्युक्ते स्थाणुपुरुषौ घटपटस्तम्भकुम्भा इत्यादि समूहा-लम्बनेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तत्परिहारार्थमेकस्मिन् धर्मिणीति । तावत्युक्ते वृक्षः शिंशपा, घटो द्रव्यमित्यादिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः । अतो विरुद्धेति । तावत्युक्ते इदं रजतमिति भ्रमेऽतिव्याप्तिः । अतो भासमानेति । अत्र विरोधे भासमानत्वस्य विवक्षितत्वान्नोक्तदोष इत्यवधेयम् । तस्य संशयस्य निर्णायकाभावसहकृताः साधारण-धर्मासाधारणधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्युपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धयः पञ्च कारणानीति केचिदाहुः । तत्र साधारणधर्मजन्यः संशयो यथा । स्थाणु-पुरुषयोः साधारणमूर्ध्वतालक्षणं धर्मं पुरोवर्तिन्युपलभ्य स्थाणु-



पुरुषौ स्मृत्वा विशेषजिज्ञासायां स्थाणुत्वनिश्चायकं वक्रकोटरादिकं पुरुषत्वनिश्चायकं शिरःपाण्यादिकमनुपलभमानस्य डोलायमानं संशयज्ञानमुत्पद्यते किमयं स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति ॥ असाधारण-धर्मजन्यः संशयो यथा । शब्दे चाकाशविशेषगुणत्वमसाधारण-धर्ममुपलभमानस्य निर्णायकमजानतः संशयो भवति किमयं शब्दो नित्योऽनित्यो वेति ॥ विप्रतिपत्तिजन्यः संशयो यथा । इन्द्रियेषु वैशेषिकसाङ्ख्ययोः भौतिकत्वाभौतिकत्वविप्रतिपत्तिं पश्यतो निश्चायकमपश्यतः संशयो भवति किमिन्द्रियाणि भौतिकानि उताभौतिकानीति ॥ उपलब्धिजन्यः संशयो यथा । कूपखननानन्तरं जलोपलब्धौ सत्यां निश्चायकाभावे संशयो भवति । किं प्राक् सदेवोदकं कूपखननेनाभिव्यक्तं सदुपलभ्यते उतासदेवोत्पन्नमिति ॥ अनुपलब्धिजन्यः संशयो यथा । अस्मिन्वटे पिशाचोऽस्तीति वार्तां श्रुतवतो हि वटसमीपगतस्य पिशाचानुपलब्धौ सत्यां निर्णायकाभावे संशयो भवति । किं विद्यमान एव पिशाचोऽन्तर्धानशक्त्या नोपलभ्यते किंवाऽविद्यमान एवेति ॥ उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्योः साधारणधर्मं एवान्तर्भावात् त्रीण्येव कारणानीत्यपरे ॥ उपलब्धेः साधारण्यं कथम् । उप-लब्धिर्हि अन्धकारे सतामेव घटादीनामालोकानयनेन दृष्टा । असतां घटादीनां कुलालादिव्यापारानन्तरमिति ॥ अनुपलब्धेः साधारण्यं कथम् । अनुपलब्धिर्हि सतामीश्वरादीनामसतां शश-विषाणादीनां च दृष्टेति ॥ असाधारणधर्मविप्रतिपत्त्योरपि साधारणधर्म एवान्तर्भावात् साधारणधर्म एक एव संशयहेतुरिति तत्त्वम् ॥ एतयोरन्तर्भावप्रकारस्तु पद्धत्युक्तप्रकारेण ज्ञेयः ॥

तदभाववत्येव तत्प्रकारकावधारणरूपज्ञानं विपर्ययः । ज्ञानं विपर्यय इत्युक्ते संशयेऽतिव्याप्तिः । तद्व्युदासार्थम् अवधारण-

रूपमिति। तावत्युक्ते सम्यग्ज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतस्तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकेति। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानं विपर्यय इत्युक्ते पुनः संशयेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽवधारणेति। तदभाववति तत्प्रकारकावधारणरूपज्ञानं विपर्यय इत्युक्ते वृक्षः कपिसंयोगीति प्रमायामतिव्याप्तिः। संयोगस्याव्याप्यवृत्तित्वात्। अतः, एवेति॥ स च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाभासेभ्यो जायते। तत्र प्रत्यक्षाभासतो यथा। शुक्तिकायां रजतमिति। अनुमानाभासतो यथा धूलीपटले धूमभ्रमाद् वह्न्यभाववति वह्न्यनुमितिः। आगमाभासतो यथा। नदीतीरे पञ्च फलानि सन्तीति प्रतारकवाक्यजन्यं ज्ञानम्॥

ननु यथावस्थितज्ञेयविषयीकारित्वं प्रमाणलक्षणमिति यदुक्तं तदनुपपन्नम्। स्मृतावतिव्याप्तेरिति चेत्, न।

स्मृतिः प्रत्यक्षमैतिह्यमनुमान*श्चतुष्टयम्।
प्रमाणमिति विज्ञेयं धर्माद्यर्थं मुमुक्षुभिः॥

इति श्रुत्यादेः स्मृतिप्रामाण्यस्य सिद्धत्वात्॥ केचित् प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणमिति वदन्ति। तत्र प्रमेत्यनुक्तौ परत्वादावतिव्याप्तिः। प्रेत्यनुक्तौ प्रमाणाभासेऽतिव्याप्तिः। करणमित्यनुक्तौ असम्भवः। फलेऽतिव्याप्तिश्चेति। तत्र, फलेऽव्याप्तेः। प्रमाव्याप्तं प्रमाणमित्यपरः। तदपि न सम्भवति। यदा घटादि

* For the use of the word अनुमान in masculine, compare—

महाभाष्यकृतः कोऽसावनुमान इति स्मृतिः।
ल्युडन्तोऽपि न पुंलिङ्गो मानशब्दः प्रदुष्यति॥

*Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, ch., śl. 70.



सर्वं प्रमेयम् ईश्वरः प्रमाता तदा सर्वप्रमेयस्येश्वरप्रमाव्याप्तत्वेन प्रमेयेऽतिव्याप्तिः। साधनाश्रययोरन्यतरत्वे सति प्रमाव्याप्तत्वं विवक्षितमिति चेत्, न। आश्रयपदवैयर्थ्यात्। नन्वीश्वरस्यापि प्रामाण्यात्तत्राव्याप्तिपरिहारार्थं तदिति चेत्, न। प्रमाणशब्दस्य ल्युडन्तत्वात् ल्युटश्च करणाधिकरणभावेष्वनुशासनेऽपि कर्तर्यननुशासनात्। नन्वीश्वरस्य कर्तृत्वेऽपि प्रमां प्रत्यधिकरणत्वमस्त्येव, अतः प्रमाणशब्दवाच्यत्वमुपपद्यत इति चेत्, न। तस्य कर्तृत्वेऽपि अधिकरणत्वाभावात्। क्रियाश्रययोः कर्तृकर्मणोराधारत्वस्याधिकरणलक्षणत्वादिति॥ अनुभूतिः प्रमाणम्। स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तं ज्ञानमनुभूतिः। ज्ञानमित्यनुक्तौ घटेऽतिव्याप्तिः। स्मृतिव्यतिरिक्तेत्यनुक्तौ स्मृतावतिव्याप्तिरित्यन्वयः। अत्र संशयादावतिव्याप्तेः। स्मृतौ वेदादौ चाव्याप्तेश्चेति॥

प्रमाणं द्विविधं केवलमनुप्रमाणं चेति। अत्र प्राधान्यक्रमेणोद्देशः। तत्र यथार्थज्ञानं केवलप्रमाणम्॥ यथार्थमिति संशयव्युदासः। ज्ञानमिति प्रत्यक्षव्युदासः। केवलप्रमाणं चतुर्विधम्। ईश्वरज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानं योगिज्ञानमयोगिज्ञानं चेति॥ स्वतन्त्रज्ञानमीश्वरज्ञानम्। स्वतन्त्रमिति लक्ष्म्यादिज्ञाननिरासः। ज्ञानमिति ईश्वरादिव्युदासः। यद्वा स्वपरगतसर्वार्थविषयज्ञानमीश्वरज्ञानम्। ज्ञानमीश्वरज्ञानमित्युक्तेऽयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय स्वपरगतेति। ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानपदम्। तन्नियमेन यथार्थमीश्वरस्वरूपम् अनादि नित्यं च। ईश्वरैकाधीनं ज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानम्। ज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानमित्युक्ते ईश्वरज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अत ईश्वराधीनमिति। अधीनत्वस्य भेदघटितत्वान्नातिव्याप्तिः। तावत्युक्ते ब्रह्मादिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अत

एकेति। ज्ञानमिति लक्ष्मीनिवृत्तिः ॥ अथ च ईश्वरे त्वसार्वत्रिकम् अन्यत्रानालोचने सर्वविषयज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानम्। ज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानमित्युक्ते अस्मदादिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतः सर्वविषयमिति। तावत्युक्ते ऋजुयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽनालोचने इति। तस्यालोचने सर्वविषयत्वात्। अनालोचने सर्वविषयज्ञानं लक्ष्मीज्ञानमित्युक्ते ईश्वरज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः अत ईश्वरे त्वसार्वत्रिकमिति ॥ ईश्वरे त्वसार्वत्रिकमनालोचने सर्वविषयज्ञानमित्युक्ते व्याघातेनाऽसम्भवः स्यात्। अतोऽन्यत्रेति। लक्ष्मीप्रत्यक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय ज्ञानमिति। तदपि नियमेन यथार्थं लक्ष्मीस्वरूपमनादि नित्यं च ॥ योगप्रभावलब्धातिशयज्ञानम् योगिज्ञानम्। तत्त्रिविधम् ऋजुयोगिज्ञानं तात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानम् अतात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानं चेति ॥ ऋजवो नाम ब्रह्मत्वयोग्या जीवाः। ईश्वरादन्यत्र आलोचने सर्वविषयं ज्ञानम् ऋजुयोगिज्ञानम्। ज्ञानम् ऋजुयोगिज्ञानमित्युक्ते अस्मदादिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतः सर्वविषयमिति। तावदुक्ते ईश्वरज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतआलो इति। तावत्युक्तेऽसंभवः। तस्येश्वरे आलोचने सर्वविषयत्वाभावात्। अत ईश्वरादन्यत्रेति ॥ तद्द्विविधं स्वरूपं मनोवृत्तिरूपं चेति। तत्र स्वरूपमनादिनित्यम्। वृत्तिज्ञानं तु प्रवाहतोऽनादि। इयमपि नियमेन यथार्थम् ॥ तद्व्यतिरिक्तास्तत्त्वाभिमानिनो देवास्तात्त्विकाः। तत्त्वाभिमानिनो देवास्तात्त्विका इत्युक्ते ऋजुयोगिष्वतिव्याप्तिः। अतस्तद्व्यतिरिक्ता इति। तद्व्यतिरिक्तास्तत्त्वाभिमानिन इत्युक्ते अतात्त्विकदेवेष्वतिव्याप्तिः। अतः तत्त्वाभिमानिन इति। तद्व्यतिरिक्तास्तत्त्वाभिमानिन इत्युक्ते असुरेष्वतिव्याप्तिः। अतो देवा इति। अनादित्वे सति ईश्वरादन्यत्र आलोचनेऽप्यसर्वविषयं ज्ञानं तात्त्विक-



योगिज्ञानम्। ज्ञानं तात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानमित्युक्ते ईश्वरज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽसर्वविषयमिति। तावत्युक्ते लक्ष्मीज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तस्येश्वरेऽसर्वविषयत्वात्। अत ईश्वरादन्यत्रेति। तावत्युक्ते ऋजुयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तस्यालोचनाभावदशायाम् ईश्वरादन्यत्र सर्वविषयत्वात्। अतः आलोचनेऽपीति। तावत्युक्तेऽतात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽनादित्वे सतीति। तदपि द्विविधं स्वरूपं बाह्यं चेति। स्वरूपं यथार्थमेव। बाह्यं कदाचिदयथार्थमपि। ऋजुतात्त्विकव्यतिरिक्ता [illegible] योगिनोऽतात्त्विकाः। अनादित्वे सति ईश्वरादन्यत्र [illegible] ज्ञानम् अतात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानम्। ज्ञानमतात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानमित्युक्ते ईश्वरज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽज्ञानयुक्तमित्युक्तम्। तावत्युक्ते अयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतोऽपीति। तावत्युक्ते असंभवः। तस्येश्वरे [illegible]। अत ईश्वरादन्यत्रेति। तावत्युक्ते तात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतः आदित्वे सतीति। तदपि द्विविधं स्वरूपं बाह्यं चेति। अयथार्थमियमादि पूर्ववत्। तात्त्विकातात्त्विकयोगिज्ञानयोः अनादित्वसादित्वे प्रागुक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्ये। योगिव्यतिरिक्ता अयोगिनः। ईश्वरलक्ष्मीयोगिव्यतिरिक्ता जीवा इति। [illegible] योगिव्यतिरिक्ता इति। ईश्वरादन्यत्र अज्ञानप्रचुरज्ञानम् अयोगिज्ञानम्। अज्ञानप्रचुरज्ञानमयोगिज्ञानमित्युक्ते योगिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तस्येश्वरे अज्ञानप्रचुरत्वात्। अत ईश्वरादन्यत्रेति। तदपि पूर्ववद्द्विविधम्। उत्पत्तिविनाशवच्च। स्वरूपज्ञानस्याभिव्यक्त्यपेक्षया उत्पत्तिविनाशवत्त्वम्। वृत्तिज्ञानस्य स्वरूपापेक्षयेति द्रष्टव्यम्।

अयोगिनोऽपि त्रिविधाः। मुक्तियोग्याः नित्यसंसारिणः तमोयोग्याश्चेति। मुक्तियोग्यानां स्वरूपज्ञानं यथार्थमेव।

नित्यसंसारिणां तु मिश्रमेव। अन्येषां त्वयथार्थमेव। बाह्यं तु सर्वेषामप्युभयविधमिति। इन्द्रियजं लिङ्गजं स्मृतिरार्षं चेति चतुर्विधं यथार्थज्ञानमिति वैशेषिकाः। तदसत्, नित्यस्येश्वरज्ञानादेरागमजन्यस्य चासंग्रहात्। स्मृतेर्मनोरूपेन्द्रियजन्यत्वेन आर्षस्य च योगिज्ञानत्वेन योगिज्ञानस्य योगसहकृतेन्द्रियजन्यज्ञानप्रभेदत्वस्य तैरुक्तत्वेन पृथग्ग्रहणायोगाच्च। यथार्थज्ञानसाधनमनुप्रमाणम्। ज्ञानमित्युक्ते तत्र संशयादौ चातिव्याप्तिः। साधनमित्युक्ते कुठारेऽतिव्याप्तिः। यथार्थज्ञानमित्युक्ते संशयादिसाधनेऽतिव्याप्तिः। यथार्थज्ञानकारणमित्युक्ते प्रमात्रादावतिव्याप्तिः। इति सर्वं सार्थकम्। सति च दात्रादौ कारणे यदभावात् कार्याभावो यस्मिन्सत्यप्रतिबन्धे भवत्येव कार्यं तदुच्यते साधनमिति। यथा व्यापारवान् कुठारः। अतो न यादृच्छिकसंवादिलिङ्गविभ्रमादावतिव्याप्तिः। काचादयः प्रतिबन्धा इत्युच्यन्ते। अनन्यथासिद्धत्वे सति कार्यनियतपूर्ववृत्ति कारणम्। कार्यं प्रागभावप्रतियोगि। तत्कारणं द्विविधम्। उपादानकारणं निमित्तकारणं चेति। परिणामित्वे सति यत्कारणं तदुपादानकारणम्। यथा जगतः प्रकृतिः, मृत्पिण्डश्च घटस्य। अपरिणामित्वे सति यत्कारणं तन्निमित्तकारणम्। यथाऽदृष्टादिकं जगतः, दण्डादिकं च घटस्य। ततश्च उक्तकारणकलापे यदतिशयितं तत् साधनमित्युक्तं भवति।

अनुप्रमाणं त्रिविधं प्रत्यक्षम् अनुमानम् आगमश्चेति। प्रायेणासन्नाव्यवहितवर्तमानकतिपयार्थग्राहकं प्रत्यक्षम्। अनासन्नातीतानागतव्यवहितार्थगोचरमनुमानम्। स्वातन्त्र्येणाशेषार्थविषय आगम इति। अर्थग्रहणक्रमेणोद्देशः। अनुप्रमाणत्रैविध्यात् तज्जन्यज्ञानमपि त्रिविधम्। प्रत्यक्षानुमितिशाब्दभेदात्।



तत्र प्रत्यक्षजन्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्। इदमेव साक्षात्कार इत्युच्यते। अनुमानजन्यं ज्ञानमनुमितिः। आगमजन्यं ज्ञानं शाब्दम्॥ निर्दोषेन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षं दुष्टेन्द्रियेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय निर्दोषेति। अनुमानादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय इन्द्रियमिति। ननु प्रत्यक्षं करणविशेषः। करणस्य चावान्तरव्यापारेण भाव्यम्। यथा छिदाकरणस्य परशोर्दारुसंयोगोऽवान्तरव्यापारः। तज्जन्यस्तज्जन्यजनकोऽवान्तरव्यापारः। यथा परशुजन्यो दारुसंयोगः। सत्यम्। इन्द्रियं करणम्। तस्यार्थसंयोगोऽवान्तरव्यापारः। साक्षात्कारः फलम्। अत्र तु धर्मिप्राधान्यविवक्षया "अदुष्टम् इन्द्रियं त्वक्षम्" इति तत्त्वनिर्णयानुरोधेन स्वस्वविषयसन्निकृष्टमदुष्टमिन्द्रियं प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तम्। क्वचिदवान्तरव्यापारप्राधान्यविवक्षया लक्षणानुरोधेन निर्दोषार्थेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षः प्रत्यक्षमित्युक्तम्। अतो न विरोधः॥ प्रत्यक्षं सप्तविधम्। साक्षिषडिन्द्रियभेदात्। तत्र प्रमातृस्वरूपेन्द्रियं साक्षीत्युच्यते। तस्य विषयाः आत्मस्वरूपं तद्धर्माः सुखादयो भावरूपाविद्या मनस्तद्वृत्तयो ज्ञानसुखाद्याः कालोऽव्याकृताकाशश्चेत्याद्याः। स च स्वरूपज्ञानं व्यनक्ति। षडिन्द्रियाणि च घ्राणरसनचक्षुस्त्वक्श्रोत्रमनांसि। तत्र गन्धस्तद्विशेषाः सौरभादयो घ्राणेन्द्रियस्य विषयाः। रसस्तद्विशेषा माधुर्यादयो रसनेन्द्रियस्य विषयाः। महत्त्वसमानाधिकरणोद्भूतरूपवन्ति द्रव्याणि केचिद्गुणाः संख्यादयः कर्माणि जातयश्चक्षुस्त्वचोर्विषयाः। वायुस्पर्शोऽपि त्वचो विषयः। वायुस्तु स्पर्शानुमेयः। तथा हि योऽयं वायौ वाति सति अनुष्णाशीतस्पर्श उपलभ्यते स स्पर्शः क्वचिदाश्रितः गुणत्वाद्रूपवत्। न चास्य पृथिवी आश्रयः उद्भूतस्पर्शवत्याः पृथिव्या उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वनियमात्। उपलभ्यमानस्पर्शाश्रयस्य नीरूपत्वात्। नापि

उपलब्धिर्ज्ञानस्य स्पर्शाश्रयत्वानुमानातीतत्वात्। न दिक्-चतुष्टयम्, सर्वसहितत्वात्। तथापि तदङ्गीकारे सर्वदा स्पर्शो-पलब्धिप्रसङ्गात्। न मनः, परमाणुस्पर्शस्यातीन्द्रियत्वात्। तस्मात् यः प्रतीयमानस्पर्शाश्रयः स वायुः। ननु वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वात् घटवत् इति चेत्, न। उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्यो-पाधित्वात्। यस्योपाधेः पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकत्वात्। यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वे सति प्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति दृष्टान्ते साध्य-व्यापकत्वात्। यत्र प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति व्याप्तिर्नास्ति। पक्षे साधनाव्यापकत्वात्। तस्माद्वायोः स्पर्शानुमेयत्वं सिद्धम्। शब्दस्तद्विशेषा वर्णादयः श्रोत्रेन्द्रियस्य विषयाः। एतेषां पञ्चेन्द्रियाणां मनोऽनधिष्ठितत्वं काचकामला-दयश्च दोषाः। मनसस्तु बाह्येन्द्रियाधिष्ठानेनैते सर्वे विषयाः। बहिरिन्द्रियनैरपेक्ष्येणातीताः पदार्था मनोविषयाः। स्मृतिः फलम्। मानसप्रत्यक्षजा स्मृतिरित्युक्तेः। तत्र संस्कारः सन्निकर्षरूपः। यत्र योगीन्द्रियाणां योगजो धर्मः। तत्र मनसो दोषाः रागादयः। चक्षुर्दोषाश्च अतिदूरस्थत्वम्, अति-सान्निध्यं सौक्ष्म्यं व्यवधानम् अनभिव्यक्तत्वं साम्यं चेत्यादयः। एतेषु दोषेषु सत्सु क्वचित् ज्ञानमेव न जायते। क्वचिच्च संशया-दिकम् उत्पद्यते।

इन्द्रियजन्यज्ञाने आत्मादिचतुर्णां सन्निकर्षः कारणम्। आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते। मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियाणां वस्तु ग्राह्य-प्रकाशकत्वनियमात्। सर्वेषामिन्द्रियाणां स्वस्वविषयैः स्वस्वविषयप्रतियोगिकाभावेन च साक्षादेव एव सन्निकर्षः कारणम्। न तु क्वचित्परम्परा इति ज्ञातव्यम्। एके तु सम्प्रदायप्रमादेनेन्द्रियार्थयोः सन्निकर्षः षड्विधः। तद्यथा



संयोगः, संयुक्तसमवायः, संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः, समवायः, समवेतसमवायः, विशेषणविशेष्यभावश्चेति। तत्र चक्षुषो घटादिद्रव्यैः संयोगः। रूपकर्मसामान्यैः संयुक्तसमवायः। तथा त्वचो घटादिद्रव्यैः संयोगः। स्पर्शकर्मसामान्यैः संयुक्तसमवायः। तथा मनस आत्मना संयोगः। आत्मगतसुखादिभिश्च संयुक्त-समवायः। घ्राणरसनयोर्गन्धरसाभ्यां संयुक्तसमवायः। ताभ्यां संयुक्ते फले गन्धरसयोः समवायात्। तथा गुणकर्मगतसामान्यैः संयुक्तसमवेतसमवायः। श्रोत्रस्य शब्देन समवायः। कर्णशष्कुल्य-वच्छिन्ननभसः श्रोत्रत्वात्। शब्दस्याकाशगुणत्वात्। तद्गत-शब्दत्वादिसामान्यैः समवेतसमवायः। तथा चक्षुषो घटाभावेन विशेषणविशेष्यभावः सन्निकर्षः। इह भूतले घटो नास्तीत्यत्र चक्षुःसंयुक्तस्य भूतलस्य विशेष्यत्वात्। घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वात्। घटाभाववद्भूतलमित्यत्र चक्षुः-संयुक्तस्य भूतलस्य विशेष्यत्वम्। घटाभावस्य विशेषणत्वम्। एवं समवायेऽपि विशेषणविशेष्यभावः सन्निकर्षः। इह तन्तुषु पटसमवायः, पटसमवायवन्तस्तन्तव इत्यादि वदन्ति। तदेतदसत्। गुणादीनां गुणादिभिरभेदेन समवाया-भावात्। समवायसद्भावे प्रमाणाभावाच्च। आत्ममनः-संयोगस्यान्यत्र प्रत्यासत्तित्वेऽपि आत्मनि तद्धर्मेषु च न तस्य तथात्वम्। आत्मनस्तद्धर्माणां च साक्षिविषयत्वेन मनो-विषयत्वाभावात्। वर्णात्मकशब्दस्य द्रव्यत्वेन आकाश-गुणत्वाभावात्। न च सामान्यवत्त्वे सत्यस्मदादिबाह्ये-न्द्रियग्राह्यत्वेन वर्णानां गुणत्वसिद्धेः कथं द्रव्यत्वमिति वाच्यम्। सामान्यवति तमसि व्यभिचारात्। प्रचलति प्रदीपप्रभायां व्यभिचारात्। ध्वन्यात्मकशब्दस्य आकाशगुणत्वेऽपि तदभेदेन

समवायाभावात्। विशेषणविशेष्यभावस्य स्वरूपसम्बन्धत्वेन भिन्नसम्बन्धत्वाभावात्।

यत् केचिदाहुः संस्कारमात्रजन्यज्ञानं स्मृतिः। प्रत्यभिज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय मात्रपदम्। संस्कारसम्प्रयोगाभ्यां जायमानं ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। सम्प्रयोगः संयोगः। संस्कारेत्युक्ते अयं घट इति ज्ञानेऽतिव्याप्तिः। सम्प्रयोगेत्युक्ते स्मृतावतिव्यापकमिति। तन्न। तथा सति यथार्थज्ञानमात्रस्य प्रमाणजन्यत्वनियमात्, स्मृतेश्च यथार्थज्ञानत्वात् तज्जनकसंस्कारस्यापि पृथक्प्रामाण्यापत्तेः। ततश्च तानि प्रमाणानि चत्वारीति विभागानुपपत्तेः। ननु इदं दूषणं भवतामपि समानम् इति चेत्, न। अस्माभिस्तु स्मृतेर्भावनासहकृतमानसप्रत्यक्षजन्यत्वाङ्गीकारादिति॥

चतुर्विधं प्रत्यक्षम्। ईश्वरप्रत्यक्षं लक्ष्मीप्रत्यक्षं योगिप्रत्यक्षम् अयोगिप्रत्यक्षं चेति। विषयस्तु तत्तज्ज्ञानविषयवद् विवेक्तव्यः। अत्र विशेषस्तु पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्य इति सर्वमवदातम्।

इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थपूज्यपादप्रदर्शितमार्गानुवर्तिन्यां प्रमाणचन्द्रिकायां प्रत्यक्षपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः।

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## द्वितीयः परिच्छेदः

श्रीवेदव्यासाय नमः। अथानुमानं निरूप्यते। निर्दोषोपपत्तिरनुमानम्। उपपत्तिर्युक्तिर्लिङ्गं व्याप्यमिति पर्यायः। उपपत्तिरनुमानमित्युक्ते आश्रयासिद्धे बाधिते चातिव्याप्तिः। तयोर्व्याप्तत्वाश्रयत्वेनोपपत्तित्वात्। अतो निर्दोषेति। तावन्मात्रोक्ते प्रत्यक्षादावतिव्याप्तिः। अत उपपत्तिरिति॥ अत्र लिङ्गं करणम्। परामर्शो व्यापारः। अनुमितिः फलम्। व्याप्तिप्रकारकपक्षधर्मताज्ञानं परामर्शः। यथा वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयमिति ज्ञानम्। तज्जन्यं पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति ज्ञानमनुमितिः। यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति साहचर्यनियमो व्याप्तिः। अत्र साहचर्यं हेतोः साध्येन सम्बन्धमात्रं विवक्षितम्, न तु सामानाधिकरण्यमेव। तस्य नियमो नियतत्वम्। अव्यभिचरितसाध्यसम्बन्धो व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः। साहचर्यनियम इत्येव व्याप्तिलक्षणम्। यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तिदर्शनम्। तत्र धूमो व्याप्यः अग्निर्व्यापकः। व्याप्त्यधिकरणं व्याप्यम्। व्याप्तिनिरूपकं व्यापकम्। अत्र व्याप्यस्य पक्षधर्मत्वं नाम समुचितदेशवृत्तित्वं विवक्षितम्। अतो न कश्चित् क्षुद्रोपद्रवः।

केचित्प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणः साधनसमानाधिकरणो योऽत्यन्ताभावः तस्याप्रतियोगि यत्साध्यं तत्सामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्यर्थः। साध्यसामानाधिकरण्यं व्याप्तिरित्युक्ते पर्वतोऽग्निमान् प्रमेयत्वादित्यत्रातिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय

साधनसमानाधिकरणात्यन्ताभावाप्रतियोगीति। तावत्युक्ते वृक्षः संयोगी द्रव्यत्वादित्यत्राव्याप्तिः।* तत्परिहाराय प्रतियोग्यसमानाधिकरणेति। संयोगाभावस्य प्रतियोगिसमानाधिकरणत्वान्नाव्याप्तिरित्याहुः। तदसत्, ऊर्ध्वदेशो वृष्टिमान् अधोदेशे नदीपूरात्। अधोदेशे नदीपूरः तदूर्ध्वदेशे वृष्टिः यथा संप्रतिपन्नमित्यादिव्यधिकरणानुमानेऽव्याप्तेः।

इष्टमिदं दूषणं भवतां समानमिति चेत्, न। अस्माभिः व्यभिचरितसम्बन्धस्य व्यधिकरणस्यानुमापकत्वाङ्गीकारादिति।

धर्माश्चतुर्विधाः। केचन समव्याप्ताः। केचन विषमव्याप्ताः। केचन परस्परपरिहारेणैव वर्तमानाः। केचित्क्वचित्समाविष्टा अपि परस्परपरिहारेणैव वर्तन्ते। तत्राद्या यथा निषिद्धत्वाधर्मसाधनत्व-विहितत्व-धर्मसाधनत्वादयः। यत्र निषिद्धत्वं तत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं, यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति नियमात्। तत्र द्वयोरन्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभावः। एवं यत्र विहितत्वं तत्र धर्मसाधनत्वम्। यत्र धर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र विहितत्वं द्रष्टव्यम्। द्वितीया यथा धूमवत्त्वाग्निमत्त्व-कृतकत्वानित्यत्वादयः। यत्र धूमवत्त्वं तत्राग्निमत्त्वमिति व्याप्तेः। यत्राग्निमत्त्वं तत्र धूमवत्त्वमिति व्याप्तिर्नास्ति। अयोगोलके व्यभिचारात्। अत्र न्यूनदेशवृत्ति धूमवत्त्वं व्याप्यमेव। अधिकदेशवृत्ति अग्निमत्त्वं व्यापकमेव। एवं यत्र कृतकत्वं तत्रानित्यत्वमिति व्याप्तेः। यत्रानित्यत्वं तत्र कृतकत्वमिति व्याप्तिर्नास्ति। प्रागभावे व्यभिचारादिति द्रष्टव्यम्। तृतीया यथा गोत्वाश्वत्वगजत्वसिंहत्वादयः। यत्र गोत्वं न तत्र

* मुद्रितपुस्तके ...तिव्याप्तिरिति पाठः।



सर्वथाश्वत्वम्। यत्राश्वत्वं न तत्र सर्वथा गोत्वम्। तयोर्नान्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभावः। सम्बन्धस्यैवाभावात्। एवं यत्र गजत्वं न तत्र सर्वथा सिंहत्वम्। यत्र सिंहत्वं न तत्र गजत्वमिति द्रष्टव्यम्। चतुर्थी यथा पाचकत्वपुरुषत्वभूतत्वमूर्तत्वादयः। पाचकत्वपुरुषत्वयोः पुरुषविशेषे समावेशे पाचकत्वं पुरुषत्वपरिहारेण स्त्रीषु वर्तते। पुरुषत्वमपि पाचकत्वपरिहारेणापचति पुरुषे वर्तते। तावपि नान्योन्यं व्याप्यव्यापकभाववन्तौ सत्यपि सम्बन्धे परस्परव्यभिचारात्। एवम्भूतत्वमूर्तत्वयोः क्वचित्समावेशेऽपि भूतत्वं मूर्तत्वपरिहारेण आकाशे वर्तते। मूर्तत्वं भूतत्वपरिहारेण मनसि वर्तत इति द्रष्टव्यम्। तत्र व्याप्यो धर्मो व्यापकप्रमितिं जनयन्ननुमानमित्युच्यते। व्यापकश्चानुमेय इति।

ननु पर्वते वर्तमानो धूमो गृहान्तर्वर्तिनः पुरुषस्य किमित्यग्निप्रमां न जनयति। उच्यते। न प्रत्यक्षवदनुमानमज्ञातकरणम्। किन्तु ज्ञातमेव। तथापि नारिकेलद्वीपवासिनो देशान्तरगतस्य धूमप्रतीतावपि कस्मान्नाग्निप्रमोदयः। तस्य धूमस्वरूपज्ञानेऽपि अग्निव्याप्ततया तज्ज्ञानाभावात्। ज्ञातव्याप्तिकस्यापि कुतः कदाचिदग्निप्रमानुत्पत्तिः। व्याप्तिस्मरणाभावात्। तथा च व्याप्तिस्मरणसहितं सम्यग्ज्ञातं लिङ्गं समुचितदेशादौ लिङ्गिप्रमां जनयदनुमानमित्युक्तं भवति। अतएव लिङ्गिस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातत्वेऽपि देशविशेषादिसंसृष्टतया ज्ञापकत्वान्नानुमानवैफल्यम्। ततश्चानुमानस्य द्वे अङ्गे व्याप्तिः समुचितदेशादौ वृत्तिश्चेति। न तु पक्षधर्मतानियमः।

ननु व्याप्तिज्ञानं केन प्रमाणेन जायते। यथायथं प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैरिति ब्रूमः। तत्र तावद्धूमस्याग्निना

व्याप्तिर्मानसादौ प्रत्यक्षगम्या। तत्र भूयोदर्शनव्यभिचारादर्शने सहकारिणी।

ननु वर्तमानसन्निकृष्टमात्रग्राहि प्रत्यक्षं सर्वोपसंहारेण कथमतीताद्यास्पदां व्याप्तिं गृह्णीयात्। प्रत्यासत्तेरभावादिति चेन्न। सामान्यलक्षणप्रत्यासत्तेरभावेऽपि साहचर्येणैव अतीतादिना प्रत्यासत्तिसम्भवेन सर्वोपसंहारेण व्याप्तिग्रहोपपत्तेः। अनुमानगम्यां तु व्याप्तिमुत्तरत्रोदाहरिष्यामः। यो ब्राह्मणः स न हन्तव्यः। या गौः सा न पदा स्प्रष्टव्या। यद्विहितं तत्कर्तव्यमित्याद्यागमगम्या व्याप्तिर्द्रष्टव्या।

त्रिविधमनुमानं कार्यानुमानं कारणानुमानं अकार्यकारणानुमानं चेति। यत्कार्यं कारणमनुमापयति तत् कार्यानुमानम्। यथा धूमोऽग्नेरनुमापकः। यत्कारणं कार्यमनुमापयति तत्कारणानुमानम्। यथा इतरकारणविशिष्टमेघोन्नतिर्वृष्टेरनुमापिका। यत् स्वसाध्यस्य कारणं न भवति कार्यं च न भवति अथ च तदनुमापकं तदकार्यकारणानुमानम्। यथा रसो रूपस्यानुमापकः।

पुनर्द्विविधमनुमानम्। दृष्टं सामान्यतोदृष्टं चेति। तत्र प्रत्यक्षयोग्यार्थानुमापकं दृष्टम्। यथा धूमोऽग्नेः। प्रत्यक्षायोग्यार्थानुमापकं सामान्यतोदृष्टम्। यथा रूपादिज्ञानं चक्षुरादेरिति। केचित् त्रिविधमनुमानं केवलान्वयिकेवलव्यतिरेक्यन्वयव्यतिरेकिभेदात्। साध्यधर्मवान् धर्मी पक्षः। सपक्षादौ धर्मिण्यतिव्याप्तिवारणाय साध्यधर्मवानित्युक्तम्। यत्प्रतीतिर्लिङ्गेन जनयितव्या स साध्यो धर्मः अतो नातिव्याप्तिः। साध्यधर्मवत्त्वं संयोगेन सम्बन्धेन हेतावप्यस्ति तद्वारणाय धर्मीति। साध्यसमानधर्मवान् धर्मी सपक्षः। महानसीय-



भूमेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय धर्मीति। साध्यधर्मवान् धर्मी सपक्ष इत्युक्ते असम्भवः। पक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिश्च। अतः समानेति। सन्दिग्धत्वाकारमन्तरेण समानधर्मवानित्यर्थः। साध्यसमानधर्मरहितो धर्मी विपक्षः। पक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय साध्यरहितपदम्। सपक्षेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय तत्समानरहितेति। पक्षव्यापकं सपक्षवृत्ति अविद्यमानविपक्षं केवलान्वयि। अविद्यमानविपक्षं केवलान्वयीत्युक्ते सर्वमभिधेयं प्रमेयत्वादित्यनुपसंहारिण्यतिव्याप्तिः। अतः सपक्षवृत्तीति। सपक्षवृत्ति अविद्यमानविपक्षं केवलान्वयीत्युक्ते शब्दोऽभिधेयश्चाक्षुषत्वादिति स्वरूपासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तत्परिहाराय पक्षवृत्तीत्युक्तम्। तावत्युक्ते घटशब्दावभिधेयौ मूर्तत्वादिति भागासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तत्परिहाराय पक्षव्यापकमिति। तद्द्विविधम्। सपक्षव्यापक-तदेकदेशवृत्तिभेदात्। शब्दोऽभिधेयः प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदिति सपक्षव्यापकम्। तस्यामेव प्रतिज्ञायां गुणत्वाद्रूपवदिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्ति।

व्याप्तिर्द्विविधा। अन्वयतो व्यतिरेकतश्चेति। साधनस्य साध्येन व्याप्तिरन्वयव्याप्तिः। साध्याभावस्य साधनाभावेन व्याप्तिर्व्यतिरेकः। तत्र च अन्वयव्याप्तौ साधनं व्याप्यम्। साध्यं व्यापकम्। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तौ तु साध्याभावो व्याप्यः। साधनाभावो व्यापकः। सर्वत्र व्याप्यपुरस्कारेणैव व्याप्तिर्ग्राह्या। अत्र प्रमेयत्वस्य केवलमन्वयव्याप्तिरेवास्ति। यत्प्रमेयं तदभिधेयम्। यथा घट इति। न तु व्यतिरेकः। यदभिधेयं न भवति तत् प्रमेयं न भवति। यथामुकमिति दृष्टान्ताभावात्। सर्वस्याभिधेयत्वेन अनभिधेयत्वाभावात्। तेनैतत्केवलान्वयीत्युच्यते। पक्षव्यापकमविद्यमानसपक्षं सर्वस्माद्विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं केवलव्यतिरेकि। विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तं केवलव्यतिरेकीत्युक्ते

पर्वतोऽग्निमान् पर्वतत्वादित्यादि-व्यभिचारिण्यतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय सर्वस्मादिति। पर्वतत्वस्य निरग्निकमहाह्रदादेर्व्यावृत्तत्वेऽपि निरग्निकपर्वताद्व्यावृत्तत्वेन सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वाभावान्नातिव्याप्तिः। तावत्युक्तेऽन्वयव्यतिरेकिण्यतिव्याप्तिः। तत्परिहाराय अविद्यमानसपक्षमिति। तावत्युक्ते जीवच्छरीरं सात्मकं चेतनत्वादिति स्वरूपासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय पक्षवृत्तीति। तावत्युक्ते जीवेश्वरौ सर्वज्ञौ सर्वकर्तृत्वादिति भागासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय पक्षव्यापकमिति। उदाहरणं तु ईश्वरः सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वादिति। अस्य यः सर्वज्ञो न भवति स सर्वकर्ता न भवति यथा देवदत्त इति व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरेवास्ति। न तु यः सर्वकर्ता स सर्वज्ञ इत्यन्वयव्याप्तिः। ईश्वरावताराणां रामकृष्णादीनां पक्षत्वात् अन्येषां जीवानामसर्वज्ञत्वात्। तेनैतत्केवलव्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते। पक्षव्यापकं सपक्षवृत्ति सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तं अन्वयव्यतिरेकि। विपक्षव्यावृत्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकीत्यङ्गीकारे जीवच्छरीरमनित्यं पृथिवीत्वादिति व्यभिचारिण्यतिव्याप्तिः। पृथिवीत्वस्य नित्ये गगनादाववृत्तेः। अतः सर्वेति। तत्र पृथिवीत्वस्य नित्यगगनादावृत्तेरपि नित्ये पार्थिवपरमाणौ वृत्तेः सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वाभाव इति ज्ञेयम्। सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तमन्वयव्यतिरेकीत्युक्ते केवलव्यतिरेकिण्यतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय सपक्षवृत्तीति। तावत्युक्ते देवदत्तः सर्वज्ञः सर्वकर्तृत्वादिति स्वरूपासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। अतः पक्षवृत्तीत्युक्तम्। तावत्युक्ते पर्वतह्रदौ वह्निमन्तौ धूमवत्त्वादिति भागासिद्धेऽतिव्याप्तिः। तद्वारणाय पक्षव्यापकमिति। धूमवत्त्वस्य ह्रदे अभावेन पक्षव्यापकत्वाभावात्।

तद्द्विविधं सर्वसपक्षवृत्ति-तदेकदेशवृत्तिभेदात्। जीवो



नित्यः विनाशकारणशून्यत्वादिति सपक्षव्यापकम्। सर्वस्मिन् नित्ये गगनादौ विनाशकारणशून्यत्वस्य वृत्तेः। पर्वतोऽग्निमान् धूमवत्त्वादिति सपक्षैकदेशवृत्तिः। अग्निमत्यपि क्वचिद्धूमवत्त्वस्यावृत्तेः। इदं हि यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः। योऽग्निमान् न भवति स धूमवान् न भवति यथा महाह्रद इति व्याप्तिद्वयवदन्वयव्यतिरेकीत्युच्यते इत्याहुः। तदिदमसत्। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तेः प्रकृतसाध्यसिद्धावनुपयोगात्। न हि भावेन भावसाधने अभावस्य अभावेन व्याप्तिरुपयुज्यते। व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोर्वैयधिकरण्यं च एवं सति स्यात्। कथं तर्हि केवलव्यतिरेकिणः संव्यवहारः। इत्थं तत्रापि यस्सर्वकर्ता स सर्वज्ञ इत्येव व्याप्तिः। किन्तु व्याप्तिग्रहणस्थानस्यैव विप्रतिपत्तिविषयत्वेन सा दर्शयितुमशक्याऽभूत्। ततोऽनुमानेन तां साधयितुं व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरुपयुज्यते। सर्वकर्तृत्वादिति प्रयुक्ते कथमस्य व्याप्तिरित्याकाङ्क्षायां सर्वकर्तृत्वं सर्वज्ञत्वेन व्याप्तं तदभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगित्वात्। यद्यदभावव्यापकाभावप्रतियोगि तत्तेन व्याप्तम्। यथा धूमवत्त्वमग्निमत्त्वेनेत्यस्यार्थस्य विवक्षितत्वात्। अन्वयव्यतिरेकिणि तु व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिरनुपयुक्तैव। विवक्षितव्याप्तेः प्रत्यक्षादिनैव सिद्धत्वात्। व्यभिचाराभावप्रदर्शनमुखेन कथञ्चिदुपयुज्यते वेति॥

पुनरनुमानं द्विविधं स्वार्थं परार्थं च इति। तत्र स्वार्थं स्वप्रमितिहेतुः। स्वयमेव भूयोदर्शनेन महानसादौ यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तिं गृहीत्वा तदनन्तरं पर्वतसमीपं गतः। तद्गते चाग्नौ सन्दिहानः पर्वते धूमं पश्यन् व्याप्तिं स्मरति। यत्र धूमस्तत्राग्निरिति। तदनन्तरं पर्वतसमीपं गतस्य

वह्निव्याप्यधूमवानयं पर्वत इति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। तत्स्वार्थानुमानम्। अयं लिङ्गपरामर्श इत्युच्यते। तस्माद्वह्निमानिति ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते। यत्तु धूमादग्निमनुमाय परं प्रतिबोधयितुं पञ्चावयववाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते। पर्वतो वह्निमान् धूमवत्त्वात्। यो यो धूमवान् स सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानसः। तथा चायम्। तस्मात्तथेति। अनेन प्रतिपादिताल्लिङ्गात्परोऽप्यग्निं प्रतिपद्यते। एतदेव परार्थानुमानमित्युच्यते। प्रतिज्ञाहेतूदाहरणोपनयनिगमनानीति पञ्चावयवाः। साध्यवत्तया पक्षवचनं प्रतिज्ञा। यथा पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति। साधनत्वव्यापकविभक्त्यन्तं लिङ्गवचनं हेतुः। यथा धूमवत्त्वादिति। व्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं दृष्टान्तः। स द्विविधः। साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तो वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तश्चेति। तत्रान्वयव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः यथा धूमानुमाने महानसः। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिग्रहणस्थलं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्तः यथा तस्मिन्नेवानुमाने महाह्रदः। व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं दृष्टान्तवचनमुदाहरणम्। तद्द्विविधं साधर्म्योदाहरणं वैधर्म्योदाहरणं चेति। अन्वयव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं साधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभिधानं साधर्म्योदाहरणम्। यथा यो धूमवान् सोऽग्निमान् यथा महानस इति। व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं वैधर्म्यदृष्टान्ताभिधानं वैधर्म्योदाहरणम्। योऽग्निमान् न भवति स धूमवान् न भवति यथा महाह्रद इति। दृष्टान्ते प्रसिद्धव्याप्तिकस्य लिङ्गस्य पक्षवृत्तित्वव्यापकं वचनमुपनयः। सोऽपि दृष्टान्तानुसारेण द्विविधः। तत्र महानस इवायं पर्वतोऽपि धूमवानिति साधर्म्योपनयः। न च ह्रद इवायं निर्धूमः पर्वत इति वैधर्म्योपनयः। सहेतुकं पक्षवचनं निगमनम्। यथा तस्मात्पर्वतोऽग्निमानिति।



तदेतदसत्। व्याप्तिद्वैविध्यनिराकरणेनोदाहरणद्वैविध्यस्यापि निराकृतत्वात् पञ्चावयवादिनियमानुपपत्तेश्च। नियमखण्डनप्रकारः पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञेयः। इत्यनुमाननिरूपणम्।

अथोपपत्तिदोषा निरूप्यन्ते। उपपत्तिदोषो द्विविधः। विरोधासङ्गतिभेदात्। तत्र विरोधस्त्रिविधः। प्रतिज्ञाविरोध-हेतुविरोध-दृष्टान्तविरोधभेदात्। तत्र प्रतिज्ञाविरोधो द्विविधः। प्रमाणविरोध-स्ववचनविरोधभेदात्। तत्र प्रमाणविरोधोऽपि द्विविधः। प्रबलप्रमाणविरोध-समबलप्रमाणविरोधभेदात्। तत्र प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधस्योदाहरणं तु विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, यद्दृश्यं तन्मिथ्या, यथा शुक्तिरजतमिति। अत्र सन् घट इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षेण, विमतं सत्यम्, अर्थक्रियाकारित्वात्, सम्प्रतिपन्नवदित्याद्यनुमानेन, विश्वं सत्यमित्याद्यागमेन च जगतः सत्यत्वावधारणात् प्रबलप्रमाणविरोधो द्रष्टव्यः। समबलप्रमाणविरोधस्योदाहरणं तु विमतं मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, शुक्तिरजतवत्, विमतं सत्यं प्रामाणिकत्वादात्मवदिति। अत्रानुमानद्वये व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतयोः साम्यात् समबलप्रमाणविरोधो ज्ञातव्यः। स्ववचनविरोधो द्विविधः। अपसिद्धान्तजातिभेदात्। तत्र पूर्वाचार्यैः प्रामाणिकतयाभ्युपगतं तद्विरुद्धाङ्गीकारोऽपसिद्धान्तः। पूर्वाचार्यवचनस्यापि स्वयमङ्गीकृतत्वेन स्ववचनत्वादपसिद्धान्तः स्ववचनविरोधो भवति। यथा निरीश्वरसाङ्ख्यमते ईश्वराङ्गीकारः। स्ववचन एव स्वव्याहतिर्जातिः। यथा मे माता वन्ध्येत्यादि।

हेतुविरोधोऽपि द्विविधः, स्वरूपासिद्धिरव्याप्तिश्चेति। स्वरूपासिद्धेरुदाहरणं तु शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वात् इति। अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं शब्दे नास्ति, तस्य श्रावणत्वात्। अव्याप्तिश्च

त्रिधा। लिङ्गस्य साध्येन तदभावेन च सम्बन्धः; साध्यसम्बन्धा-भावे सति तदभावेनैव सम्बन्धः; उभयसम्बन्धाभावश्चेति। तत्राद्यो यथा शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रमेयत्वादिति। द्वितीयो यथा शब्दो नित्यः ज्ञातकत्वादिति। तृतीयो यथा सर्वमनित्यं सत्त्वादिति। अत्र सर्वस्य पक्षत्वेनोभयसम्बन्धो नास्ति।

दृष्टान्तविरोधो द्विविधः। साध्यवैकल्यं साधनवैकल्यं चेति। आद्यं यथा मनोऽनित्यं मूर्तत्वात् परमाणुवदिति। द्वितीयं यथा अत्रैवानुमाने यथा कर्मेति।

असङ्गतेरुदाहरणं तु ईश्वरवादिनं प्रति क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्पटवदिति। अत्रानाकाङ्क्षितसाधनाय प्रयुक्तत्वादिति। आकाङ्क्षाविरहोऽसङ्गतिरिति तत्त्वचर्यादिति।

अन्ये तु पक्षधर्मत्वं सपक्षसत्त्वं विपक्षाद्व्यावृत्तिः अबाधित-विषयत्वं असत्प्रतिपक्षत्वं चेति हेतोः पञ्च रूपाणि। तत्रान्वय-व्यतिरेकिणः पञ्चापि विवक्षितानि। केवलान्वयिनस्तु चत्वारि रूपाणि। तस्य विपक्षाभावेन विपक्षव्यावृत्तत्वाभावात्। केवलव्यतिरेकिणोऽपि चत्वारि रूपाणि, तस्य सपक्षाभावेन सपक्ष-सत्त्वानुपपत्तेः। तत्र विवक्षितरूपेषु कतिपयसहिताः कतिपय-रहिता हेत्वाभासाः। ते चासिद्ध-विरुद्धानैकान्तिक-कालात्यया-पदिष्ट-सत्प्रतिपक्षाख्याः पञ्च हेत्वाभासाः। व्याप्तिपक्षधर्मतान्यतर-विकलो हेतुरसिद्धः। स च त्रिविधः, आश्रयासिद्धः स्वरूपासिद्धो व्याप्यत्वासिद्धश्चेति। तत्राश्रयासिद्धो द्विविधः। असदाश्रयः सिद्धसाधकश्चेति। आद्यो यथा। गगनारविन्दं सुरभि, अरविन्दत्वात्सरोजारविन्दवत्। अत्र गगनारविन्दमाश्रयः, स च नास्त्येव। द्वितीयो यथा। ईश्वरवादिनं प्रति क्षित्यादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात्पटवदिति। अत्र साध्यस्य विनिश्चितत्वेन पक्षे



साध्यसन्देहानुपपत्तौ साध्यवतः पक्षस्य प्रमाणान्तरादप्रसिद्धि-र्बोध्या। स्वरूपासिद्धो यथा शब्दोऽनित्यश्चाक्षुषत्वादिति। अत्र चाक्षुषत्वं हेतुः, स च शब्दे नास्ति। शब्दस्य श्रावणत्वात्। व्याप्यत्वासिद्धो द्विविधः। साध्यसम्बन्धरहितः सोपाधिक-सम्बन्धश्चेति। आद्यो यथा सर्वं क्षणिकं सत्त्वादिति। अत्र सर्वस्य पक्षत्वेन पक्षातिरिक्तसपक्षाभावात्साध्यसम्बन्धाभावो ज्ञेयः। द्वितीयो यथा वैधी हिंसा पापसाधनं हिंसात्वात्, क्रतुबाह्य-हिंसावदिति। हिंसात्वपापसाधनत्वयोः सम्बन्धे निषिद्धत्वस्यो-पाधेः सत्त्वात्। साध्यव्यापकत्वे सति साधनाव्यापक उपाधिरिति उपाधिलक्षणम्। यत्राधर्मसाधनत्वं तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति साध्य-व्यापकता। यत्र हिंसात्वं तत्र निषिद्धत्वमिति नास्ति। पक्षे हिंसात्वस्य सत्त्वेऽपि निषिद्धत्वस्याभावात्। ननु उपाधिः कथं दोष इति चेदित्थम्। उपाधिर्व्यभिचारोन्नायकत्वेन प्रति-पक्षोन्नायकत्वेन वा दोषो भवति। तत्र निषिद्धत्वं साधना-व्यापकत्वात्पक्षान्निवर्तमानं सत् साध्यव्यापकत्वात्स्वव्याप्यमधर्म-साधनत्वं निवर्तयद्धिंसात्वस्य साध्याभावसम्बन्धमापादयति। व्यापकनिवृत्तौ व्याप्यनिवृत्तेरावश्यकत्वात्। ततश्च पक्षस्यैव विपक्षत्वप्राप्त्या तत्र विद्यमानो हेतुरनैकान्तिको भवति। प्रतिपक्षोन्नायकत्वं त्वित्थम्। उपाधिः स्वयं पक्षाद्व्यावर्तमानः स्वव्याप्यं साध्यं व्यावर्तयति। ततश्चोपाध्यभावः साध्याभाव-साधने हेतुर्भवति। वैधी हिंसा अधर्मसाधनं न भवति अनिषिद्धत्वात् भोजनवदिति। एवं च सोपाधिकत्वाद्धिंसात्वं व्याप्यत्वासिद्धमिति ज्ञेयम्।

उपाधिश्चतुर्विधः। केवलसाध्यव्यापकः, पक्षधर्मावच्छिन्न-साध्यव्यापकः, साधनधर्मावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापकः, उदासीनधर्मा-

वच्छिन्न-साध्यव्यापकत्वेति। आद्यो यथा—पर्वतो धूमवानग्निमत्त्वादित्यत्रार्द्रेन्धनसंयोग उपाधिः। द्वितीयो यथा—वायुः प्रत्यक्षः प्रत्यक्षस्पर्शाश्रयत्वादित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपत्वम्। अत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वं पक्षधर्मः। अत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वस्य केवलसाध्यव्यापकत्वं नास्ति। गुणादौ प्रत्यक्षत्वसद्भावेऽपि उद्भूतरूपवत्त्वाभावात्। अतो द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नेत्युक्तम्। तथाप्यात्मनि न साध्यव्यापकता। अतो बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नेत्युक्तम्। तृतीयो यथा—गर्भस्थः श्यामो भवितुमर्हति मैत्रीतनयत्वादित्यत्र मैत्रीतनयत्वावच्छिन्न-श्यामत्वव्यापकं शाकपाकजत्वम्। अत्रापि शाकपाकजत्वस्य केवलसाध्यव्यापकत्वं नास्ति। घटादौ श्यामत्वसद्भावेऽपि शाकपाकजत्वाभावात्। अतो मैत्रीतनयत्वावच्छिन्नेत्युक्तम्। चतुर्थो यथा—परमाणुरूपं प्रत्यक्षं प्रमेयत्वात् घटवदित्यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्न-प्रत्यक्षत्वव्यापकमुद्भूतरूपवत्त्वम्। अत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वमुदासीनो धर्मः। अस्य पक्षधर्मत्वाभावात् साधनत्वाभावाच्च। अत्र यत्र प्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपत्वम् इति साध्यव्यापकता नास्ति। गुणादौ व्यभिचारात्। अतो बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नेत्युक्तम्। तथा च यत्र बहिर्द्रव्यत्वावच्छिन्नप्रत्यक्षत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपवत्त्वमिति साध्यव्यापकता ज्ञेया। यत्र प्रमेयत्वं तत्रोद्भूतरूपमिति साधनव्यापकता नास्ति। पक्षे व्यभिचारात्। उपाधिलक्षणे तु साधनाव्यापक उपाधिरित्युक्ते शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वादित्यत्र घटत्वमुपाधिः स्यात्। कृतकत्ववति शब्दे घटत्वस्याभावात्। अत उक्तं साध्यव्यापकत्वे सतीति। साध्यव्यापक उपाधिरित्युक्ते धूमानुमाने द्रव्यत्वमुपाधिः स्यात्। अत उक्तं साधनाव्यापकेति।



साध्याभावव्याप्तो हेतुर्विरुद्धः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः कृतकत्वादिति। कृतकत्वं हि नित्यत्वाभावेनानित्यत्वेन व्याप्तम्। सव्यभिचारोऽनैकान्तिकः। स त्रिविधः। साधारणासाधारणानुपसंहारिभेदात्। तत्र साध्याभाववद्वृत्तिः साधारणानैकान्तिकः। पर्वतोऽग्निमान् प्रमेयत्वादिति। प्रमेयत्वस्य वह्न्यभाववति ह्रदे विद्यमानत्वात्। सर्वसपक्षविपक्षव्यावृत्तः पक्ष एव वर्तमानो हेतुरसाधारणानैकान्तिकः। भूर्नित्या गन्धवत्त्वादिति। गन्धवत्त्वं सर्वेभ्यो नित्येभ्योऽनित्येभ्यो व्यावृत्तं भूमात्रवृत्ति। अन्वयव्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तरहितोऽनुपसंहारि। यथा सर्वमनित्यं प्रमेयत्वादिति। अत्र सर्वस्यापि पक्षत्वात् दृष्टान्तो नास्ति। यस्य साध्याभावः प्रमाणेन निश्चितः स कालात्ययापदिष्टः। अयमेव बाधित इति चोच्यते। यथा सर्वं तेजोऽनुष्णं पदार्थत्वादित्यत्रानुष्णत्वं साध्यं तदभाव उष्णत्वं स्पार्शनप्रत्यक्षेण गृह्यत इति। साध्याभावसाधकं हेत्वन्तरं यस्य विद्यते स सत्प्रतिपक्षः। यथा शब्दो नित्यः श्रावणत्वात् शब्दत्ववत्। शब्दोऽनित्यः कार्यत्वाद्घटवदित्यनेन प्रतिबद्धत्वात्। अयमेव प्रकरणसम इति चोच्यते। तथोदाहरणरहिता उदाहरणवदवभासमाना उदाहरणाभासाः। ते चानेकप्रकाराः। तत्र साधर्म्योदाहरणे तावत्साध्यवैकल्यं यथा—मनोऽनित्यं मूर्तत्वात्। यन्मूर्तं तदनित्यं यथा परमाणुरिति। परमाणावनित्यत्वाभावात् साध्यवैकल्यम्। साधनवैकल्यं यथा अत्रैवानुमाने यथा कर्मेति। कर्मणोऽनित्यत्वेऽपि मूर्तत्वाभावात्। उभयवैकल्यं यथा—अस्मिन्नेवानुमाने यथाऽऽकाश इति। वैधर्म्योदाहरणे साध्याभाववैकल्यं यथा—तत्रैवानुमाने यथा कर्मेति। साधनाभाववैकल्यं यथा—तत्रैवानुमाने यदनित्यं न भवति तन्मूर्तं न

भवति यथा परमाणुरिति। उभयाभाववैकल्यं यथा—तस्मिन्नेवानुमाने यथा घट इति वदन्ति।

तदेतदसत्। केषाञ्चिददूषणत्वात्। केषाञ्चित्प्रमाणविरोधादिष्वन्तर्भावात्। केषाञ्चित् अदूषणत्वप्रकारः अन्तर्भावप्रकारश्च पद्धत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्यः। विस्तरभयान्नेहोच्यते। इति सर्वं समञ्जसम्। इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थपूज्यपादप्रदर्शितमार्गानुवर्तिन्यां प्रमाणचन्द्रिकायामनुमानपरिच्छेदः।

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# आगमपरिच्छेदः

श्रीवेदव्यासाय नमः। हरिः ॐ॥

अथागमो निरूप्यते। निर्दोषः शब्द आगमः। आगमाभासेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय निर्दोषेति। प्रत्यक्षादावतिव्याप्तिवारणाय शब्द इति। अबोधकत्वम्, विपरीतबोधकत्वम्, ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वम्, अप्रयोजनवत्त्वम्, अनभिमतप्रयोजनवत्त्वम्, अशक्यसाधनप्रतिपादनम्, लघूपाये सति गुरूपायोपदेशनमित्यादयः शब्ददोषाः। तत्राबोधकत्वं च द्वेधा। निरभिधेयत्वेन अन्वयाभावेन चेति। तत्राद्यस्योदाहरणं कचटतपानां जबगडदत्वादित्यादि। द्वितीयस्योदाहरणं गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति; कुण्डमजाजिनम्; दश दाडिमानि षडपूपा इत्यादि। विपरीतबोधकत्वस्योदाहरणं विमतं मिथ्या; शूद्राणां वेदाधिकारोऽस्ति ब्राह्मणानां नास्तीत्यादि। ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वस्योदाहरणं तु पुरस्तादादित्यः उदेति पश्चादस्तमेति। मधुरो गुडः; तिक्तं निम्बफलमित्यादि। न च प्रमाणान्तरसंवादस्य दार्ढ्यहेतुत्वेनेष्टत्वेन कथं ज्ञातज्ञापकत्वस्य दोषत्वमिति वाच्यम्। पूर्वप्रवृत्तप्रमाणेनाप्रामाण्यशङ्काकलङ्कितेनार्थानिर्णये तु उत्तरोत्तरप्रवृत्तप्रमाणानां तन्निर्णायकत्वेन दार्ढ्यहेतुत्वस्य तदर्थत्वात्। अप्रयोजनवत्त्वस्योदाहरणम्—

काकस्य कति वा दन्ताः मेषस्याण्डं कियत्पलम्।
कम्बले कति रोमाणि का वार्ता चोलमण्डले॥ इत्यादि।

अनभिमतप्रयोजनवत्त्वस्योदाहरणं विरक्तं प्रति वाणिज्योपदेश इत्यादि। अशक्यसाधन-प्रतिपादकत्वस्योदाहरणं मृतसुद्दिश्य मृतिहरहिममहीधरोत्तर-सानुसिद्धमृतसञ्जीवनीकथनादि। लघूपाये सति गुरूपायोपदेशनस्योदाहरणं नखेन जायमानं कार्यं कुठारेण कुर्विति; तृषितं प्रति गीर्वाणतरङ्गिणीतीरे कूपखननोपदेश इत्यादि।

शब्दः पदवाक्यात्मकः। विभक्त्यन्ता वर्णाः पदम्। जवगडदेत्यादिवर्णसमूहेऽतिव्याप्तिवारणाय विभक्त्यन्ता इति। आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासन्निधिमतां पदानां समूहो वाक्यम्। यस्य येन विना वाक्यार्थान्वयाननुभावकत्वं तस्य तेनाकाङ्क्षा। यथा घटमानयेत्यत्र क्रियापदस्य कर्मपदेन विना क्रियाकर्मभावान्वयबोधाजनकत्वमित्यानयपदस्य घटपदेन सहाकाङ्क्षा। अथवा पूर्वपदसञ्जाताकाङ्क्षापूरकत्वमाकाङ्क्षा। अतएव गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति न वाक्यम्, परस्परान्वयविरहात्। यद्यप्याकाङ्क्षा चेतनधर्मः तथापि अर्थास्तावत्स्वपदश्रोतुरन्योन्यविषयाकाङ्क्षाजनकत्वेन साकाङ्क्षा इत्युच्यन्ते। तत्प्रतिपादकत्वात्पदान्यपि साकाङ्क्षाणीत्युच्यन्ते। प्रतीतान्वयस्य प्रमाणादिविरोधाभावो योग्यता। यथा जलेन सिञ्चतीत्यत्र जलसेचनयोः कार्यकारणभावसंसर्गस्याबाधितत्वात् सेचनस्य जलेन सहान्वयो योग्यता। अत एवाग्निना सिञ्चतीति न वाक्यम्। योग्यताविरहात्। न ह्यग्निसेचनयोः परस्परान्वययोग्यतास्ति। अविलम्बेनोच्चरितत्वं सन्निधिः। यथाऽव्यवधानेनोच्चरितानि गामानयेत्यादिपदानि सन्निधिमन्ति। अतएव प्रहरे प्रहरेऽसहोच्चरितानि गामानयेत्यादीनि न वाक्यम्। सन्निध्यभावात्।

अत्र वाक्यं करणम्, पदार्थस्मृतिरवान्तरव्यापारः वाक्यार्थज्ञानं



फलम्। आगमोऽपि शक्तिग्रहादिसंयुतः सम्यक् श्रुत एवार्थस्य बोधको न प्रत्यक्षवत्सत्तामात्रेण। आगमस्यानुमानवत् ज्ञातकरणत्वात्। अन्यथा आगमस्य स्वरूपतः सत्त्वेऽपि तदश्राविणः श्रवणेऽप्यगृहीतसङ्गतिकस्य वा पुंसः स्वार्थप्रमापकत्वापत्तेः।

गवादिपदानां जातावेव शक्तिः विशेषणतया जातेः प्रथममुपस्थितत्वात्। व्यक्तिलाभस्त्वाक्षेपादिति केचित्। जातिविशिष्टा व्यक्तयो वाच्याः। अत्र जातिशब्दः शब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तपरः। तथा चाकाशादयः सर्वेऽपि शब्दाः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तविशिष्टवस्तुवाचिन इत्यपरे। घटादिशब्देषु जातिः, देवदत्तादिसंज्ञाशब्देषु व्यक्तिः, सास्नादिमच्छब्देषु आकृतिः, गवादिशब्देषु त्रितयमपीत्येके। वस्तुतस्तु यस्माच्छब्दाद्झटिति यावन्तोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते तावन्तस्तच्छब्दवाच्याः। सादृश्यं तु शक्तिग्रहे प्रत्यासत्तिरूपम्। यथा घटशब्देन घटघटत्वयोः प्रतीयमानत्वात् स शब्दः तत्र शक्तः। शुक्लशब्दः गुणगुणिनोः शक्तः। गतशब्दः क्रियातदाश्रययोः, दण्डिशब्दो देवदत्तदण्डयोः शक्त इत्यादि द्रष्टव्यम्। यद्वा गवादिपदानां विशिष्टतया व्यक्तय एव वाच्याः। आनयादिकं तु विशेषणत्वादिना वाच्यम्। गामानयेत्यादौ सर्वत्रानयनादेः व्यक्तावेव सम्भवेन विशिष्टतया व्यक्तावेव शक्तिकल्पनात्।

शक्तिग्रहश्चाङ्गुलिप्रसारणादिपूर्वकनिर्देशेनैव भवति। तथा हि मातुः पितुर्वा अङ्के स्थितं बालमन्यमनस्कं सन्तमङ्गुलिप्रसारणछोटिकावादनाभ्यां स्ववचनश्रवणाभिमुखं मात्राद्यभिमुखं च विधाय यदा व्युत्पादयिता वाक्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते बाल तवेयं माता तव पितायं ते भ्रातायं कदलीफलमभ्यवहरतीत्यादि। तदा तेन निर्देशेनैव तस्य शब्दसमुदायस्य तस्मिन्नर्थसमुदाये वाच्यवाचकभावसम्बन्धं तावत्सामान्यतोऽवगच्छति बालः इदमनेनार्थं

बोधयतीति। पुनरियं ते स्वसा, अयं ते सखाऽयं भ्रातेत्यादिप्रयोगान्तरेषु शब्दार्थयोरावापोद्वापाभ्यां शब्दभेदादिकमवगम्य मातापित्रादिपदानां जनन्यादौ विशेषतो वाचकत्वमवगच्छतीति।

अपरे तु शक्तिग्रहस्य वृद्धव्यवहारात्। तथा हि व्युत्पित्सुर्बालो गामानयेत्युत्तमवृद्धवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरं मध्यमवृद्धस्य प्रवृत्तिमुपगम्य गवानयनं दृष्ट्वा मध्यमवृद्धप्रवृत्तिजनकज्ञानस्य अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां वाक्यजन्यत्वं निश्चित्य अश्वमानय गां बधानेति वाक्यान्तरे आवापोद्वापाभ्यां गोपदस्य गोव्यक्तौ शक्तिः अश्वपदस्य अश्वव्यक्तौ शक्तिरिति व्युत्पद्यत इत्याहुः। तन्न। शब्दस्मरणशीलस्य बालस्य एतदानयनपर्यन्तं शब्दानुसन्धानाद्यनुपपत्तेः।

वृत्तिर्द्विविधा। मुख्याऽमुख्या चेति। तत्र शक्तिर्मुख्या वृत्तिः। अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलपदार्थसम्बन्धः शक्तिः। सा च समयसङ्गतिसङ्केतवाचकत्वादिभिर्व्यवह्रियते। सा शक्तिस्त्रिविधा। योगः रूढिः योगरूढिश्चेति। तत्रावयवशक्तिर्योगः। समुदायशक्तौ रूढिः। उभयशक्तिर्योगरूढिः। तत्र केचन शब्दा योगेनैवार्थबोधकाः। ते च पाचकपाठकदण्डिकुण्डल्यादयः। केचन रूढ्यैवार्थबोधकाः। ते च घटपटादयः। केचन उभाभ्यामर्थप्रत्यायकाः। ते च पङ्कजादयः। एवमन्या अपि महायोगाद्याः मुख्यवृत्तयो ज्ञेयाः। लक्षणा त्वमुख्या वृत्तिः। शक्यसम्बन्धो लक्षणा। सा द्विविधा जहल्लक्षणा अजहल्लक्षणा चेति। यत्र वाच्यार्थस्यान्वयाभावः तत्र जहल्लक्षणा। यथा गङ्गायां घोष इत्यादौ। यत्र वाच्यार्थस्याप्यन्वयः तत्राजहल्लक्षणा। यथा छत्रिणो यान्तीत्यादौ। सा पुनर्द्विविधा। प्रयोजननिरपेक्षा प्रयोजनसापेक्षा चेति। तत्राद्या यथा मार्गोऽचलतीति। इयं



प्रयोजनाभावेऽपि प्रतीयमानत्वात् रूढलक्षणेत्युच्यते। द्वितीया यथा गङ्गायां घोष इति। इयं च पावित्र्यादिप्रयोजनापेक्षया प्रवर्तमानत्वात्केवललक्षणेत्युच्यते। मुख्यार्थानुपपत्तिर्लक्षणाबीजम्। एवमन्या अपि गौण्याद्या अमुख्या वृत्तयो ज्ञेयाः।

आगमो द्विविधः। अपौरुषेयः पौरुषेयश्चेति। तत्रापौरुषेयः ऋगादिसदागमाः। पौरुषेयो भारतादिसदागमाः। तदुक्तम्

आगमो द्विविधो ज्ञेयो नित्योऽनित्यस्तथैव च।
ऋगाद्या भारतं चैव पञ्चरात्रमथाखिलम्।
मूलरामायणं चैव पुराणं च तदात्मकम्॥
*ये चानुयायिनस्त्वेषां सर्वे ते च सदागमाः।
दुरागमास्तदन्ये ये ते न ज्ञेया जनार्दन इति॥

ननु वेदः पौरुषेयो वाक्यसमूहत्वात् कालिदासादिवाक्यवदिति चेन्न। श्रूयमाणकर्तृकत्वस्योपाधित्वात्। ननु वेदो न प्रमाणम्। तदनुष्ठानेऽपि फलानुपलम्भात्, विप्रलम्भकवाक्यवदिति चेन्न। वेदः प्रमाणमेव अपौरुषेयवाक्यत्वात् व्यतिरेके पौरुषवाक्यवदिति युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात्। न चासिद्धिः। वाचा विरूपनित्ययेत्यादिश्रुतेः अनादिनिधना नित्या वागुत्सृष्टा स्वयम्भुवेति स्मृतेश्च। न च फलविसंवादादप्रामाण्यम्। अधिकारिणां फलोपलम्भेन तदनुपलम्भस्य कर्तृवैगुण्यादिनिमित्तकत्वादिति। नन्वागमो न प्रमाणं निर्विषयत्वात्। विप्रलम्भकवाक्यवत्। तथा हि। विषयो द्विविधः अपरोक्षः - परोक्षश्चेति। तत्राद्यः प्रत्यक्षस्य विषयः।

* मुद्रितपुस्तके पाठस्तु अस्पष्टार्थकः। अस्माभिः यथाबुद्धि परिशोध्य स्थापितः। ग्रन्थान्तरसंवादाद् यथास्थितः पाठो निर्णेतव्यः।

*न चातिरिक्तं विषयमीक्षामहे येन विषयेणागमः प्रमाणं स्यात्। यद्यप्यागमः परोक्षज्ञानजनकः तथापि लब्धस्य ज्ञापकस्य सिद्धसाधकस्य मानान्तरविषये प्रवर्तमानत्वादप्रामाण्यम्। एवं सर्वोऽप्यागमः असङ्कीर्णविषयाभावादप्रमाणमिति चेन्न। यथाऽपरोक्षविषयत्वाविशेषेऽपि श्रोत्रादिविषयासङ्कीर्णविषयसिद्धये चक्षुरादेः प्रामाण्यमवर्जनीयं तद्वत्परोक्षविषयत्वाविशेषेऽपि अनुमानविषयासङ्कीर्ण-स्वर्गापवर्गादिगतविषयविशेषसिद्धये आगमप्रामाण्यस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्। न हि स्वर्गापवर्गादिगतो विशेषोऽनुमानवेद्यः येनागमस्य निर्विषयत्वं स्यात्। अन्यथा परोक्षविषयत्वादागम एव प्रमाणम्। अनुमानं तु निर्विषयत्वादप्रमाणमेवेति स्यादिति।

आगमोऽनुमान एवान्तर्भवतीति वैशेषिकाः। तदसत्। व्याप्त्याद्यननुसन्धानेऽपि वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेरनुभवसिद्धत्वात्। अपौरुषेयः पृथक् प्रमाणं पौरुषेयस्त्वनुमानमिति †भास्करः। तदप्यसत्। उभयत्र वाक्यार्थबोधकाकाङ्क्षायोग्यतादिसामग्रीसाम्ये सति विशेषकल्पकाभावात्। तदेवं वर्णितानि त्रीणि प्रमाणानि। एतेभ्योऽन्यन्न प्रमाणम्।

नन्वर्थापत्तिरपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति। अनुपपद्यमानार्थदर्शनात्तदुपपादके बुद्धिरर्थापत्तिः। जीवंश्चैत्रो गृहे नास्तीति श्रुते दृष्टे वा चैत्रस्य बहिस्सत्त्वं कल्प्यते। जीवतो गृहेऽसत्त्वं बहिर्भावं विना नोपपद्यते। अतो गृहेऽसत्त्वान्यथा-

* अन्योऽनुमानस्य विषय इत्येवं पाठः अपेक्ष्यते। लिपिकरप्रमादात् पाठभ्रंशः सञ्जात इत्युत्प्रेक्षामहे।

† प्रभाकरः (?)



नुपपत्तिप्रसूतार्थापत्तिरेव बहिःसत्त्वे प्रमाणम्। तच्च प्रत्यक्षादिभ्यो भिन्नम्। बहिर्भावस्य प्रत्यक्षाद्यविषयत्वात्। मैवम्, अर्थापत्तेरनुमान एवान्तर्भावात्। चैत्रो बहिरस्ति जीवत्वे सति गृहेऽसत्त्वात्। यो जीवन् यत्र नास्ति स ततोऽन्यत्रास्ति यथाहमित्यनुमानेनैव बहिर्भावस्य प्रतीयमानत्वान्नार्थापत्तेः पृथक्कल्पनया। मृते व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तं गृहे विद्यमाने देवदत्ते व्यभिचारवारणाय विशेष्यभाग इति ध्येयम्।

नन्वुपमानमपि पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति। अतिदेशवाक्यार्थस्मरणसहकृतगोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डज्ञानमुपमानम्। तथाहि कश्चिद् गवयशब्दार्थमजानन्कुतश्चिदारण्यकात्पुरुषाद्गोसदृशो गवय इत्यतिदेशवाक्यं श्रुत्वा वनगतस्तद्वाक्यार्थं स्मरन् गोसादृश्यविशिष्टपिण्डं पश्यति। तदनन्तरमयं गवयशब्दवाच्य इति प्रमितिरुत्पद्यते। इयं तु प्रत्यक्षाद्यजन्यत्वात् प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानाख्यमाक्षिपतीति। तन्न, उपमानस्याप्यनुमान एवान्तर्भावात्। यथा विमतो गवयशब्दवाच्यः अगोत्वे सति गोसदृशत्वाद्व्यतिरेकेण घटवत्। गोसदृशे गवान्तरे व्यभिचारवारणाय सत्यन्तम्। घटादौ व्यभिचारवारणाय विशेष्यमिति।

नन्वभावाख्यं पृथक् प्रमाणमस्ति। तच्चाभावग्रहणायाङ्गीकरणीयम्। तथा हि घटाद्यनुपलब्ध्या घटाभावो निश्चीयते। अनुपलब्धिश्चोपलब्ध्यभाव इति। अभावग्रहणेन घटाभावो गृह्यत इति चेन्न। तयोरन्यत्रान्तर्भावात्। तथा हि अभावज्ञानकारणमभावप्रमाणम्। तत्रेदानीं कौरवाद्यभावो भारतादवगम्यते देवदत्तस्य, चक्षुराद्यभावः विमतश्चक्षूरहितः अरूपज्ञत्वादित्यनुमानगम्यः। सुखाद्यभावप्रमितिस्तु साक्षिप्रत्यक्षेणैव गम्या। पुरोवर्तिघटाद्यभावप्रतीतिस्तु झटिति जायमाना

प्रत्यक्षफलमेव। न त्वनुपलब्धिमात्रजन्या अपरोक्षज्ञान-त्वात्। अनुपलब्धिस्त्ववर्जनीयसन्निधिरिव। अनुपलब्धेरवर्जनीय-सन्निधित्वमात्रेण पृथक्प्रमाणत्वे भावोपलब्धावभावानु-पलब्धिरपि प्रमाणं स्यात्। यत्र त्वन्धकारे हस्तप्रसारणादिरूप-परामर्शेन घटाभावं प्रत्येति तदानुपलब्धिस्तत्त्वेन न तत्कारणम्। किन्तु *लिङ्गत्वेनैव। घटोऽत्र नास्ति योग्यत्वे सत्यनुपलभ्य-मानत्वान्नरशृङ्गवदिति। नन्वभावस्यापीन्द्रियेण सन्निकर्षानुप-पत्तेर्न तज्ज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षफलत्वमिति चेन्न। भाववदभावस्यापि इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षे बाधकाभावात्।

ननु सम्भवादीन्यपि पृथक् प्रमाणानि सन्ति। मैवम्। तेषामप्युक्तेष्वन्तर्भावात्। तथाहि अल्पप्रमासाधनं बहुलज्ञानं सम्भवः। यथा शतमस्तीति ज्ञाने पञ्चाशज्ज्ञानम्। तदनुमान एवान्तर्भवति। देवदत्तः पञ्चाशद्वान् शतवत्त्वात् यथाहमिति प्रयोगसम्भवात्। प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे परिशिष्यमाणे बुद्धिः परिशेषः। स द्विविधः। विधिमुखो निषेधमुखश्च। तत्राद्यो यथा। चैत्रमैत्रयोरयं चैत्र इत्युक्तेऽन्यस्मिन्मैत्रप्रमा। द्वितीयो यथा। नायं चैत्र इत्युक्ते तस्मिन्मैत्रप्रमेति। इयमप्यनु-मानजन्या। विमतो मैत्रः चैत्रमैत्रयोरन्यतरत्वे सति अचैत्रत्वात् व्यतिरेकेण चैत्रवदिति प्रयोगोपपत्तेः। घटादौ व्यभिचार-वारणाय सत्यन्तम्। उपक्रमादीन्यपि अनुमानादीन्येव। एतेषां वाक्यतात्पर्यानुमापकत्वात्। अनिर्दिष्टवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यं ऐतिह्यम्। यथात्र वटे पिशाचोऽस्तीति वाक्यम्। तदागम एव। एवमन्यानि शाकुनलिपिचेष्टादीन्यपि प्रमाणान्युक्तेष्वन्तर्भाव्यानि।

* लिङ्गेनैव इति तु मुद्रितपुस्तके पाठः।



अथ प्रामाण्यं निरूप्यते। प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वं द्विविधम्। उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ चेति। तत्रोत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वं नाम ज्ञानकारणमात्र-जन्यत्वम्। येन ज्ञानं जायते तेनैव तद्गतं प्रामाण्यं जायत इति। ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वं नाम ज्ञानग्राहकमात्रग्राह्यत्वम्। येन ज्ञानं गृह्यते तेनैव तद्गतप्रामाण्यमपि गृह्यत इति। अप्रामाण्यस्य परतस्त्व-मपि द्विविधम्। उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ चेति। तत्रोत्पत्तौ परतस्त्वं नाम ज्ञानकारणातिरिक्तकारणजन्यत्वम्। ज्ञप्तौ परतस्त्वं नाम ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्त-ग्राह्यत्वमिति वस्तुस्थितिः। तत्र ज्ञानानां प्रामाण्यमप्रामाण्यं च उत्पत्तौ ज्ञप्तौ च स्वत एवेति साङ्ख्या मन्यन्ते। उभयं परत एवेति नैयायिकाः। तत्र ज्ञानमिन्द्रियादिजन्यम्। प्रामाण्यं पुनरिन्द्रियादिगुणजन्यम्। तथा अप्रामाण्यं तद्दोष-जन्यम्। एवं ज्ञानं मानसप्रत्यक्षवेद्यम्। तत्प्रामाण्यज्ञानं च संवादविसंवादादिलिङ्गजन्यमिति। प्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं गुणः। अप्रमाऽसाधारणकारणं दोषः। प्रामाण्यं परतोऽप्रामाण्यं स्वत इति बौद्धाः। वस्तुतस्तु इन्द्रियादिनैव ज्ञानं प्रामाण्यं चोत्पद्यते। अप्रामाण्यं तु दोषसहकृतेन्द्रियादिभिरुत्पद्यते। तथा ज्ञानं तत्प्रामाण्यं च साक्षिणैव ज्ञायते। अप्रमाणज्ञान-स्वरूपमात्रं साक्षिवेद्यम्। तदप्रामाण्यं तु विसंवादादिनानुमेय-मिति। ननु ज्ञानग्राहकमात्रेणैतत्प्रामाण्यग्रहणं कारणानां तु ज्ञानजनकत्वशक्तिरेव स्वकारणासादितप्रामाण्यजनकत्वशक्तिः*।

* स्वकारणासादिताप्रामाण्यजनकत्वशक्तिरिति पाठो मुद्रितपुस्तके प्रमाणपद्धतौ चोपलभ्यते। स च प्रामादिकः। अस्मदुत्प्रेक्षितपाठस्यैव साधीयस्त्वं "तथा च ज्ञानजनकत्वशक्तिप्रामाण्यजनकत्व शक्त्योरेकत्वमेव कारणप्रामाण्यस्योत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वमिति भावः" इति जनार्दनभट्टटीकातः समर्थ्यते।

अप्रामाण्यजनने तु दोषवशादन्या शक्तिर्भवतीति। ज्ञप्तिस्तु* परत एव। इन्द्रियादिस्वरूपस्य यथायथं† प्रमाणवेद्यत्वात्। ‡यथार्थज्ञानसाधनत्वस्याप्यनुमानवेद्यत्वादित्येतत् कुतः। ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तग्राह्यत्वे किं बाधकमिति चेन्न। तथात्वेऽनवस्थानात्। तथा हि प्रामाण्यं तावदवश्यं केनचित् प्रमाणेन ज्ञातव्यं अन्यथा तदभावप्रसङ्गात्। न च ज्ञानग्राहकातिरिक्तेन तद्ग्रहणं सम्भवति। तत्प्रामाण्यस्याप्यन्येन ग्रहणाङ्गीकारेऽनवस्थानात्। तस्य स्वतस्त्वे प्रथमस्यैव तथात्वाङ्गीकारोपपत्तेः। अतः परिशेषात् प्रामाण्यस्य स्वतस्त्वसिद्धिः। न च साक्षिवेद्यत्वेऽप्यनवस्थानप्रसङ्गः समान इति वाच्यम्। साक्षी स्वयम्प्रकाशः स्वात्मानं स्वप्रामाण्यं च गोचरयतीत्यङ्गीकारात्। ज्ञानस्यैव तथाभावोऽभ्युपगम्यतामिति चेन्न। अन्तःकरणवृत्तेर्ज्ञानस्य जडत्वेन स्वयम्प्रकाशत्वायोगादिति। करणप्रामाण्यं तु परत्युक्तरीत्या ज्ञातव्यमिति सर्वं रमणीयम् ॥ श्रीः ॥

इति श्रीमज्जयतीर्थाचार्यविरचितायां प्रमाण-
चन्द्रिकायामागमपरिच्छेदः समाप्तः।
श्रीवेदव्यासः प्रीयताम् ॥

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* करणप्रामाण्यस्येति शेषः।

† स्वप्रमाणवेद्यत्वादिति पञ्चम्या पाठः।

‡ इन्द्रियादिग्राहकानुमानातिरिक्तानुमानवेद्यत्वादित्यर्थः। इदं च प्रामाण्यस्य ज्ञप्तौ परतस्त्वकथनं करणस्य करणग्राहकमात्रग्राह्यत्वरूपं स्वतस्त्वं नेत्यभिप्रेत्य। अतएव सुधायां 'करणानां तु ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वं नास्त्येव' इत्यादिना अनौचित्यमुक्त्वा "अथवा ज्ञानजनकत्वं येन गृह्यते तत एव यथार्थज्ञानजनकत्वस्य तदीयस्य ग्राह्यत्वं स्वतस्त्वम्" इति पक्षान्तरमुक्तम्" इति जनार्दनटीका मूलग्रन्थाभिप्रायं विशदयन्ती अनुसन्धेया।